The battle of the Falkland Islands

THE BATTLE
FALKLAND ISLANDS

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THE BATTLE OF THE
FALKLAND ISLANDS

Digitized by the Internet Archive

in 2008 with funding from

Microsoft Corporation

http://www.archive.org/details/battleoffalklandOOspen

The Battle of the
Falkland Islands

Before and After

By

Commander H. Spencer-Cooper

With Coloured Frontispiece
and Ten Maps and Charts

CASSELL AND COMPANY, LTD

London, New York, Toronto and Melbourne

1919

Zo tbc Aftemors

of the

Officers and Men

of the Royal Navy and the Royal Naval Reserve

who so gallantly gave their lives in the actions
described in this book

CONTENTS

Part I.— Exploits off South America

MAPTEK

i. German Men-of-War in Foreign Seas

2. The Policy of Admiral Count von Spee

3. British Men-of-War off South America

4. Life at Sea in 1914 ....

5. The Sinking of the "Cap Trafalgar"

6. The Action off Coronel .

7. Concentration .....

8. Possibilities and Probabilities

3
13
19
28

35
45
60
67

Part II.— The Battle of the Falkland's

9. Away South .....

10. Enemy in Sight .....

11. The Battle-Cruiser Action

12. The End of the "Leipzig"

13. The Sinking of the "Nurnberg"

14. Aftermath ......

15. The Psychology of the Sailor in Action
if). Vow Spee's Aims and Hot

17. The Parting of im. w \ .

18. THE Last of- ti i i "DRESDEN"

79

87
96

no
124

134
141

151

158

[63

viii Contents

Part III. — Official Dispatches

CHAPTER PAGE

i. The Action of H.M.S. "Carmania" . . 169

2. The Action off Coronel by H.M.S. "Glasgow" 172

3. Report by Vice-Admiral Count von Spee 174

4. The Battle of the Falkland Islands . 178

5. The Surrender of the " Dresden " . . 194

Appendix

A List of the Officers serving in the

Actions Recorded ..... 197

Index 221

MAPS AND CHARTS

The War Zone in Western Seas .

Chart of Course in " Carmania " — " Cap Trafalgar "

Duel ........

The Coronel Action : Position when Enemy

Sighted

The Coronel Action : Position at Sunset .
Chart of " Cornwall " Action {Inset) .
Chart of Battle-Cruiser Action {Inset)
Stanley Harbour : Positions of Warships .
Battle of the Falklands : Positions at 1.20 p.m
Battle of the Falklands : Positions at 2.45 p.m
Duel between " Kent " and " Nurnberg " .

PAGE

5

39

49
5i
79
79
83
94
112
127

INTRODUCTION

This plain, unvarnished account, so far as is known, is
the first attempt that has been made to link with the
description of the Falkland Islands battle, fought on
December 8th, 1914, the events leading up to that
engagement.

In order to preserve accuracy as far as possible,
each phase presented has been read and approved by
officers who participated. The personal views expressed
on debatable subjects, such as strategy, are sure to
give rise to criticism, but it must be remembered that
at the time of writing the exact positions of the ships
engaged in overseas operations were not fully known,
even in the Service.

The subject falls naturally into three divisions :

Part I. deals briefly with the movements of British
and German warships, and includes the duel fought by
the Carmania, and the action that took place off Coronel.

PART EI. describes the Falkland Islands battle itself,
and thu subsequent fate of the German cruiser Dresden.

Part III. contains the official dispatches bearing on
these exploits.

The words of Alfred Noyes have been referred to
frequently, because they arc in so many respects pro-

xii Introduction

phetic, and also because of their influence in showing
that the spirit of Drake still inspires the British Navy
of to-day.

The author takes this opportunity of expressing his
warmest thanks to those who have helped him in
collecting information and in the compilation of this
book.

Part I
EXPLOITS OFF SOUTH AMERICA

' Meekly content and tamely stay-at-home
The sea-birds seemed that piped across the waves ;
And Drake, bemused, leaned smiling to his friend
Doughty and said, ' Is it not strange to know
When we return, yon speckled herring-gulls
Will still be wheeling, dipping, flashing there ?
We shall not find a fairer land afar
Than Ihose thyme-scented hills we leave behind !
Soon the young lambs will bleat across the combes,
And breezes will bring puffs of hawthorn scent
Down Devon lanes ; over the purple moors
Lav'rocks will carol ; and on the village greens
Around the maypole, while the moon hangs low,
The boys and girls of England merrily swing
In country footing through the flowery dance.' "

—ALFRED NOYES [Drake).

THE BATTLE OF THE
FALKLAND ISLANDS

CHAPTER I

GERMAN MEN-OF-WAR IN FOREIGN SEAS

" I, my Lords, have in different countries seen much of the miseries
of war. I am, therefore, in my inmost soul, a man of peace. Yet
I would not, for the sake of any peace, however fortunate, consent to
sacrifice one jot of England's honour." — (Speech by Lord Nelson in the
House of Lords, November i6lh, 1802.)

We are now approaching the end of the third year of
this great war,* and most Englishmen, having had some
of the experience that war inevitably brings with it,
will agree that the words which Nelson spoke are as
true to-day as when tiny were uttered just over a cen-
tury ago. Furthermore, as time and the war go on,
the spirit of the whole British nation — be it man or
woman — is put to an ever-increasing test of endur-
ance, which is sustained and upheld by those two simple
words, " England's Honour." An old platitude, " Might
is Right," is constantly being quoted; but the nation
that reverses the order is bound to outlast the other
win through to the desired goal. The justness
of the cause, then, is the secret of our strength, which

• S'nie. — This book was completed in May, 1917. but was withheld from
publication on account of the many omissions prescribed by the Naval Censor.

4 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

will not only endure but bring success to our arms in
the end.

When Great Britain plunged into this Armageddon
on August 4th, 1914, the only German squadron not
in European waters was stationed in the Western Pacific,
with its main base at Tsingtau. In addition there were
a few German light cruisers isolated in various parts of
the world, many of them being in proximity to British
squadrons, which would point to the fact that Germany
never really calculated on Great Britain throwing in
her lot on the opposite side.

The recent troubles in Mexico accounted for the
presence of both British and German cruisers in those
waters, where they had been operating in conjunction
with one another in the most complete harmony. As
an instance, it might be mentioned that on August 2nd,
1914, one of our sloops was actually about to land a
guard for one of our Consulates at a Mexican port in
the boats belonging to a German light cruiser !

A short description of some of the movements of
the German ships during the first few months of war
will suffice to show that their primary object was to
damage our overseas trade as much as possible. Further,
since it is the fashion nowadays to overrate Germany's
powers of organisation and skill, it will be interesting to
observe that in spite of the vulnerability of our world-
wide trade comparatively little was achieved.

The German squadron in China was under the com-
mand of Vice-Admiral Count von Spee. The outbreak

German Men-of-War in Foreign Seas 5

of war found him on a cruise in the Pacific, which ulti-
mately extended far beyond his expectations. The
two armoured cruisers Scharnhorst — in which Admiral
von Spee flew his flag — and Gneisenau left Nagasaki on

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THE WAR ZONE IN WBSTERN SEAS

June 28th, 1914. Their movements southward are of
no particular interest until their arrival on July 7th
at the Truk or Rug Islands, in the Caroline group,
which then belonged to Germany. After a few days
they leisurely continued their cruise amongst the

6 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

islands of Polynesia. About the middle of the month the
light cruiser Number g was hastily recalled from San
Francisco, and sailed on July 21st, joining von Spee's
squadron at Ponape (also one of the Caroline Islands),
where the three ships mobilised for war. On August 6th
they sailed for an unknown destination, taking with them
an auxiliary cruiser called the Titania.

Apparently they were somewhat short of provisions,
particularly of fresh meat and potatoes, for it was said
in an intercepted letter that their diet consisted mainly
of " spun yarn " (preserved meat).

On August 22nd the Niimberg was sent to Honolulu
to get papers and to send telegrams, rejoining the
squadron shortly afterwards. A day or two later she
was again detached, this time to Fanning Island, where
she destroyed the British cable station, cut the cable,
rejoining the squadron about September 7th, apparently
at Christmas Island. Hearing that hostile forces were
at Apia (Samoan Islands), von Spee sailed southward
only to find, on his arrival, that it was empty of
shipping.

The squadron now proceeded eastward to the French
Society Islands to see what stores were to be found
there. Completing supplies of coal at Bora Bora Island,
it suddenly appeared off Papeete, the capital of Tahiti,
on September 22nd. A French gunboat lying in the
harbour was sunk by shell-fire, the town and forts were
subjected to a heavy bombardment, whilst the coal stores
were set on fire. Calling in later at the Marquesas Islands,
the German Admiral shaped his course eastward toward
Easter Island, which was reached on October 12th.

German Men-of-War in Foreign Seas 7

The light cruiser Leipzig sailed from Mazatlan, an
important town on the west coast of Mexico, on August
2nd. Ten days later she was reported off the entrance
to Juan de Fuca Straits, between Vancouver and the
mainland, but never ventured inside to attack the naval
dockyard of Esquimalt. When war broke out the
Canadian Government with great promptitude purchased
two submarines from an American firm at Seattle ; this
was probably known to the Germans, and might account
for their unwillingness to risk an attack on a port that
was otherwise practically defenceless.

The Canadian light cruiser Rainbow, together with
the British sloop Algerine, did excellent work on this
coast. The former, in particular, showed much zeal in
shadowing the Leipzig, though they never actually met.

The Leipzig achieved absolutely nothing worthy of
note, although she remained on the west coast of America
for a long time. It was not till the middle of October
that she joined Admiral von Spee's squadron at Easter
Island, without having caused any damage to the
British Mercantile Marine.

The light cruiser Dresden was at St. Thomas, one
of the larger of the Virgin Islands group, West Indies.
She sailed on August ist and proceeded straight to
Cape Horn, only staying her career to coal at various
places en route where she was unlikely to be reported.
Crossing and re-crossing the trade route, she arrived
on September 5th at Orange Bay, which is a large un-
inhabited Datura] harbour a few miles to the north-
west of Cape Horn. Here she was met by a collier,

8 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

and stayed eleven days making adjustments to her
engines. She evidently considered that she was now
free from danger — we had no cruisers here at this period
— for she continued her course into the Pacific, easing
down to a speed of 8| knots, and keeping more in the
track of shipping. She met the German gunboat Eber
on September 19th, to the northward of Magellan, and
continued her way, apparently on the look out for
allied commerce, but only succeeded in sinking two
steamers before joining the flag of Admiral von Spee
at Easter Island on October 12th. Altogether she sank
three steamers and four sailing vessels, representing a
total value of just over £250,000.

The light cruiser Karlsruhe, the fastest and most
modern of the German ships on foreign service, was in
the Gulf of Mexico at the commencement of the war.
On her way to her sphere of operations in the neighbour-
hood of Pernambuco she was sighted on August 6th,
whilst coaling at sea from the armed liner Kronprinz
Wilhelm, by the British cruiser Suffolk. Admiral Cradock,
who was then flying his flag in the Suffolk, immediately
gave chase to the Karlsruhe, the Kronprinz Wilhelm bolt-
ing in the opposite direction. During the forenoon
Admiral Cradock called up by wireless the light cruiser
Bristol, which was in the vicinity, and, giving her the
position of the Karlsruhe, ordered her to intercept the
enemy. The Karlsruhe was kept in sight by the Suffolk
for several hours, but was never within gun-range, and
finally escaped from her by superior speed. It was a
beautiful moonlight evening when the Bristol sighted her

German Men-of-War in Foreign Seas 9

quarry at S p.m., and a quarter of an hour later opened
fire, which was returned a few moments later by the
Karlsruhe, but it was too dark for either ship to see
the results of their shooting. All the enemy's shots fell
short, so that the Bristol incurred no damage. Both
ships went on firing for fifty-five minutes, by which
time the German had drawn out of range. Admiral
Cradock signalled during the action, " Stick to it — I am
coming " ; all this time the Suffolk was doing her best
to catch up, but never succeeded in reaching the scene
of the first naval action in the world-war. The German
disappeared in the darkness, and was never seen again
by our warships.

In her subsequent raids on British commerce along
the South Atlantic trade routes the Karlsruhe was, on
the whole, successful, until she met a sudden and in-
glorious end off Central America. Her fate was for a
long time shrouded in mystery, the first clue being
some of her wreckage, which was found washed up on
the shores of the island of St. Vincent in the West Indies.
Some of her survivors eventually found their way back
to the Fatherland and reported that she had foundered
with 260 officers and men — due to an internal explosion
on November 4th, 1914, in latitude io° 07' N., longitude
55° 25' W. (See Map p. 5)

In all she sank seventeen ships, representing a value
of £1,622,000.

There remain three German armed merchant cruisers
that claim our attention on account of their operations
off South America. The Cap Trafalgar only existed for

io The Battle of the Falkland Islands

a month before being sunk by the armed Cimard liner
Carmania. A description of the fight is given in a
subsequent chapter.

The Frinz Eitel Friedrich was more directly under the
orders of Admiral von Spee, and acted in conjunction
with his squadron in the Pacific until the battle of the
Falkland Islands, when she operated on her own account
against our trade with South America. She achieved
some measure of success during the few months that
she was free, and captured ten ships altogether, several
of which, however, were sailing vessels. Early in March
she arrived at Newport News in the United States with a
number of prisoners on board, who had been taken from
these prizes. She was badly in need of refit ; her
engines required repairs, and the Germans fondly imag-
ined that they might escape internment. On hearing
that one of her victims was an American vessel, public
indignation was hotly aroused and but little sympathy
was shown for her wants. Her days of marauding were
brought to an abrupt termination, for the Americans
resolutely interned her.

Lastly, there was the Kronprinz Wilhelm, which, as
we have seen, was in company with the Karlsruhe when
the latter was sighted and chased by the Suffolk only
two days after war was declared. She was commanded
by one of the officers of the Karlsruhe, and worked
under her orders in the Atlantic. In fact, the German
cruiser transferred two of her Q.F. guns to the armed
merchantman, and they were mounted on her forecastle.
She was skilful in avoiding our cruisers and literally
fed upon her captures, being fortunate in obtaining

German Men-of-War in Foreign Seas n

coal with fair frequency. In the course of eight
months the Kronprinz WUhelm captured and destroyed
fifteen British or French ships, four of which were
sailing vessels. It will be realised how small was
the toll of our ships sailing these seas, especially
when it is recollected that the main object of the Ger-
mans at this time was to make war on our maritime
trade. Finalfy, sickness broke out on board and there
were several cases of beriberi ; moreover, the ship
leaked and was in want of repairs, so on April nth
she also steamed into Newport News and was interned.
That the Germans did not approach the results they
hoped for in attacking our commerce was in a large
measure due to the unceasing activity of our cruisers,
who forced the German ships to be continually on the
move to fresh hunting grounds. Thus, although many
of them escaped capture or destruction for some time,
they were perpetually being disturbed and hindered
in their work of depredation.

The exploits of the light cruisers Emden and Konigs-
berg are outside the scope of this book, but the following
brief summary may be of interest.

Sailing from Tsingtau on August 5U1, with four
colliers, the Emden apparently proceeded to cruise in
the neighbourhood of Vladivostock, where she captured
.a Russian auxiliary cruiser and one <>r two merchant
-hi].- , before going south t<> make history in tin- r..i\
oi Bengal She was eventually brought i" book off

the I I land on November 9th, km 1. by the Aus

tralian light cruiser Sydney, in a very gallant action

12 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

which lasted over an hour and a half, when she ran
herself ashore in a sinking condition on North Keeling
Island. She sank seventeen ships all told, representing
a total value of £2,211,000.

The Konigsberg, at the commencement of hostilities,
was lying at Dar-es-Salaam, the capital of what was
formerly German East Africa. She sank the Pegasus,
a light cruiser only two-thirds of her size and of much
inferior armament, at Zanzibar on September 20th, but
only succeeded in sinking one or two steamers after-
wards. She was eventually discovered hiding in the
Rufiji Delta in German East Africa, towards the end of
October, 1914, where she was kept blocked up by our
ships for nearly nine months. Finally, on July nth,
1915, she was destroyed by gunfire by the monitors
Severn and Mersey, who went up the river — the banks
on both sides being entrenched — and reduced her to
a hopeless wreck where she lay, some fourteen miles
from the sea.

CHAPTER II

THE POLICY OF ADMIRAL COUNT VON SPEE

It is clearly impossible to state with any exactitude
the motives which governed von Spee's policy ; but,
in briefly reviewing the results, a shrewd idea of the
reasons which led him to certain conclusions may be
formed. Also, it will assist the reader to a conclusion
on the merits and demerits of the strategy adopted, and
will help him to follow more easily the reasons for some
of the movements of our own ships described in the
next chapter.

That Admiral von Spee did not return to Tsingtau
at the outbreak of hostilities appears significant, since
ho was by no means inferior to our squadron, and wished
to mobilise his ships. He, however, sent the Emden
there with dispatches and instructions to the colliers
about meeting him after she had escorted them to sea.
Japan, it will be remembered, did not declare war till
August 2 jrd, 1914, and therefore could scarcely have
come into his earlier calculations. His action in con-
tinuing his cruise in the Southern Pacific, where he
handy and ready to strike at the French colonies*
at the psychological moment of the outbreak of hostilities,
gives the impression that he did not consider England's
intervention probable.

• The German Chancellor bad publicly declared the intention to c.ipturr
the French colonies.

13

14 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

Previous to the war, the Leipzig and Numberg had
been detached to the West Coast of America, and it
appears likely that von Spee was influenced in his decision
to remain at large in the Pacific by this fact, as, before
this dispersal of his squadron, he would have been dis-
tinctly superior to the British Fleet in the China Station
at that time. Great care was taken by him to keep all
his movements secret, and he appears to have avoided
making many wireless signals.

The decision of the British Government to proceed
with operations against the German colonies in the
Southern Pacific must have had a determining effect
on German policy ; this decision was made at the very
outset and allowed the enemy no time to make pre-
parations to counter it. The value of the patriotism
and loyal co-operation of the Dominions in building up
their own Navy in peace time was now clearly demon-
strated, Australia being the first of our Dominions to
embark on this policy.

The German China squadron was inferior in strength
to our ships in Australian waters, and could not afford
to risk encountering the powerful battle-cruiser Aus-
tralia with her eight 12-inch guns ; consequently, von
Spee was compelled to abandon the many colonies in
Polynesia to their fate. Finally, the advent of Japan
into the conflict left him little choice but to make his
way to the eastward, since not to do so was to court
almost certain destruction, while to move west and
conceal his whereabouts was an impossibility. That
von Spee felt his position to be precarious, and had diffi-
culty in making up his mind what to do, is shown by

Policy of Admiral Count von Spee 15

the slow and indecisive movement of his squadron at
first.

The movements of the German light cruisers lead to
the conclusion that they must have received orders to
scatter so as to destroy our trade in various spheres.
The Leipzig apparently patrolled the western side of
North America, whilst the Karlsruhe took the South
Atlantic, and so on.

Why the Dresden should have steamed over 6,000
miles to the Pacific instead of assisting the Karlsruhe
is hard to explain, unless she had direct orders from
the German Admiralty. She could always have joined
von Spee later.

With the exception of the Emdcn, who operated with
success in the Bay of Bengal, and the Karlsruhe, whose
area of operations was along the junction of the South
Atlantic and the West Indian trade routes, none of them
succeeded in accomplishing a fraction of the damage
that might reasonably have been expected at a time
when our merchantmen were not organised for war and
business was " as usual." It cannot be denied that the
Emdcn s raid wholly disorganised the trade along the
east coast of India. The local moneylenders — who are
the bankers to the peasants — abandoned the coast com-
pleted, trade nearly came to a standstill, and the damage
>k months to recover. In this case the effects
could by no means be measured by an armchair calcu-
lation of the tonnage sunk by the Iimdcn in pounds,
shilling- and pence.

The main anxiety of the German Admiral lay in the
continuance of his supplies, which could only be assured

16 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

by careful organisation. This was rendered compara-
tively easy in South America, where every port teemed
with Germans ; the wheels of communication, through
the agency of shore wireless stations, were well oiled by
German money, and there were numerous German mer-
chantmen, fitted with wireless, ready to hand to be used
as supply ships or colliers.

It was thus of paramount importance that the Ger-
man Squadron should be rounded up and annihilated
before it could become a serious menace to our trade
and that of our Allies. The other remaining light
cruisers of the enemy, who were operating singly, could
be dealt with more easily, since our ships could afford
to separate in order to search for them, thus rendering
it only a matter of time before they were destroyed.

What was the object, then, of the German Admiral ?
This was the all-important question that occupied the
thoughts of all our naval officers in foreign parts. On
the assumption that he would come eastwards, there
appeared to be few choices open to him beyond the
following :

(i) To bombard the seaports of our colonies on the
west coast of Africa and to attack weakly defended
but by no means valueless naval stations (such as
St. Helena), at the same time operating against British
and French expeditions going by sea against German
colonies.

(2) To go to South Africa, destroy the weak British
squadron at the Cape, and hang up Botha's expedition
by supporting a rising against us in the South African
Dominions.

Policy of Admiral Count von Spee 17

(3) To endeavour to make his way home to Germany.

(4) To operate in the North Atlantic

(5) To harass our trade with South America.
Both the first and second appeared quite feasible,

but they had the twofold disadvantage of involving
actions nearer England and of very possibly restrict-
ing the enemy a good deal in his movements ; there
are few harbours on this coast, and his every movement
would become known in a region where we held the
monopoly in methods of communication. Consequently,
any success here was bound to be more or less short-
lived. On the other hand, matters were undoubtedly
very critical in these parts. De la Rey, when he was
shot, was actually on his way to raise the Vierkleur
at Potchefstroom, and any striking naval success which
it would have taken us three weeks to deal with at
the very least, might have just set the balance against
us at this time in the minds of the waverers. Moreover,
it would not have been difficult to ensure supplies from
the German colonies.

The third may be dismissed as being extremely
improbable at the outset, for it is difficult to run a
blockade with a number of ships, and, for the enemy,
it would too much have resembled thrusting his head
into the lion's jaws. Besides, he could be of far greater
service to his country in roaming the seas and in con-
tinuing to be a thorn in our side as long as possible.

The fourth will scarcely bear examination ; cut off
from all bases, he could hardly hope to escape early
<h -truction.

Ih- fifth seemed by far the most favourable '«' Ins

18 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

hopes, as being likely to yield a richer harvest, and, if
successful, might paralyse our enormous trade with
South America, upon which we were so dependent.

German influence was predominant as well as un-
scrupulous along the Brazilian coasts, which would render
it easy to maintain supplies. To evoke sympathy amongst
the smaller Republics would also come within his horizon.
Finally, he could have had little idea of our strength in
South Africa ; whereas information gleaned from Val-
paraiso (which von Spee evidently considered reliable)
as to the precise extent of our limited naval resources
then on the east coast of South America, must have
proved a deciding factor in determining his strategy.

Whichever course were adopted, it was practically
certain that the German Admiral would move east-
wards, either through the Straits of Magellan or, more
probably, round the Horn to avoid having his where-
abouts reported. That this occurred to the minds of
our naval authorities before the action off Coronel took
place is practically certain, but it is to be regretted that
reinforcements to Admiral Cradock's squadron operating
in South American waters were not sent there in time
to prevent that disaster.

This, then, in brief, was the problem that presented
itself to our commanders after the battle of Coronel
took place, and no doubt influenced them in the choice
of the Falkland Islands as a base, its geographical posi-
tion making it almost ideal in the event of any move
in that direction on the part of the Germans.

CHAPTER III

BRITISH MEN-OF-WAR OFF SOUTH AMERICA

" If England hold
The sea, she holds the hundred thousand gates
That open to futurity. She holds
The highways of all ages. Argosies
Of unknown glory set their sails this day
For England out of ports beyond the stars.
Ay, on the sacred seas we ne'er shall know
They hoist their sails this day by peaceful quays,
Great gleaming wharves i' the perfect City of God,
If she but claims her heritage."

— Alfred Noyes (Drake).

Before attempting to give a description of the battle
of the Falkland Islands, it is necessary to review very
briefly the movements and dispositions of our ships,
as well as the events preceding the battle, which include
both the duel between the armed merchant cruiser Car-
mania and Cap Trafalgar and the action fought off
Coronel on the coast of Chili by Admiral Cradock.

Our naval forces were scattered in comparatively
small units all over the world when war broke out.
Ships in various squadrons were separated from one
another by great distances, and, with the exception
of our Mediterranean Fleet, we possessed no squadron
in any part of the globe equal in strength to that of
von Sj>'

Attention is directed to the positions of Eastei
Island, where the Germans had last been reported,

19

20 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

Valparaiso, Coronel, Magellan Straits, Staten Island,
the Falkland Islands, Buenos Ayres, Montevideo, Rio de
Janeiro, Pernambuco, and the Island of Trinidad off
the east coast of South America, since they occur con-
tinually in the course of this narrative.*

In the early part of 1914 Rear-Admiral Sir Christo-
pher Cradock, K.C.V.O., C.B., flying his flag in the
Suffolk, was in command of the fourth cruiser squadron,
which was then doing some very useful work in the
Gulf of Mexico. On August 2nd he was at Kingston,
Jamaica, and received information that the Good Hope
was on her way out to become his flagship, so he sailed
northwards to meet her. On the way he sighted and
gave chase to the Karlsruhe on August 6th, as has
been related. The Suffolk and the Good Hope met at
sea ten days later, and the Admiral went on board the
latter immediately and hoisted his flag.

Turning south, he went to Bermuda, called in at
St. Lucia on August 23rd, and thence proceeded along
the north coast of South America on his way to take
up the command of a newly forming squadron of British
ships patrolling the trade routes and protecting the
merchant shipping in South American waters. At St.
Lucia Admiral Cradock would probably have learned of
the sailing of von Spee's squadron from Ponape on
August 6th, and this accounts for his haste in making
south in order to meet and form his ships together.

The squadron was gradually augmented as time
went on, and in the months of September and October,
1914, consisted of the flagship Good Hope (Captain Philip

* See Map, p. 5.

British Men-of-War off S. America 21

Francklin), Canopus (Captain Heathcoat Grant), Mon-
mouth (Captain Frank Brandt), Cornwall (Captain W. M.
Ellerton), Glasgow (Captain John Luce), Bristol (Captain
B. H. Fanshawe), and the armed merchant cruisers
Otranto (Captain H. Mel. Edwards), Macedonia (Captain
B. S. Evans), and Orama (Captain J. R. Segrave).

No news was obtainable as to the whereabouts of
the German squadron stationed in the Pacific, which
consisted of the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Emden, Niirn-
berg, and Leipzig, except that it was known that the
two latter had been operating on the east side of the
Pacific, and that the Emden was in the Bay of Bengal.
The vaguest rumours, all contradicting one another,
were continually being circulated, in which it is more
than likely that German agents had a large share.

Admiral Cradock proceeded south in the middle
of September to watch the Straits of Magellan, and
to patrol between there and the River Plate, as he
doubtless hoped to prevent the Karlsruhe and Dresden
— which, when last heard of, were in South American
waters — from attempting to effect a junction with their
main squadron. With him were the Monmouth, Glasgow,
and the armed Orient liner Otranto, in addition to his
own ship the Good Hope, which, together with his
colliers, had their first base in the Falkland Islands.

On hearing of the appearance of the Germans off
Papei-t'- and of the bombardment of the French colony
there on September 22nd, it was apparently considered
expedient to proceed to the wesl coasl of South America
in order to intercept the enemy. Accordingly, early

22 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

in October the Monmouth, Glasgow, and Otranto went
round to the Pacific, diligently searching out the many
inlets and harbours en route, and arrived at Valparaiso
on October 15th, but only stayed a part of one day
in order to get stores and provisions. They then went
back southwards to meet the Good Hope and Canopus,
vainly hoping to fall in with the Leipzig or Dresden
on the way. The Good Hope reached the Chilian coast
on October 29th, and all ships filled up with coal ; the
Canopus was due very shortly, and actually sighted
our ships steaming off as she arrived.

In order to carry out a thorough and effective exam-
ination of the innumerable inlets that abound amongst
the channels of Tierra del Fuego, in addition to the bays
and harbours on both coasts of South America, it be-
came necessary to divide up this squadron into separ-
ate units. To expedite matters, colliers were sent to
meet our ships, so that valuable time should not be lost
in returning to the base at the Falkland Islands. The
first fine day was seized to fill up with coal, care always
being taken to keep outside the three-mile territorial
limit.

It must have been a trying and anxious time for
both officers and men, while pursuing their quest, never
knowing what force might suddenly be disclosed in
opening out one of these harbours. From the weather
usually experienced in these parts some idea may be
formed of the discomforts. An officer in the Glasgow,
writing of this period, says : "It blew, snowed, rained,
hailed, and sleeted as hard as it is possible to do these
things. I thought the ship would dive under alto-

British Men-of-War off S. America 23

get her at times. It was a short sea, and very high,
and doesn't suit this ship a bit. The Monmouth was
rather worse, if anything, though not quite so wet.
We were rolling 35 degrees, and quite useless for fight-
ing purposes. The ship was practically a submarine."

Imagine, too, the position of the Otranto, searching
these waters by herself, without the least hope of being
able to fight on level terms with one of the enemy's
light-cruisers. The words of one of her officers sum up
the situation : "' We finally got past caring what might
happen," he said ; " what with the strain, the weather,
and the extreme cold, we longed to find something
and to have it out, one way or the other."

When the depredations of the Karlsruhe became
more numerous, the Admiralty dispatched ships — as
could best be spared from watching other trade routes
— to reinforce Admiral Cradock's command. Thus,
what may be termed a second squadron was formed,
consisting of the Canopus, Cornwall, Bristol, the armed
P. & O. liner Macedonia, and the armed Orient liner
Orama. This latter squadron carried out a fruitless
search during September and October for the ever
elusive Karlsruhe, but, so far as is known, did not suc-
ceed in getting near her, for she was never actually
sighted. In the absence of orders from Admiral Cradock,
the «luli' of Senior Naval Officer of this northern
squadron frequently involved the consideration of
matters of no little consequence. These duties primarily
Ived upon the houlders "i Captain Fanshawe of
the Bristol, who was succeeded "ii tit*- arrival ol the
Canopus by Captain Heathcoat Grant. As tin pool

24 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

state of the engines of the Canopus did not enable her
to steam at any speed, she remained at the base and
directed operations, forming a valuable link with her
wireless. Orders, however, were received from Admiral
Cradock which necessitated her sailing on October ioth
in order to join his southern squadron, so that Captain
Fanshawe was again left in command.

On October 24th the Carnarvon (Captain H. L. d'E.
Skipwith) arrived, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral A. P.
Stoddart, who, though acting under the orders of Admiral
Cradock, now took charge of the sweeping operations
necessitated by our quest. Admiral Stoddart had pre-
viously been in command of the ships operating along
our trade routes near the Cape Verde Islands, where
the Carnarvon had not long before made a valuable
capture, the German storeship Professor Woermann,
filled with coal and ammunition.

The comparatively large number of men-of-war
mentioned is accounted for by the fact that at this
time the Karlsruhe began to make her presence felt
by sinking more merchant ships, which caused no little
apprehension amongst the mercantile communities in
all the ports on the north and east coasts of South
America, Brazilian firms at this period refusing to ship
their goods in British bottoms, although some British
vessels were lying in harbour awaiting cargoes. The
German ship's activities were mainly confined to the
neighbourhood of St. Paul's Rocks, Pernambuco, and
the Equator.

It is not easy to put clearly the disposition of the
ships acting under Admiral Cradock at this time, nor

British Men-of-War off S. America 25

to give an adequate idea of the many disadvantages
with which he had to contend. The difficulties of
communication on the east coast of South America be-
tween his two squadrons were very great, on account
of the long distances between them (often some thou-
sands of miles and always greater than the range of our
wireless). The only method found feasible was to send
messages in code by means of passing British merchant-
men— usually the Royal Mail liners. The inevitable
result of this was that it was frequently impossible for
Admiral Cradock to keep in touch with his northern
squadron, and important matters of policy had thus to
be decided on the spot, the Admiral being informed later.

On the rare occasions that our ships visited Brazilian
ports, which were crowded with German shipping, the
crews of these ships, having nothing better to do, would
come and pull round our cruisers — in all probability
cursing us heartily the while — much to the interest
and amusement of our men. These visits could only
take place at the most once every three months, when
the opportunity of getting a good square meal at a civ-
ilised restaurant was hailed with delight by those officers
who were off duty.

Our coaling base in these waters was admirably
selected. There was sufficient anchorage for a large
number of ships four or five miles from any land, but
protected from anything but a heavy swell or sea by
surrounding ledges of coral awash at low water. Some-
times colliers got slightly damaged by bumping against
our ships when there was a swell, but in other respects

26 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

it suited its purpose excellently. The Brazilians sent
a destroyer to investigate once or twice, but could find
nothing to arouse their susceptibilities, for our ships
were always well outside the three-mile limit. Our sole
amusement was fishing, frequently for sharks.

Towards the latter part of August, the armed mer-
chant cruiser Carmania (Captain Noel Grant) was sent
out to join Admiral Cradock's squadron with coal, pro-
visions, and a large quantity of frozen meat, which was
sadly needed. She was ordered by him to assist the
Cornwall in watching Pernambuco on September nth,
as it was thought that the German storeship Patagonia
was going to put to sea on September nth to join the
Karlsruhe. On her way south she got orders to search
Trinidad Island in the South Atlantic to find out whether
the Germans were making use of it as a coaling base,
and there fell in with the German armed liner Cap
Trafalgar, which she sank in a very gallant action that
is described in a subsequent chapter.

The armed merchant cruiser Edinburgh Castle (Cap-
tain W. R. Napier) was sent out from England with
drafts of seamen and boys, as well as provisions and
stores for our men-of-war in these waters. On her
arrival at the base on October 12th, she was detained
on service to assist in the sweep that had been organised
to search for the Karlsruhe. Some of us have pleasant
recollections of excellent games of deck hockey played
on the spacious promenade deck during her all too short
stay with us.

The Defence (Captain E. La T. Leatham) touched at

British Men-of-War off S. America 27

the base to coal on October 27th, being on her way
south to join Admiral Cradock's southern command.
She had to coal in bad weather, and perforated the
collier's side in doing so, but succeeded in completing
with coal in the minimum possible time under difficult
conditions. Without loss of time she proceeded to
Montevideo, but never got any farther, as it was there
that the news of the Coronel disaster first reached her.
Admiral Cradock hoped to find von Spee before the
German light-cruisers Dresden and Leipzig joined the
main squadron ; but he also was most anxious to wait
for the Defence. She would have made a very powerful
addition to his squadron, and it seems a thousand pities
that it was not possible to effect this junction before he
quitted the eastern shores of South America for the
Pacific.

The Defence was very unlucky, and had a great deal
of hard work without any kudos ; not till Admiral
Sturdee's arrival did she leave to join the Minotaur
on the Cape of Good Hope station, and the very day
she arrived there got the news of the Falkland Islands
battle ! Having covered 23,000 miles in two and a
half months, the disappointment at having missed that
fight was, of course, intense. It is sad to think that
f« w of her gallant crew are alive to-day, as she was after-
wards sunk in the battle of Jutland.

Hi' Invincible, flagship of Vice-Admiral F. C. Dove-
ton Sturdee (Captain P. H. Beamish), the Inflexible

(tain R. F. Phiffimore, C.B., M.V.O.), and the Kent
{( aptain J. I). Allen) enter the scene oi operations Liter.

CHAPTER IV

LIFE AT SEA IN I914

" A seaman, smiling, swaggered out of the inn,
Swinging in one brown hand a gleaming cage
Wherein a big green parrot chattered and clung
Fluttering against the wires."

— ALFRED NOYES (Drake).

A short digression may perhaps be permitted, if it
can portray the long days, when for months at a time
little occurs to break the monotony of sea life. The
reader may also experience the charitable feeling that,
at the expense of his patience, the sailor is indulging
in the " grouse " that proverbially is supposed to be so
dear to him.

Of necessity, work on board ship in wartime must
be largely a matter of routine ; and, though varied as
much as possible, it tends to relapse into " the trivial
round, the common task." All day and all night men
man the guns ready to blaze off at any instant, extra
look-outs are posted, and there are officers and men
in the control positions. The ship's company is usually
organised into three watches at night, which take turns
in relieving one another every four hours.

After sunrise the increased visibility gives ample
warning of any possible attack. The messdecks, guns,
and ship generally are cleaned before breakfast, while
the forenoon soon passes in perfecting the guns' crews

28

Life at Sea in 1914 29

and controls, and in physical drill. After dinner at
noon and a smoke, everyone follows the old custom of
the sea, and has a caulk (a sleep) — a custom origin-
ated in the days of sailing ships who were at sea for
long periods at a time, and watch and watch (i.e. one
watch on and one off) had to be maintained both day
and night. The men he about the decks, too tired
to feel the want of either mattresses or pillows. The
first dog watch (4-6 p.m.) is usually given up to recrea-
tion until sunset, when it is time to go to night defence
stations. Day in and day out, this programme is seldom
varied except to stop and examine a merchant ship
now and again.

Every ship met with on the high seas is boarded
for the examination of its passengers and cargo, an
undertaking often attended by some difficulty on a
dark night. On approaching, it is customary to signal
the ship to stop ; if this is not obeyed at once, a blank
round is fired as a warning ; should this be disregarded
a shotted round is fired across her bows, but it is seldom
necessary to resort to this measure. At night these
excursions have a strange, unreal effect, and our board-
ing officer used to say that when climbing up a mer-
chantman's side in rough weather he felt like some
character in a pirate story. Getting out of a boat,
as it is tossing alongside, on to a rope ladder, is by
no means an easy job, especially if the officer is in-
< lined to be portly. The searchlight, too, turned full
on to the ship, blinding the scared passengers who come
tumbling up, frequently imagining they have been
torpedoed, adds to the mysterious effect produced, whilst

30 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

the sudden appearance of the boarding officer in his
night kit suggests a visit from Father Neptune. But
any idea of comedy is soon shattered by the grumpy
voice of the captain who has been turned out from his
beauty sleep, or by the vehement objections of a lady
or her husband to their cabin being searched. As a
matter of fact, we were always met with the most un-
failing courtesy, and the boat's crew was often loaded
with presents of cigarettes or even chocolates, besides
parcels of newspapers hastily made up and thrown down
at the last moment.

Off a neutral coast the food problem is an everlast-
ing difficulty, and as soon as the canteen runs out and
tinned stores cannot be replenished, the menu resolves
itself into a more or less fixed item of salt beef (" salt
horse ") or salt pork with pea soup. The old saying,
" Feed the brute, if a man is to be kept happy," has
proved itself true, but is one which at sea is often extra-
ordinarily hard to follow, especially when it is impossible
to get such luxuries as eggs, potatoes, and fresh meat.
If flour runs out, the ship's biscuit (" hard tack "),
which often requires a heavy blow to break it, forms
but a poor substitute for bread ; although it is quite
good eating, a little goes a long way. The joy with
which the advent of an armed liner is heralded by the
officers cannot well be exaggerated ; the stewards from
all ships lose no time in trying to get all they can, and
the memory of the first excellent meal is not easily
forgotten.

The ever-recurring delight of coaling ship is looked
forward to directly anchorage is reached. Coal-dust

Life at Sea in 1914 31

then penetrates everywhere, even to the food, and after
a couple of hours it seems impossible for the ship ever
to be clean again. Nearly every officer and man on
board, including the chaplain and paymasters, join in
the work, which continues day and night, as a rule,
until finished. If this takes more than twenty-four
hours there is the awful trial of sleeping, clothes and
all, covered in grime, for hammocks have to be foregone,
else they would be quite unfit for further use. The
men wear any clothes they like. In the tropics it is
a warm job working in the holds, and clothes are some-
what scanty. A very popular article is a bashed-in
bowler hat, frequently worn with white shorts, and a
football jersey ! There is, generally, a wag amongst
the men who keeps them cheery and happy, even during
a tropical rain storm. His powers of mimicking, often
ranging from politicians to gunnery instructors, bring
forth rounds of applause, and all the time he'll dig out
like a Trojan.

The sailor is a cheery bird, and seldom lets an oppor-
tunity of amusement escape. On one occasion, when
lying at anchor in the tropics, someone suggested fishing ;
after the first fish had been caught many rods and lines
were soon going. A would-be wit enlivened matters
by tying an empty soda-water bottle on to a rather
excitable man's line while he was away, which met with
r success on the owner crying out, " I've got a real
big 'un here " as he carefully played it to the delight
of everyone. Shark fishing was .1 favourite sport, and
three were caught and landed in one afternoon; one of
them had thn e mall shai I. inside it.

32 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

The band (very few ships had the good fortune to
possess one) plays from 4.30 to 5.30 p.m., when Jack
disports himself in Mazurkas and d' Alberts, and dances
uncommonly well before a very critical audience. Some
men are always busy at their sewing machines when
off duty, making clothes for their messmates ; this they
call " jewing " ; others are barbers, or bootmakers, and
they make quite a good thing out of it. Now that
masts and sails are things of the past, substitutes in
the way of exercise are very necessary, particularly
when living on salt food. Boxing is greatly encouraged,
and if competitions are organised, men go into strict
training and the greatest keenness prevails. A canvas
salt-water bath is usually rigged, and is in constant
demand with the younger men. The officers congre-
gate in flannels on the quarter-deck playing quoits,
deck tennis, or cricket ; some go in for doing Swedish
exercises, Miiller, or club swinging, and, to finish up
with, a party is formed to run round the decks.

The Admiralty are extraordinarily good about dis-
patching mails to our ships, but sudden and unexpected
movements often make it impossible to receive them
with any regularity. When war broke out everyone
wondered how their folk at home would manage, whether
money and food would be easily obtainable. In our own
case we were moved from our original sphere of opera-
tions, and did not get our first mail till October 19th,
over eleven weeks after leaving England, and many
other ships may have fared even worse. Again, our
Christmas mail of 1914 was not received till six months
afterwards, having followed us to the Falkland Islands,

Life at Sea in 1914 33

then back home, out again round the Cape of Good
Hope, finally arriving at the Dardanelles. On this
occasion one of the men had a pound of mutton and
a plum pudding sent him by his wife ; it can easily
be imagined with what delight he welcomed these
delicacies, which had been through the tropics several
times, as did those others whose parcels were any-
where near his in the mail bag. It may appear a paltry
thing to those who get their daily post regularly, but
the arrival of a mail at sea is a very real joy, even to
those who get but few letters. The newspapers arc
eagerly devoured, and events, whose bare occurrence
may have only become known through meagre wire-
less communiques, are at length made comprehensible.

Darkening ship at sunset is uncomfortable, more par-
ticularly in the tropics, when the heat on the mess-
decks becomes unbearable from lack of air. However,
this is now much improved by supplying wind-scoops
for the scuttles, fitted with baffles to prevent the light
from showing outboard. Everyone sleeps on deck who
can, risking the pleasures of being trodden upon in the
dark, or of being drenched by a sudden tropical shower,
when the scrum of men hastily snatching up their ham-
mocks and running for the hatches equals that of any
crowd at a football match. On moonless nights little
diversions are constantly occurring. A certain officer,
perfectly sober, on one occasion walked over the edge
of the boat-deck into space, and then was surprised
to find that he was hurt.

The hardships and anxieties of the life are probably
overrated by people ashore, The very^routine helps

D

34 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

to make the sailor accustomed to the strange and un-
natural conditions, nearly all of which have their humor-
ous side. As is the way of the world, we on the coast
of South America all envied those in the Grand Fleet
at this time, in modern ships fitted with refrigerating
rooms and plenty of good fresh food ; and they, no
doubt, willingly would have changed places with us,
being sick to death of the uneventful life, cold, rough
weather, and constant submarine strain from which
we were fortunately immune. Events took such a
shape a few months later that those of us who were
fortunate enough to be in the battle of the Falkland
Islands would not have been elsewhere for all the world.

CHAPTER V

THE SINKING OF THE " CAP TRAFALGAR "

When, with a roar that seemed to buffet the heavens

Ami rip the heart of the sea out, one red flame

Blackened with fragments, the great galleon burst

A Minder ! All the startled waves were strewn

With wreckage ; and Drake laughed : ' My lads, we have diced

With death to-day, and won ! ' "

— Alfred No yes (Drake).

It has already been mentioned that the Car mania was
ordered to search the Brazilian island of Trinidad (not
to be confused with the British Island of the same
name), which lies in the South Atlantic about 600 miles
to the eastward of South America, and in about the
same latitude as Rio de Janeiro. It was uninhabited
at this time, and seemed a likely place for the Germans
to use as a temporary coaling base ; they have never
had any compunction about breaking the laws of
neutrality if it suited their purpose.

The following narrative is taken from the official
report, supplemented by an account written by the
author two days after the action from a description
given him by the officers of H.M.S. Carmania.

Land was sighted on the morning of September i.jili,
I'M .}. A moderate brce/.r was blowing from the north-

• l.ut it was a lovely day, with a clear sky and the
sun shining. Shortly .itt< r 1 1 a.m. the masts of a vi 1
observed, and on approaching Dearer the Car*
35

36 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

mania made out three steamers, apparently at anchor
in a small bay that lies to the south-west of the island.
One of these was a large liner, but the others were clearly
colliers and had their derricks topped ; they were
probably working when they sighted us, and they imme-
diately separated and made off in different directions
before the whole of their hulls could be distinguished.

The large vessel was apparently a liner about equal
in size,* having two funnels which were painted to
resemble those of a Union Castle liner. After running
away for a while, the larger steamer, which turned out
to be the Cap Trafalgar (though this was not known
for certain till weeks afterwards), altered course to
starboard and headed more in our direction. She was
then steering about south at what appeared to be full
speed, while the Carmania was steaming 16 knots on a
sou'-westerly course.

There could no longer be any doubt that she meant
to fight, and the duel now ensued that has been so
happily described by a gifted naval writer, the late
Fred T. Jane, as " the Battle of the Haystacks." To
my idea, it appears almost a replica of the frigate actions
of bygone days, and will probably go down in history
as a parallel to the engagement fought between the
Chesapeake and Shannon. For gallantry, pluck and
determination it certainly bears comparison with many
of these actions of the past.

About noon she fired a single shot across the enemy's

* Carmania, Cunard S.S. Co. — 19,524 tons, 650 feet long, triple screw
turbines.

Cap } Tw/aZga>-/Hamburg-Sud-Amerik S.S. Co. — 18,710 tons, 590 feet
long, triple screw turbines.

The Sinking of the Cap Trafalgar 37

bows at a range of 8,500 yards, whereupon he immediately
opened fire from his after-gun on the starboard side.
This was quickly followed on both sides by salvoes (all
guns firing nearly simultaneously as soon as their sights
came on to the target), so matters at once became
lively.

Curiously enough, the enemy's first few shots fell
short, ricochetting over, and then, as the range decreased,
they went clean over the hull, in consequence of which
our rigging, masts, funnels, derricks, and ventilators all
suffered, though the ship's side near the waterline — the
principal anxiety — was so far intact. Some of the
Carmania's first shots, which were lired at a range of
7,500 yards, were seen to take effect, and she continued
to score hits afterwards with moderate frequency. The
port battery was engaging his starboard guns at this
period, so that he was on her port hand, and a refer-
ence to the plan will show that she was ahead on bear-
ing. The range was rapidly decreasing since they were
both on converging courses, but unfortunately the
German ship had the speed of her, for the Cunarder
could only do 16 knots, due largely to a lack of vacuum
in the condensers. As far as could be judged the Cap
Trafalgar was steaming between 17 and 18 knots. (See
Diagram, p. 39.)

At 4,500 yards, two of our broadsides were seen to
hit all along the waterline. As the range decreased to
1 yards the shot from the enemy's pom-poms (ma-
chine guns), lired with great rapidity, began to fall like
hail on and all round the ship ; this induced Captain
Grant to alter course away with promptitude, thus open-

38 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

ing out the range and bringing the starboard battery into
play. The port 4.7-inch guns — they were all over twenty
years old — were by this time wellnigh red-hot. That
the enemy did not apprehend this manoeuvre was demon-
strated by his erratic fire at this moment, when the
Britisher was enabled to bring five guns into action to
his four through being able to use both the stern guns.
It was now that the German suffered most heavily, the
havoc wrought in such a short time being very noticeable.
He then turned away, which brought the two ships
nearly stern on to one another ; two of his steam pipes
were cut by shell, the steam rising into the sky, he was
well on fire forward, and had a list to starboard.

One of his shells, however, had passed through the
captain's cabin under the fore bridge, and although
it did not burst it started a fire, which rapidly became
worse ; unhappily no water was available to put it out,
for the fire main was shot through, while the chemical
fire extinguishers proved of little use. All water had to
be carried by hand, but luckily the fire was prevented
from spreading over the ship by a steel bulkhead, to-
gether with an ordinary fire-proof swing door, which
was afterwards found to be all charred on one side.
Nevertheless it got a firm hold of the deck above, which
broke into flame, so the fore-bridge had to be aban-
doned. The ship had now to be steered from the stern,
and all orders had to be shouted down by megaphone
both to the engine rooms and to this new steering posi-
tion in the bowels of the ship, which was connected
up and in operation in fifty-seven seconds ! To reduce
the effect of the fire the vessel was kept before the wind,

GAR'n
.pNoon

UOpm 4000"

V.".V.V.35oqV."." ."."." ' ' "y^° '0pjn-

M/fnimnm Bmiff

40 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

which necessitated turning right round again, so that
the fight resolved itself into a chase.

The action was continued by the gun-layers, the
fire-control position being untenable due to the fire,
so each gun had to be worked and fired independently
under the direction of its own officer. Among the
ammunition supply parties there had been several
casualties and the officers, finding it impossible to
" spot " the fall of the shell, owing to the flashes from
the enemy's guns obscuring their view from so low an
elevation, lent a hand in carrying the ammunition from
the hoists to the guns. In these big liners the upper
deck, where the guns are mounted, is approximately
70 feet above the holds, whence the ammunition has
to be hoisted and then carried by hand to the guns —
a particularly arduous task.

Crossing, as it were, the enemy was at this time well
on the starboard bow, but firing was continued until
the distance was over 9,000 yards, the maximum range
of the Carmania's guns. Owing to his superior speed and
a slight divergence between the courses, the distance
was gradually increasing all the time, and at 1.30 he
was out of range. His list had now visibly increased,
and his speed began to diminish, probably on account
of the inrush of water through his coaling ports. It
was surmised that there had not been sufficient time
to secure these properly, for he had evidently been
coaling at the time she arrived upon the scene.

Towards the end the Cap Trafalgar's fire had begun
to slacken, though one of her guns continued to fire
to the last, in spite of the fact that she was out of range.

The Sinking of the Cap Trafalgar 41

It became patent that she was doomed, and her every
movement was eagerly watched through field-glasses
for some minutes by those not occupied in quenching
the lire. Suddenly the great vessel heeled right over ;
her funnels being almost parallel to the surface of the
sea, looked just like two gigantic cannon as they pointed
towards the Car mania ; an instant later she went down
by the bows, the stern remaining poised in mid-air for
a tew seconds, and then she abruptly disappeared out of
sight at 1.50 p.m., the duel having lasted an hour and
forty minutes.

There were no two opinions about the good fight
she had put up, and all were loud in their praise of the
gallant conduct of the Germans.

One of the enemy's colliers was observed approach-
ing this scene of desolation in order to pick up survivors,
some of whom had got away from the sinking ship in
her boats. The collier had been flying the United States
ensign, evidently as a ruse, in the hope that the Carmania
might be induced to let her pass without stopping her
for examination. It was, however, impossible to in-
terfere with her owing to the fire that was still raging
in the fore part of the ship. This kept our men at work
trying to get it under, and necessitated keeping the ship
running before the wind, the direction of which did not
permit of approaching the spot in order to attempt to
pick up survivors.

Smoke was now seen away to the northward, and
the signalman reported that he thought he could make
out th>- funnels "t a cruiser. As the Cap Trafalgar,
before sinking, had been in wireless communication

42 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

with some German vessel, it was apprehended that one
might be coming to her assistance. As the Carmania
was totally unfit for further action, it was deemed ad-
visable to avoid the risk of another engagement, so she
steamed off at full speed in a southerly directidn.

As soon as the collier and all that remained of the
wreckage of the Cap Trafalgar was lost to view the
gallant Cunarder was turned to the north-westward in
the direction of the anchorage. She was unseaworthy,
nearly all her navigational instruments and all the com-
munications to the engines were destroyed, making the
steering and navigation of the ship difficult and uncer-
tain. When wireless touch was established, the Corn-
wall was called up and asked to meet and escort her in.
But as she had only just started coaling she asked the
Bristol to take her place. The next day the Bristol,
which was in the vicinity, took the Carmania along until
relieved the same night by the Cornwall, which escorted
her on to the base, where temporary repairs were effected.

One of the enemy's shells was found to have passed
through three thicknesses of steel plating without ex-
ploding, but in spite of this it set fire to some bedding
which caused the conflagration under the fore bridge.
Where projectiles had struck solid iron, such as a winch,
splinters of the latter were to be seen scattered in all
directions. The ship was hit seventy-nine times, causing
no fewer than 304 holes.

There were 38 casualties. Five men were killed out-
right, 4 subsequently died from wounds, 5 were seriously
wounded and 22 wounded — most of the latter were
only slightly injured. All the casualties occurred on

The Sinking of the Cap Trafalgar 43

deck, chiefly among the guns' crews and ammunition
supply parties. No one below was touched, but a
third of those employed on deck were hit.

The following remarks may be of interest, and are
taken from the author's letters, written on September
16th, after having been shown over the Carmania :

" When I went on board this morning, I was greatly
struck by the few fatal casualties considering the number
of holes here, there, and everywhere. Not a single
part of the upper deck could be crossed without finding
holes. A remarkable fact was that only one officer,
Lieutenant Murray, R.N.R., was hurt or damaged in
any way, although the officers were in the most exposed
positions, and the enemy's point of aim appeared to
be the fore bridge.

' They had only three active service ratings on
board ; some of the gunlayers were old men, pensioners
from the Navy.

" One of the senior officers told me that the first
few rounds made him feel ' a bit dickey,' but that after
that he took no notice of the bigger shells, though,
curiously enough, he thoroughly objected to the smaller
poms-poms which were ' most irritating.' He added
that the men fought magnificently, and that the firemen
worked ' like hell.' As flames and smoke from the
fire on deck descended to the stokeholds by the ventilators
instead of cool air, the states of things down below may
easily be imagined.

"One chronomel found to be going in spite

of the wooden box which contained it having been burnt

44 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

" The deeds of heroism were many.

" I liked the story of the little bugler boy, who had
no more to do once the action had commenced, so he
stood by one of the guns refusing to go under cover.
As the gun fired he shouted : ' That's one for the
blighters ! ' And again : ' There's another for the
beggars — go it ! ' smacking the gunshield the while with
his hand.

" Again one of the gunlayers, who lost his hand
and also one leg during the engagement, insisted upon
being held up when the German ship sank, so as to be
able to cheer. I talked to him, and he waggled his
stump at me quite cheerily and said, ' It was well worth
losing an arm for.'

" It is good to feel that the spirit of our forefathers
is still active in time of need."

CHAPTER VI

THE ACTION OFF CORONEL

" Then let hini roll
His galleons round the little Golden Hynde,
Bring her to bay, if he can, on the high seas,
Ring us about with thousands, we'll not yield
I and my Golden Hynde, we will go down,
With flag still flying on the last stump left us
And all my cannon spitting the fires
Of everlasting scorn into his face."

— ALFRED No YES (Drake).

The wanderings of the German squadron in the Pacific
have been briefly traced as far as Easter Island, where
it arrived on October 12th, 1914, and found the Dresden.
The Leipzig, which had been chased from pillar to post
by British and Japanese cruisers, and succeeded in
eluding them, joined up shortly after to the relief of the
German Admiral.

The contractor at Easter Island, an Englishman
named Edwards, who supplied the Germans with fresh
meat and vegetables, was a ranch-owner, and had no
idea that war had even been declared. One of his men,
in taking off provisions to the ships, discovered this
amazing fact, which had carefully been kept secret,
and informed his master. The account was not settled
in cash, but by a bill made payable at Valparaiso. The
1 nan squadron sailed for Mas-a-fuera a week later,

the ranch-owner took the earliest opportunity of

45

46 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

sending in his bill to Valparaiso, where it was duly
honoured, vastly to his astonishment and relief.

For the reasons already adduced, it seemed almost
certain that Admiral von Spee would make his way
round South America. That there was a possibility of
his descending upon Vancouver and attacking the
naval dockyard of Esquimalt is acknowledged, but it
was so remote as to be scarcely worthy of serious con-
sideration. The three Japanese cruisers, Idzuma, Hizen,
and Asatna, were understood to be in the eastern Pacific
at this time, and this was probably known to the German
Admiral. The risk, too, that he must inevitably run in
attacking a locality known to possess submarines was
quite unjustifiable ; besides, he had little to gain and
everything to lose through the delay that must ensue
from adopting such a policy.

The vessels engaged in the action off Coronel, with
their armament, etc., were : *

Names Tonnage

A vmament Speed

Completion

Good[Hope ... 1 4, 1 00

2-9.2" ... 23.5
16-6"

... 1902

Monmouth 9,800

... 14-6" ... 23.3

... 1903

Glasgow 4,800

... 2-6" ... 25.8
10-4"

... 1910

Otranto (armed ... 12,000

... 8-4.7" ••• 18

1909

liner) gross

Speed of :

squadron 18 knots.

Names Tonnage

A rmament Speed

Completion

Scharnhorst ... 11,420

... 8-8.2" ... 22.5

6-5-9"
20-3.4"

... 1908

* According to

" Brassey's Naval Annual."

The Action off Coronel 47

Names

Tonnage

Armament I

Speed 1

Completio

1 ...

... 11,420

8-8.2" ...

6-5-9"
20-3.4"

23.8

... 1908

Leipzig

... 3,200

... 10-4. 1" ...

23

... 1906

ien

••• 3.544

12-4.1° ...

.,-2.1"

27

1908

X umber g ...

• •■ 3.396

10-4.1" ...

8 2.1"

^3-5

... 1908

Speed of s

quadron 22.5 knots.

It will be noticed that our two armoured cruisers were
respectively six and five years older than the Germans'.
Our armament was much inferior in size, number, and
quality on account of the later designs of the enemy's
artillery. The range of the German 4.1-inch guns was
nearly equal to that of our 6-inch guns. But perhaps the
greatest point in favour of the enemy was the fact that
Cradock's ships, with the exception of the Glasgow,
only commissioned at the outbreak of war, and
had had such continuous steaming that no really good
opportunity for gunnery practices or for testing the
organisation thoroughly had been possible, whilst von
s ships had been in commission for over two years
and had highly trained crews, accustomed to their ships.

The following account has been compiled from per-
sonal information received from officers who took part,
from letters that have appeared in the Press, from a
translation that has been published of Admiral von
I report, and from the official report made
by Captain Luce of the Glasgow.

Admiral Cradock, as we have seen, joined the re-
mainder <>f his little >quadron with the exception of

48 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

the Canopus off the coast of Chile on October 29th. The
latter was following at her best speed. The squadron
proceeded northwards, whilst the Glasgow was detached
to Coronel to send telegrams, a rendezvous being fixed
for her to rejoin at 1 p.m. on November 1st.

No authentic news of the movements of the Germans
was available at this time ; in fact, the last time that
von Spee's squadron had been definitely heard of was
when it appeared off Papeete and bombarded the town
toward the end of September. That the enemy might
be encountered at any moment was of course fully
realised, but it was hoped that either the Dresden and
Leipzig or the main squadron might be brought to
action separately, before they were able to join forces.
Time was everything if this was to be brought about,
so Admiral Cradock pushed on without delay. The
anxiety to obtain news of a reliable character may be
imagined, but only the vaguest of rumours, one con-
tradicting the other, were forthcoming. Reports showed
that the German merchant shipping in the neighbour-
hood were exhibiting unwonted signs of energy in load-
ing coal and stores, but this gave no certain indication
of the proximity of the entire squadron.

Rejoining the British squadron at sea on November
1st, the Glasgow communicated with the Good Hope.
Our ships had recently been hearing Telefunken *
signals on their wireless, which was proof that one
or more enemy warships were close at hand. About
2 p.m., therefore, the Admiral signalled the squadron
to spread on a line bearing N.E. by E. from the Good

* German wireless system.

The Action off Coronel 49

Hope, which steered N.W. by N. at 10 knots. Ships
were ordered to open to a distance of fifteen miles apart
at a speed of 15 knots, the Monmouth being nearest
to the flagship, the Otranto next, and then the Glasgow,
which was thus nearest the coast.

There was not sufficient time to execute this man
ceuvre, and when smoke was suddenly sighted at 4.20

DIAGRAM 1. (Enemy sighted) 4. 20 p.m..

T t , t „ ^LEIPZIG"

lCn IS Jj OTRANTO 9~CNEISENAU

•GOOD HOPE" ' "MONMOUTH* GLASGOW" *f$CHA*NHORST'(Fiegt

I Flag) sights smoke and *

alters course to U 80 E Bay of COTonall

towards it

"OTRANTOY position was Lat.3B'23'S.
Long.7340'W.

P.M. to the eastward of the Otranto and Glasgow, these
two ships were still close together and about four miles
from the Monmouth. The Glasgow went alien I to in-
vestigate and made out three German warships, which
at once turned towards her. The Admiral was over
twenty miles distant and out of sight, and had to be
informed a- possible, so the Glasgow r< turned at

full speed, warning him by wireless, which the Germans
ired to jam, that tin.- enemy was in si Jit.

50 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

The squadron reformed at full speed on the flag-
ship, who had altered course to the southward, and by
5.47 p.m. had got into single line-ahead in the order :
Good Hofie, Monmouth, Glasgow, and Otranto. The
enemy, in similar formation, was about twelve miles
off.

For the better understanding of the movements
which follow, it may be stated that the ideal of a naval
artillerist is a good target — that is, a clear and well
defined object which is plainly visible through the
telescopic gunsights ; the wind in the right direction,
relative to the engaged side, so that smoke does not
blow across the guns, and no sudden alterations
of course, to throw out calculations. The tactics of
a modern naval action are in a large measure based
on these ideals, at any rate according to the view of
the gunnery specialist.

It is evident that it was Admiral Cradock's intention
to close in and force action at short range as quickly
as possible, in order that the enemy might be handi-
capped by the rays of the lowering sun, which would
have been behind our ships, rendering them a very
poor target for the Germans as the squadrons drew
abeam of one another. He therefore altered course
inwards towards the enemy, but von Spee was either
too wary or too wise, for he says in his report that
he turned away to a southerly course after 5.35, thus
declining action, which the superior speed of his squadron
enabled him to do at his pleasure. The wind was south
(right ahead), and it was blowing very fresh, so that
a heavy head sea was encountered, which made all

The Action off Coronel

5i

ships — especially the light-cruisers— pitch and roll con-
siderably. It seems very doubtful whether the Good
Hope and Monmouth were able to use their main deck
guns, and it is certain that they could not have been
of any value. This would mean that these two ships
could only fire two 9-2-inch and ten 6-inch guns on

tf OTRANTO'

Vglascow'

Q 'mc.vmouth'

<

aQ 'good hope"

DIAGRAM 11 6 40 p.m.

■ 14.800 yards-

Wit - 200O V.n!-.

f DRESDEN'

^LEIPZIG"
I 'GNIISENMJ'

■mpnqgpsf

the broadside between them, instead of their whole
armanii nt of two 92-inch and seventeen 6-inch guns.

There was little daylight lefl wh< n Admiral Cradock

tried to close the Germans, hoping thai they would

hallenge in view of their superior strength.

At 6.18 Admiral Cradock inert a >l speed I" 17 km
making a wireless message to the Campus, " I am about
to attack enemy now." Both squadrons were now on

parallel courses approximately, steering south, and

52 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

about 7| miles apart. A second light cruiser joined the
German line about this period ; according to von Spee's
report the Scharnhorst was leading, followed by the
Gneisenau, Leipzig, and Dresden.

As the sun sank below the horizon (about 6.50 p.m.)
the conditions of light became reversed to our com-
plete disadvantage ; our ships were now lit up by the
glow of the sunset, the enemy being gradually enshrouded
in a misty haze as the light waned. Admiral Cradock's
last hope of averting defeat must have vanished as he
watched the enemy turning away ; at the best he could
only expect to damage and thus delay the enemy, while
it was impossible to withdraw. He had no choice but
to hold on and do his best, trusting in Providence to
aid him. In judging what follows it should be kept
in mind that in the declining light even the outlines
of the enemy's ships rapidly became obliterated, making
it quite impossible to see the fall of our shots in
order to correct the range on the gunsights ; on the
other hand, our ships showed up sharply against the
western horizon and still provided good targets for
the German gunners. Von Spee in his report says
his " guns' crews on the middle decks were never able
to see the sterns of their opponents, and only occasion-
ally their bows." This certainly implies that the upper
deck gunners could see quite well, whilst we have in-
formation from Captain Luce's report that our ships
were unable to see the enemy early in the action, and
were firing at the flashes of his guns.

Accordingly, as soon as the sun disappeared, von
Spee lost no time in approaching our squadron, and

The Action off Coronel 53

opened tire at 7.4 at a range of 12,000 yards. Our ships
at once followed suit with the exception of the Otranto,
whose old guns did not admit of her competing against
men-of-war at this distance. The German Admiral
apparently endeavoured to maintain this range, so as
to reap the full advantage of his newer and heavier
armament, for the two 9/2-inch guns in the Good Hope
wire the only ones in the whole of our squadron that
were effective at this distance with the possible ex-
ception of the two modern 6-inch guns in the Glasgow.
Von Spec had, of course, calculated this out, and took
care not to close until our armoured cruisers were hors
de combat.

The Germans soon found the range, their fire proving
very accurate, which was to be expected in view of the
reputation of the Schamhorst and Gnciscnau for good
shooting — the former had won the gold medal for the
best average. These armoured cruisers concentrated
their fire entirely on our two leading ships, doing con-
sidi Table execution. In addition, they had a great
stroke of luck, for in the lirst ten minutes of the en-
gagement a shell struck the fore turret of the Good
II pe, putting that 0/2-inch out of action. The Mon-
muiith was apparently hit several times in rapid suc-
ion, for she was forced to haul out of the line to
the westward, and her forecastle was seen to be burn-
ing furiously, but she continued to return the enemy's
fire valiantly. This manoeuvre caused her to drop astern,
and compelled the Glasgow, who now followed on after
the Good Hope, to ea • peed to avoid getting into the
intended foi the Monmouth.

54 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

It was now growing dark, but this did not deter
both squadrons from continuing to blaze away as hard
as they could ; in fact, the fight was at its height ; the
German projectiles were falling all round and about
our ships, causing several fires which lit them up with
a ghostly hue. The heavy artillery of the enemy was
doing great damage, and it was evident that both the
Good Hope and Monmouth were in a bad way ; the
former sheered over unsteadily towards the Germans,
returning their fire spasmodically, whilst the latter had
a slight list and from her erratic movements gave the
impression that her steering arrangements had been
damaged. The results of our shooting could not be
distinguished with accuracy, though von Spee mentions
that the Scharnhorst found a 6-inch shell in one of her
storerooms, which had penetrated the side and caused
a deal of havoc below but did not burst, and also that
one funnel was hit. The Gneisenau had two men
wounded, and sustained slight damage.

At 7.50 p.m. a sight of the most appalling splendour
arrested everyone, as if spellbound, in his tussle with
death. An enormous sheet of flame suddenly burst
from the Good Hope, fighting up the whole heavens
for miles around. This was accompanied by the noise
of a terrific explosion, which hurled up wreckage and
sparks at least a couple of hundred feet in the air from
her after funnels. A lucky shot had penetrated one of
her magazines. " It reminded me of Vesuvius in erup-
tion," said a seaman in describing this spectacle. It was
now pitch dark, making it impossible for the opposing
vessels to distinguish one another. The Good Hope

The Action off Coronel 55

was never heard to fire her guns again, and could not
have long survived such a terrible explosion, though
no one saw her founder.

The moon had risen about 6.30 p.m. and was now
well up, but it was too overcast to see much. Accord-
ing to von Spee the squadrons had closed in to about
5,400 yards, which caused him to sheer off, fearing
torpedo attack. It seems certain that although firing
was continued it could not have been effective, for
three minutes after the Good Hope blew up the Germans
erased lire altogether. Shortly afterwards von Spee
ordered the Leipzig, Dresden, and Niimberg — the last-
named having joined the squadron during the action —
to make a torpedo attack.

The Monmouth ceased firing just before the explo-
sion on board the Good Hope, and was then steering
roughly N.W. It was clear she was on her last legs,
as her list had increased and she was down by the bows.
She now suddenly altered course to the N.E. in the
direction of the oncoming enemy. Captain Luce was
senior naval officer, being senior to Captain Brandt,
of the Monmouth. He saw the Germans approaching
and signalled the Monmouth at 8.30, " Enemy following
US," but received no reply. Clearly there was no
alternative left him but to save his ship, if he was not
to make a needless sacrifice of his men, as it was obvious
th.it be could be of no further assistance to his doomed
•it. In addition, it was essential that the Cuno/nts
should be warned ID time to avert a further calamity,
a task not so simple as it sounds, for the German- we
jamming our wireless messages. It is said that when

56 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

last seen the gallant Monmouth turned and made straight
for the enemy in a heroic attempt to ram one of their
ships. Von Spee reports that the Niirnberg sank the
Monmouth at 9.28 p.m. by bombardment at point-
blank range ; this accounts for the seventy-five flashes
of gunfire as well as the play of the beams of a search-
light, which were observed by the Glasgow after leaving
the scene of action. It must have been brutal work.

Thus perished Admiral Cradock together with 1,600
gallant officers and men. In fairness to the Germans
it should be stated that our own officers considered it
too rough for boats to be lowered with any safety.

The Glasgow had been subjected to the combined
fire of the Leipzig and Dresden, whose gunnery was
fortunately not very effective owing to the long range
maintained between the two squadrons before the
light failed. That she had withstood this combined
onslaught for fifty-two minutes (von Spee's report) was
remarkable, but that she had suffered no material damage
was little short of a miracle. Her casualties amounted
to four men slightly wounded. She was hit five times,
on or near the water line, but not in vital places. The
protection afforded by the coal in her bunkers saved her
on three occasions, as otherwise in the nasty sea running
at the time she would have found herself in a very pre-
carious position. Of the remaining two hits, one pene-
trated the deck but did not explode, while the other
wrecked the captain's pantry and cabin. There was one
large hole, which luckily did not prevent her eluding her
pursuers at high speed by steering out to the W.N.W.,
and thence in a wide circle to the southward to the

The Action off Coronel 57

Magellan Strait?, finally arriving at Port Stanley in the
Falkland Islands.

At the outset of the engagement the Good Hope
made a signal down the line to the Otranto, the only
words received being, " Leaving Otranto." The latter,
therefore, hauled out to endeavour to get this signal
direct from the flagship, but as the Good Hope had been
badly hit, nothing further was received. As projectiles
were falling all round her, and it was realised that the
Otranto, being a large ship, would be used by the enemy
as a rangefinder to enable him to calculate the distance
of the Glasgow, she hauled out still farther to upset the
accuracy of his gun-fire. The enemy proceeded to carry
this method of ranging into effect ; the first salvo passed
over the Otranto' s bridge, the second missed the bows by
50 yards, the third fell 150 yards astern, while others
which followed fell, some over, some short. By this time
she had worked out of the line about 1,200 yards, so
turned to the same course, as far as could be judged,
as the remainder of the squadron. She was now out
of range. The Otranto ran the gauntlet of the enemy's
fire most successfully, since she emerged from this
storm of shell quite unscathed, but it must have been
touch and go. Moreover — and hardest of all — she had
to submit to this treatment without being in a position
to retaliate. After the flagship blew up, nothing was
seen of the Monmouth ; subsequently the Glasgow was
reported cro -u^a her stern. Seeing that she could be
of no assistance, the Otranto dodged her opponents
by steaming hill speed to the westward for 200 miles,
and then e to the southward. Rounding ( ape Horn,

58 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

she passed between the Falklands and the mainland
and arrived at Montevideo. Both she and the Glasgow
must have accounted themselves most fortunate in
escaping safely from this unequal contest.

The Canopus, which had been steaming northward
with two colliers, intercepted a wireless message from
the Glasgow to the Good Hope reporting the enemy in
sight. She immediately increased to her full speed,
dispatching the colliers to Juan Fernandez, and pro-
ceeded on her course northward in the hope that she
would arrive in time to engage the enemy. About
9 p.m. she received a signal from the Glasgow that it
was feared the Good Hope and Monmouth had been
sunk, and that the squadron was scattered. Seeing
the hopelessness of continuing on her course, the Canopus
turned round, picked up her colliers, and made for the
Magellan Straits via Smyth's Channel, the successful
navigation of which reflects great credit, since she was
probably the first battleship ever to make use of it.
By this means she succeeded in reaching Port Stanley
without molestation, although the German ships were
constantly in close proximity.

Admiral Cradock appears to have had definite orders
to prevent the enemy coming round to the east coast
of America. The Canopus was only 120 miles away
when he met the enemy But had the Admiral waited
for her the Germans might have slipped past him during
the night, and, moreover, her slow speed would have
seriously hampered the mobility of his squadron. Speak-
ing of Admiral Cradock, Sir Henry Newbolt * says,

* " Tales of the Great War " (Longrnans).

The Action off Coronel 59

" He had asked for reinforcements, and the Admiralty
had sent him what they thought sufficient. It was
not for him to hold back."

The advantages of speed and modern guns of superior
range were perhaps the outstanding features of the
Coronel action. It was not the vain sacrifice which at
first sight it might appear to be, as it probably saved
our ships operating on the east coast of South America
from a similar fate.

Admiral Cradock carried out unflinchingly his search

for a force which he knew would almost certainly be

superior to his own. His unhesitating acceptance of

the action and the gallantry of uie fight uphold the

finest traditions of the Royal Navy, and will always

be recalled by it with pride. Surely, before God and

man, such deeds of heroism go far to mitigate the infamy

of war.

" At set of sun,
Even as below the sea-line the broad disc
Sank like a red-hot cannon-ball through surf
Of seething molten lead, the Santa Maria,
Uttering one cry that split the heart of heaven,
Went down with all hands, roaring into the dark."

Alfred Noyes {Drake).

CHAPTER VII

CONCENTRATION

" And Drake growled, . . .

. . . ' So, lest they are not too slow
To catch us, clear the decks. God, I would like
To fight them ! ' "

— Alfred NOYES (Drake).

Several disquieting wireless messages were received
by the British warships on the east coast of South
America, giving garbled and unreliable accounts of
the Coronel action It was not till November 5th
that a statement which appeared to be fairly authorita-
tive, in spite of its German origin, was received from
Valparaiso. It said that the Monmouth was sunk and
that the Good Hope had probably shared her fate ; no
mention was made of the Canopus, Glasgow, or Otranto.
The command in these waters now devolved upon
Rear Admiral Stoddart (flying his flag in the Carnarvon),
who was still busily engaged in the search for the Karls-
ruhe. His ships had been operating over a wide area
extending from the neighbourhood of Rio de Janeiro
to the northward of St. Paul's Rocks and the Rocas,
and thence to the westward along the north coast of
South America. This otherwise fruitless search achieved
one notable result in compelling the Karlsruhe to aban-
don her system of obtaining supplies through German
storeships coming from Pernambuco, as that port was

60

Concentration 61

kept under rigid observation. She was thus forced to
leave the trade route between Great Britain and South
America for longer periods in order to meet her con-
sort, the armed liner Kronprinz Wilhclm, who now
became a link between her and her sources of supply
in Central America. There was, in consequence, a
marked falling off at this period in the number of her
captures.

Assuming that the worst had happened, and that
the German squadron was now on its way round to
the east coast, it became imperative to unite our re-
maining ships into one squadron as quickly as possible.
It was obvious that with the Australian and Japanese
ships behind them, the Germans could not afford to
linger where they were ; moreover, they had learned
at Valparaiso that we had no naval force of any pre-
ponderance with which to oppose them. Flushed with
their recent victory, it seemed probable that if they
were not much damaged they would most likely
hasten their movements in the hope of meeting our
ships before we had had time to unite or to gather
reinforcements.

The German squadron would not be able to separate
with any safety once we had succeeded in joining to-
gethei our scattered forces, so that the damage they
might do to our commerce would be thereby reduced
to a minimum.

For tb us it will be seen that the River

Plate was admirably situated for the rendezvous of

our ships th.it had escaped from Coronel to the Falk-

, and ol the northern squadron. Again, it was

62 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

possible to coal there without infringing territorial
rights, as there is an excellent anchorage well outside
the three mile limit from the foreshore.

The following calculations, written on November 6th,
1914, were made by the author :

" The German Admiral will expect us to get rein-
forcements out from England, so that it seems pro-
bable that he will lose no time in coming round to the
east coast.

" He arrived at Valparaiso on November 3rd. Sup-
posing he coals there and leaves at earliest on Novem-
ber 4th, the distance from Valparaiso to the Plate
is roughly 2,600 miles, or nine days at 12 knots ; there-
fore, allowing one day for coaling en route, the earliest
that he could be off the Plate would be the 13th, more
likely not before November 15th."

The strategical aspect in this sphere of operations
was completely changed by the success of the German
squadron off Cape Coronel, and necessitated not only
a complete change of plans, but also an entire redis-
tribution of our ships. These consisted of the Carnarvon,
Cornwall, Bristol, Macedonia, and Edinburgh Castle,
also the Defence and Orania, who were near Montevideo,
and the Canopus, Glasgow, and Otranto.

Admiral Stoddart, therefore, decided to go south
to Montevideo at once in order to meet the remainder
of our scattered ships. The Bristol, Macedonia, and
Edinburgh Castle were left to continue the search for
the Karlsruhe, although as a matter of fact she had
blown up on November 4th. Colliers were sent down
south to Montevideo to be in readiness for our ships.

Concentration 63

and were ordered to sail at twelve-hour intervals to
diminish the chance of capture.

The Carnarvon and Cornwall left the base on Novem-
ber 6th, the former calling at Rio de Janeiro on the way
for telegrams. Arriving at the Plate on the ioth, where
we found the Defence and Orama, the Admiral immediately
transferred his flag to the former ship, which was the
newest and most powerful of our cruisers. All ships
rilled up with coal and awaited the arrival of the Glas-
and Otranto ; meanwhile, patrols were constantly
maintained at the mouth of the river.

The following evening the Glasgow arrived amidst
congratulations from us all ; she had put in to the
Falkland Islands to coal, in which assistance was pro-
vided by volunteers from amongst the inhabitants.
After coaling, she was detached to Rio de Janeiro to
go into dry dock, so that the damage to her side might
be properly repaired. The same day the Orama, whilst
patrolling, met and sank the German storeship Navarra
which was set on fire by the Germans when escape
^,ecn to be impossible. We also got the cheering
that the Emden had been sunk and that the
Konigsberg had been bottled up, tidings winch augured
well for the future.

The Admiralty seem to have had a premonition
that the Germans intended to attack the Falklands
for the Canopus, although on her way north to Montc-
>, was ordered back to the Falkland Islands in
ord' c to fortify and arm the harbour of Port Stanley
in ( i»n with the local volunteers, converting

If ml'; a lloating fort.

64 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

The possibility of our encountering and having to
fight von Spee was the subject uppermost in all minds
at this time, and led to a great deal of discussion. The
outstanding feature in the situation was the extra-
ordinary lack of homogeneity of the composition of our
squadron. It consisted of three armoured cruisers of
entirely different classes, each carrying a different arma-
ment, one light cruiser and four armed merchantmen.
The latter could not, of course, be pitted against warships
even of the light-cruiser type, and therefore had to be left
out of^the reckoning. Amongst the four fighting ships
there were four descriptions of guns, viz. two 0/2-inch,
fourteen 7 '5-inch, twenty-two 6-inch, and ten 4-inch,
while the German squadron had only three descriptions,
viz. sixteen 8 "2-inch, twelve 5*g-inch, and thirty-two
4"i-inch. A prominent question, therefore, was what
range we should endeavour tojnaintain during an action ;
the answer to which was very varied, preference being
given to ranges from 14,000 yards downwards. From
the gunnery point of view the enemy undoubtedly held
an advantage, as not only was his squadron more homo-
geneous, having only two classes of ships, but also the
range of his guns was greater. As regards speed, there
was nothing to choose between the two squadrons, who
were evenly matched in this respect. Much would
depend upon whether he would choose to keep his
squadron together for the purpose of an action or to
disperse them on reaching the east coast. Opinions on
this and on many other points were divided. All were
agreed, however, that we ought to give a good account
of ourselves.

Concentration 65

The wildest reports about von Spee's movements
were constantly received from Chilean and other sources.
Whilst at Montevideo rumours were circulated that the
German ships had been seen coming round Cape Horn.

The Admiralty now informed Admiral Stoddart that
reinforcements were being sent out from England at
once ; they had actually started just after our arrival
at the Plate. The secret of this news was well kept,
not an inkling leaking out at home or abroad — a fact
which contributed very largely to our subsequent vic-
tory. It was decided, therefore, to return northwards
in order to effect a junction with the two battle-cruisers
that were on their way out. The squadron sailed on
November 12th, spread out in line abreast, and put in
some useful exercises on the way. Arriving at the base
five days later, we found the Kent, which was expected
as we had heard that she was being sent out to reinforce
us ; she had brought a mail, which made her doubly
welcome. The Bristol and Edinburgh Castle rejoined,
but the latter was ordered off northwards on other ser-
vice, and sailed on November 19th, taking a mail for
England. It was blazing hot, but the next few days
passed quickly enough in carrying out gunnery prac-
tices, patrolling, and coaling ship, during which the
Glasgow returned from Rio, spick and span.

Most of November was a time of some suspense for
our ships, as we were hourly expecting an encounter
with the enemy, and it was with mixed feelings that
we learned of the nature of the reinforcements that were
coming out with such despatch. Our feelings of relief
were also tempered with regret at not having been

66 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

afforded an opportunity to prove our mettle. Further,
there was an awful and terrible thought that it might
be considered necessary to leave one of us cruisers
behind to guard the base.

Most of our ships had had steam on their main
engines incessantly since war broke out, and a rest to
let fires out so as to make necessary adjustments was
badly needed, but was quite impossible near a neutral
coast.

On November 26th our hearts were gladdened by
the sight of the Invincible, bearing the flag of Vice-
Admiral Sturdee, and the Inflexible ; these two formid-
able-looking ships had come out from England at a
mean speed of over 18 knots for fifteen days. Truly a
fine performance !

CHAPTER VIII

POSSIBILITIES AND PROBABILITIES

The various possible courses open to Admiral Count von
Spec, both before and after Coronel, have already been dis-
eased, but the movements of his squadron have not been
subjected to examination in the light that they bear on
the policy which he adopted, nor have the results of that
action been considered from his point of view.

The German squadron sailed from Mas-a-Fuera on
October 27th, and three days later arrived about noon
at a position some fifty miles to the westward of Val-
paraiso, where it remained for upwards of twenty-four
hours. On October 31st — the same day that the Glasgow
wont into Coronel with telegrams and the day before
that action was fought — the squadron steamed off
south, leaving the Niimbcrg to wait off Valparaiso for
a few hours and probably to get information of import-
ance. The German Admiral undoubtedly went to the
neighbourhood of Valparaiso with the express intention
<>t obtaining news and was in communication with the
shore, for he begins his official report on the action fought
iron I by saying that his three light cruisers reached
on November 1st a point about twenty " sea miles from
the Chilean coast, in order to attack .1 British cruiser
[Glasgow), which, according to trustworthy information,
had reached the locality on the previous evening."

It 1-, of course, impossible to know what were von

67

68 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

Spee's intentions at this moment ; they can only be
surmised from a general survey of the situation and
the means that he had of obtaining information. The
latter was acquired by an organised system, for there
were German agents in every South American port.
It may be taken as certain that any ship calling at
or passing Punta Arenas (Magellan Straits) would be
reported to him, and that the names of the ships and
certain of their movements on the south-east coast
would also be known to him.

Easter Island — which was von Spee's original base
— is approximately 2,300 miles from Valparaiso, and
therefore out of range of wireless communication,
although it is possible he might occasionally be able
to take in a message under favourable conditions. How-
ever, it is known from an officer survivor of the Gneisenau
that on October 19th the German Admiral received a
message — possibly through a German supply ship —
stating that a British Squadron consisting of " Good
Hope, Monmouth, and Glasgow was to the south." Now
we know that this squadron was at Punta Arenas on
September 28th, and leaving on that date was employed
searching inlets and bays round Tierra del Fuego for
some days. The Good Hope then returned to the Falk-
lands, finally leaving them on October 22nd, whilst the
others went on to the coast of Chile and were there
from October nth onwards, making use of a sequestered
spot as a base. The Glasgow was at Coronel on October
14th and at Valparaiso the day following, so the fact of a
British Squadron being " south " was well known, though
the information did not reach von Spee till the 19th.

Possibilities and Probabilities 69

On receiving this news von Spee sailed immediately.
He knew he was in superior force to Cradock's squadron,
and the presumption is that he went over to prospect
and. if possible, to force an action. He went straight
to Mas-a-Fuera, only remained two days to coal, and
then on to a position off Valparaiso to pick up further
information.

Immediately on hearing that the Glasgow was at
Coronel on the 31st, he proceeded south to cut her off,
and, as was likely to be the case, to meet Cradock. He
must have judged that the rest of the squadron could
not be far behind the Glasgow. The probability was that
he received information of the Good Hope passing through
the Straits about the 24th or 25th, and he might also
have heard of the Canopus doing so a day or two later,
in which case he would have calculated that the latter
could scarcely be so far north by this time.

There is no indication that by this date von Spee
had made up his mind to quit the South Pacific. He
had hardly had time to make his arrangements for so
doing, and there is no doubt that they were not then
completed.

V< n Spee was at his full strength, having recently

added the Dresden and Leipzig to the squadron while

I land, he possessed the advantage of homo-

:' -.', and his squadron was far more modern. The

result we know, our ships were out-gunned and com-

1. Fate played right into the hands

of \ on this occasion.

1 .1 undoubtedly blow to British pn

in these parts, and the Germans in all the large town.

70 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

were not slow in making the most of this temporary
success in order to advance their own interests. The
rumours that were circulated caused no little perturba-
tion amongst the neutral shipping agents, who feared
that von Spee would lose no time in attacking British
trade, and that those cargoes which were consigned to
Great Britain would be in jeopardy. Insurance rates
rose with a bound, and it is said that the Germans
went about openly deriding the British and causing
the most fantastic articles to be inserted in the local
Press. The exaggerated reports that were published,
both of the action and of its effects, certainly lends
colour to this source of information.

It will be interesting to consider what von Spee
would have done if he had missed Admiral Cradock and
the action off Coronel had not been fought. In view of
his superior speed, von Spee would in all probability have
continued on his southerly course and rounded Cape Horn,
leaving Admiral Cradock behind him. There seem to be
grounds for supposing that he might go to the Cape of
Good Hope, but the campaign in German South West
Africa could scarcely be said to be progressing favour-
ably for the Germans, and it is not unreasonable to
suppose he would have preferred to go north along the
eastern side of South America to harass our trade. It
is legitimate to suppose that in this case he would not
have delayed to attack the Falkland Islands, with
Cradock's squadron on his heels and Stoddart's ships
converging on him from the north ; in fact, it would
have been suicidal, for the wireless station there would
have given our ships warning of his approach, and the

Possibilities and Probabilities 71

delay might have enabled our two forces to unite. From
Stoddart's squadron alone he had nothing to fear, and
most likely would have welcomed an opportunity of
bringing it to action. The presence of the Defence at
Montevideo would certainly have been known to him at
that time, and he would probably have hoped to intercept
her before she joined Cradock. Had all this come to pass,
the Germans might then have separated, and when it
was found that the theatre of operations in the South
Atlantic became too hot for them, they might have
endeavoured to make their way home after doing as
much damage as possible to our commerce.

As events turned out, however, von Spee waited
about at sea for a day or two after the action, appar-
ently in the hope of either hearing news of the Good
Hope or rinding her. Writing at sea on November 2nd,
ays, in a letter that afterwards appeared in the
German Press : "If Good Hope escaped, she must, in
my opinion, make for a Chilean port on account of her
damages. To make sure of this, I intend going to Val-
paraiso to-morrow with Gneisenau and Niirnberg, and
to see whether Good Hope could not be disarmed by
the I lnKans." Writing under date of November 5th, he
adds : " We arrived at Valparaiso this morning. . . .
The new> of our victory had not yet reached here, but
d very quickly." The squadron split up, it seems,
arriving at different dates at Mas-a-Fuera, which be-
« ame the temporary headquarters of the * rei man squadron
for the next fortnight. Here all ships coaled in turn.

imunical maintained by sending the German

light cruisers into Valparaiso one after the other to

72 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

get the latest information. The Leipzig was there
somewhere about November 13th. This would show
a proper caution on his part, as belligerent vessels cannot
use neutral ports except at extended intervals.

At Valparaiso von Spee must have obtained in-
formation concerning the movements of our squadron
under Admiral Stoddart, who had then just sailed north
from Montevideo. He would also have probably been
aware of the presence of the Japanese squadron operating
in the Northern Pacific.

In order to make the position clear, it must be
apprehended that a squadron consisting of the British
light cruiser Newcastle, together with the Japanese
cruiser Idzuma, and the small battleship Hizen, was con-
centrated in the North Pacific. The battle-cruiser
Australia left Suva, Fiji, on November 8th to strengthen
this squadron, so that it may be deduced that this was a
direct result of the Coronel action which took place just a
week before. She joined these ships on November 26th at
Chamela Bay on the west coast of Mexico. The object
of this squadron was to prevent von Spee from coming
north, and to close on him should he remain on the
western coast of South America. Sailing southwards,
these ships visited the Galapagos Islands and then pro-
ceeded on their quest for the enemy, the Newcastle
searching the Cocos Islands en route. When nearing the
coast of Colombia, the splendid news of the Falkland
Islands battle was received, after which these ships
split up and separated.

In view of these various courses of action open to
von Spee, the reader will appreciate how our minds were

Possibilities and Probabilities 73

occupied with the question of his future movements.
Would he, in the hope of adding further to his laurels,
attempt to repeat his success by going into the North
Pacific to engage the Allied squadron there, which might
have been inferior to him in strength ? Or would he go
south and follow up his advantage in a direction where
there was nothing to oppose him for the moment, except
the Canopus and Glasgow ? He could not hope success-
fully to combat all the different squadrons looking for
him, nor, for that matter, did he wish to risk his ships,
for there were no others to replace them. It was not
his role to adopt such an offensive. He therefore chose
to give the impression that he was remaining off Chile,
and then suddenly vanished into complete oblivion.
Leaving no trace of his movements, he was careful to
forgo using all wireless ; and, having completed arrange-
ments as to future supplies, he determined to appear
suddenly where he was least expected. History repeats
itself, and he evidently decided that the boldest plan
was what would be least anticipated, and therefore
most likely to be productive of success.

Taking another point of view, it was obviously to
von Spec's advantage to hasten round to the east coast
of South America as quickly as possible after the action
off Coronel took place, and thus to reap the full benefil
of the success that he had already gained. He could QOl
possibly have shut In I 1 the fad thai the immediate

following up of his victory was the mosl promising
policy for any scheme oi operations in the South At l.i nth .
He would then have been able to strike before rein-
ments could come out from England, which be

74 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

must have been aware would be sent out to hunt him
down. Why, then, did he delay a whole month ?
On his own showing the repairs necessary to render
his ships fit for further service only took a few days,
and it would not take long to arrange for his future
supplies on the east coast of South America with all
the German shipping cooped up in this part of the
world waiting to be put to any useful purpose. Is it,
therefore, unreasonable to suppose that he waited in
order to collect German reservists from Chile, either
to garrison the Falkland Islands once they had been
captured, or to take or escort them home to Germany ?
He knew that he was really superior to the force under
Admiral Stoddart, yet he delayed leaving till November
26th, a period of nearly four weeks. The inference of
which is that he was not ready, and further that a seizure
of the Falkland Islands was deliberately contemplated
and prepared for, and was to be his first step. An
additional possible explanation lies in the deduction
that he could not have estimated that he would have
defeated Cradock so completely, and therefore took
time to consider the altered situation before committing
himself to a definite move, hoping in the interval to
get more information which might lead to a further
stroke of good fortune. The threat of the Australia
and the Japanese squadron to the north was not suffi-
ciently pronounced to force him to hurry.

We have seen that it was almost out of the question
for von Spee to maintain his ships in the Northern
Pacific, but the conditions were entirely different on
the west coast of South America. Here there were a

Possibilities and Probabilities 75

number of uninhabited anchorages where he could
shelter, and he had a large German population to help
him on the coast of Chile. In fact, he did maintain
himself here until he knew that hostile forces were con-
centrating and would move south to drive him out.
Meanwhile, he had effected repairs to his ships, and
had completed arrangements in advance for the supplies
of his ships on the east coast of South America. Thus
the conclusion appeared to be that there was no alterna-
tive open to von Spee but to leave the Pacific, where he
had already shot his bolt.

Whatever the true explanation of his policy may be,
the movements of his squadron point to his having

i quite at a loss what to do next. His position was
so hazardous and uncertain, so full of future difficulties,
that he could not see his way clear for any length of
time in order to work out any concerted plan. He
was a fugitive pure and simple, and felt that whatever
he did was in the nature of a venture.

It was not till Cradock was defeated that he appears
to have formulated his plan for attacking the Falkland
1 -hmds. He then seems to have been carried away by
the effect that the temporary capture of a British colony
and the hoisting of the German Hag would have on our
prestige throughout the world. He would have destroyed
the • station, S< ized the coal and provisions lying

there, and would then have had to abandon the colony
llbsequent recapture. Had he originally contem-
plated SUCh a dramatic coup, he would never have delayed

Lomenl Longer than was m < essary.

Keeping well away from the UbUal trade routes,

76 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

the German ships sailed south, and on the way were
lucky enough to meet the North Wales, one of Cradock's
colliers. They arrived at San Quintin Sound on Novem-
ber 21st, coaled, and stayed five days. Thence von
Spee kept out for 200 miles from the land before turning
south, and got into very rough weather.

An officer in the Gneisenau states :

" November 27th — Force of wind up to 12. Later the
weather moderated a little so that we could proceed at
8 knots.

" November 2gth — Impossible to lay the tables. Broken
up furniture thrown overboard. All crockery was
smashed. Impossible to be on deck. Necessary to
secure oneself with ropes. We are about off the entrance
to the Magellan Straits.

" December 2nd — Sighted two icebergs, appear to
be 50 metres high.

" December 3rd— We are lying at the eastern exit of
the Beagle Channel close to Picton Island.

" December 6th — We are going to Port Stanley."

In judging von Spee's motives, it is as well to bear
in mind that he attained no success whatsoever after
Coronel except for the capture of two sailing ships and a
collier. That our squadron under Admiral Sturdee, having
only arrived the day previously, met him on his arrival off
Port Stanley, was the turn of Fortune's wheel in our favour.

As all the world now knows, the battle of Coronel,
the greatest naval disaster that had befallen our arms
in the war, was to be avenged five weeks afterwards,
when the German squadron in its turn drank to the
dregs the bitter cup of despair.

Part II
THE BATTLE OF THE FALKLANDS

Plan of Action between the
Battle Cruisers "WVINCIBLE"&'lNFL£XIBLE
and the German Armoured Cruisers
i h M.s" invincible" "scharnhorst'&'gneisenau"
December 8W1914.

"inmncible's Course
Enemy's Course

J Full Rigged Sailing Ship

yl 2500 « x

XNEISENAU&, foremost
'•j5 {Tunnel, shot, away
-ffZatttfrr*3^> i0000x_

'■?» between 3ro&4">
'Hiitdnng or 0f6 2 . funnels

■■cNEiSENAii "CNEISENAW'Sank

tCHARNHORSTS"

V? Tunnel shot away

yj '30

Enemy a/co in succession
to Starboard
U 4 "SCHARNHORSTlistmg to Port

SCHARNHORST "Sank
"GNEISENAU "still firing all guns

(jLat.52°4o'S.f
|Long.5G°20 W. j

CHAPTER IX

AWAY SOUTH

" Into the golden West, across the broad
Atlantic once again. ' For I will show,'
Said Drake, ' that Englishmen henceforth will sail
Old ocean where they will.'

— Alfred Noyes {Drakt).

The two battle-cruisers looked very businesslike as
they steamed up to the anchorage ; t|ieir trip out had
taken off a good deal of paint, and they presented some-
thing of the appearance of hardened warriors returning
from a spell in the trenches, as has been so well por-
trayed by Captain Bruce Bairnsfather. To our joy they
brought a small mail only three weeks old.

No sooner had the rattle of their cables ceased than
preparations for coaling were seen to be in progress.

The same day, November 26th, the Defence sailed
for Cape Town via St. Helena to join the flag of Rear-
Admiral H. G. King-Hall. The Macedonia and Otranto
had been sent to Sierra Leone some time previously
to let out fires and examine boilers.

British Squadron was now under the command

of Vice-Admiral 1\ C. D. Sturdee, who held the title of

1 mander-in-Chief, South Atlantic and Pacific. The

Admiral's plan of operations possessed the distinctive

good invention ; it was extremely simple

. e understood. Roughly pinking, it was this.

7v

80 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

The squadron was to sail south to the Falklands, spread-
ing out to extreme visual signalling distance and search-
ing for the enemy's ships. All signals were to be made
by searchlight, and wireless was not to be used unless
it was absolutely necessary. The battle-cruisers were
placed in the centre of the squadron, comparatively
close together, with the double object of being able
to concentrate quickly in any direction and of keeping
secret their presence in these waters. Orders were sub-
sequently given that, after coaling at the Falklands,
the squadron would leave on December 9th, " in
order to get round the Horn before the enemy comes
East." The enemy was sure to be reported if he used
the Straits of Magellan ; but it is believed that, to
make doubly sure of not missing him, the Admiral
intended to divide our squadron. Some of the cruisers
would then have gone through the Straits, meeting him
with the battle-cruisers somewhere in the Pacific ; by
this means the presence of the latter would not become
known.

Sailing on November 28th, on a lovely calm morning,
Admiral Sturdee must have indeed felt a proud man ;
after years of labour in his profession, he had his ambi-
tion realised by the command of a powerful squadron
in war with a definite task before him. It consisted
of Invincible (flag), Inflexible, Carnarvon (flag), Cornwall,
Kent, Glasgow, and Bristol. The Macedonia, now on
her way back from Sierra Leone, was to join us on the
voyage south.

On December 1st a report was received that " the
German fleet was 400 miles off Montevideo " the pre-

Away South 81

vious evening, but no one believed it. The next day
we left dinner hurriedly ; a signal was received, " Alter
course together " to starboard 60 degrees. We altered
and stood by for action, but it only turned out to be
a British vessel — a false alarm which, however, was
excellent practice. Information came through on the
3rd that the German tender Patagonia left Montevideo
during the night with stores for the German warships ;
therefore presumably they were not far off.

We arrived off Port Stanley on the morning of
December 7th, and were piloted into harbour through
a channel in the line of mines, which had been hastily
constructed from empty oil-drums, and laid across the
entrance by the Canopus. As there were only three
colliers here, the ships were ordered to coal in turn ;
the remainder, under convoy of the Orama, were following
us down from the base.

The Falkland Islands number about two hundred
only two of which, East and West Falkland, are
of any size. The coast line of both these islands is
deeply indented and much resembles one of the Outer
Hebrides. Devoid of all trees, the dark brown and
green moors, relieved here and there by patches of
granite quartz, look uninviting, but abound in pen-
guins, hares, and sheep. Some of us, being unable to
coal ship, landed on the day of our arrival and shot
some hares and geese — a welcome change for the larder.
It was the breeding season, and the penguin camps or
rookeries were a striking sight ; on approaching them
hundred-, would stand up and waddli: forward in a
threatening attitude, making a terrible din in order to

G

82 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

protect their eggs. So numerous are they compared
with the inhabitants that the Governor is locally called
the " King of the Penguins."

The little town of Port Stanley, the capital, lies on
the south side of the inner portion of a harbour on
the east coast of East Falkland, and consists of two
streets of houses, almost all, except Government House
and the cathedral, constructed of timber and corru-
gated iron. It is very much like one of the new small
towns of Canada. The principal fuel is peat, which
may be seen stacked as in Ireland. The population
numbers about a thousand, and another thousand —
mostly farmers and shepherds of Scottish origin — live
out on the moors of the islands.

During the summer the temperature averages about
480 Fahr., and it is nearly always blowing hard, rain-
ing, hailing, or snowing. Situated in a cold current
from the Antarctic, the temperature only falls eleven
degrees in the winter ; as a result, scarcely any of the
inhabitants can swim, it being too cold to bathe. Owing
to the absence of sun and summer heat, wheat, oats, and
English vegetables do not thrive, but the colony is
none the less remarkably healthy.

When the news of the Coronel disaster reached
them, the islanders were naturally much concerned for
their safety. They had a volunteer corps of a few
hundred men, which took to training most assiduously
and quickly improved in efficiency. Every man was a
good horseman and proficient with the rifle, but the
corps were not sufficiently numerous to prevent a landing.
A council of war was held by the Governor, at which the

84 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

position was fully discussed. It seemed only too prob-
able that the Germans would attack the Islands, and
arrangements were made to send away from Stanley
the few women and children. Stores of provisions were
secreted within easy reach of the town, and the public
money, official documents, confidential books, and
valuables were either removed to a place of safety or
buried.

This was the position when the Canopus and the
Glasgow arrived on November 8th. Sailing the same
evening, the Canopus, when half-way to Montevideo,
was ordered by the Admiralty to return and guard the
colony.

On November 13th a warship was sighted from
the signal station at Port Stanley making straight to-
wards the harbour from the eastward, an unusual direc-
tion from which to approach. The volunteers were
called out by the church bells sounding the alarm, and
every preparation was made to resist a landing ; the
Canopus on her part could get no reply from the wire-
less station, so was only able to conclude that Port
Stanley had fallen into the enemy's hands. When it
was seen that the visitor was none other than the Canopus,
the feelings of joy and relief were universal and knew
no bounds.

Most of the inhabitants buried all their worldly
goods of any value, some using their back gardens, which
are lightly fenced off from one another, whilst others
even carried furniture some distance inland. Several
amusing stories resulted. One of these Scots, from
the window of his house, had watched his neighbour

Away South 85

burying a tin box, and had carefully noted its exact
position. Being hard up, he scaled the fence that night
and dug up and forced the box. Finding it contained
sovereigns, he helped himself to a portion, replaced
the box, and covered it over carefully with earth. A
few days later, temptation getting the better of him, he
paid his neighbour's garden another visit ; on the third
occasion, however, he was caught red-handed. When
brought to book his defence was that as they were
such friends he had not taken the whole lot the first
time, which would have been quite easy to do, but
only a little just when it was needed to tide him over
his difficulties.

The Bristol, Glasgow, and Inflexible were ordered
to coal as soon as we arrived, the remainder awaiting
their turn. The Carnarvon, Cornwall, and Bristol were
allowed to put fires out to clean boilers and make adjust-
ments to the valves and machinery of the main engines,
in preparation for a protracted sea voyage. The Mace-
donia patrolled the entrance to the harbour, the Kent
being ordered to relieve her at 8 o'clock the follow-
morning. The Bristol and Glasgow, being of light
draught, proceeded into the inner harbour, but the rest
of the squadron anchored in the outer harbour, Port
William, as will be seen from the plan.

1 here is no telegraph cable to the Falklands, so
that it was obvious the first point of attack by the
iv would be the wireless station. To protect this
ili' Canopus entered the inner harbour, forced hei i it
aground on the muddy bottom, ,m<l moored taut head
and stern in a position that would enable her to com-

86 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

mand the southern approach. Here she was able to
fire over the narrow neck of low-lying land, that at
the same time served partially to conceal her. An
observation station, connected with the ship by tele-
phone, was set up ashore, with an elaborate plan for
obtaining the bearing and elevation for the guns. Top-
masts were housed, and the ship, masts, and funnels were
painted all the colours of the rainbow in great big
splodges to render her less visible. A look-out station
was set up in Sparrow Cove, and three 12-pounder
batteries were hastily constructed to dominate the
approaches. The landing and placing of these guns,
together with the digging of the emplacements, called
for a great deal of hard work. Every credit is due to
the Canopus for the admirable manner in which she
dealt with the situation.

Major Turner, who was in command of the Falkland
Island Volunteers, was indefatigable in his efforts to
prepare efficient land defences. This corps gave valu-
able assistance to the Canopus, co-operating in the work
of preparing the coast defences. Prior to the arrival of
the Canopus, their only guns were a 12-pounder 8-cwt.
field gun which had been lent by the Glasgow, and a
few very antique muzzle-loading field guns.

CHAPTER X

ENEMY IN SIGHT

' And from the crow's iiest of the Golden Ilyude
A aoaraan cried, ' By God, the ..hunt is up ! "

— Au'RED NOYES {Drake).

December Sth, 1914, was apparently to prove an ex-
ception to the general rule in the Falklands, where
it usually rains for twenty-one days during the last
month of the year, for a perfect mid-summer's morning
g ive every promise of a fine day to follow. The prospect
of a busy day coaling, and taking in stores, brought
with it thoughts of the morrow when we were to set
forth on our quest after the enemy. The colliers went
their round from ship to ship, and the rattling of the
winches hoisting the coal inboard never ceased.

At 7.56 a.m. the Glasgow fired a gun to attract the
attention of the Invincible, who was busy coaling, to the
signal of the Canopies reporting smoke in sight to the south.

Shortly after 8 a.m. the officers in the Cornwall were
all fitting at breakfast when the Chief Yeoman of Signals
entered with a beaming face, full of news, to report that
cruisers were in sight to the southward. The general
opinion was that some Japanese cruisers were probably
coming to join 11-, and attention was again turned to
\>i< .1!;!.

About 8.15 a.m. came a signal from the flag ship:

Rai l for full speed, report when ready." Rumour

had been so rife oi late that we still remained c< ptical

88 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

until a few minutes later news came from the signal
station on Sapper Hill that two hostile men-of-war
were approaching from the southward, and shortly
after that smoke was visible beyond these vessels.

It afterwards transpired that a lady named Mrs.
Felton, the wife of a sheep farmer living near Point
Pleasant, in the south of the Island, sent her maid and
house-boy to the top of a ridge to report everything
they saw whilst she telephoned the sighting of the
enemy's ships to the nearest signal station, from which
it was passed to Port Stanley. She continued to send
messages reporting every subsequent movement of the
German ships. The three German colliers, two of which
were sunk, were also first sighted by her and duly re-
ported. She afterwards received a silver salver from
the Admiralty in recognition of her prompt action, and
her maid a silver teapot, whilst the signalman at Sapper
Hill, Port Stanley, received £5 from Admiral Sturdee —
a fact we had cause to remember later on, when fre-
quent reports of " hearing distant firing," " sighting
smoke," resulted in one or two wild-goose chases !

" Enemy in sight." What a thrilling message for
us all ! We could scarcely believe our ears. " What a
stroke of luck ! " was the general comment. But this
was no time for ruminating ; deeds, not words, were
required. At last " the Day " for which we had pre-
pared had dawned. In very truth the hunt was up.
The magic news travelled round the ship's company like
lightning, and they fell in in record time — in spite of
having to forgo some of their breakfast. The Invincible,
Inflexible, and Carnarvon were in the middle of coaling.

Enemy in Sight 89

Colliers were cast off, and all ships prepared for action in
case the enemy appeared off the entrance to Port William.

As several of our ships had one engine down at six
hours' notice, the bustle and activity in the engine
rooms may well be imagined. We on deck naturally
enough were soon ready, and chafed at the delay.

The Kent wont out of harbour to reconnoitre, to
report on the movements of the enemy, and to
relieve the Macedonia. The enemy's two leading ships —
the Gneiscnau and Nurnberg — were in sight and were
approaching the wireless station, intending to wreck
it. When near the Wolf Rocks they stopped engines and
turned to the north-eastward. The bearing and elevation
of the enemy ships having been telephoned from the ob-
servation station, the Canopus, finding that the}T could get
no closer, opened fire over the low neck of land at 9.20
a.m. with her 12-inch guns, firing five rounds at a range
of 12,000 yards {see page 83). It was the first time that
most of us had heard a shot fired in a naval action,
and it brought home very forcibly the fact that we
should soon be tackling the job to which we had looked
forward for so long. Hoisting their colours, the enemy
turned away S.E. to join the main squadron, which
headed out to the eastward. It afterwards transpired
that the ' icrmans had seen the tripod masts of our
hit tie-cruisers over the land, which probably decided
von Spee in turning away from his objective. In one
moment all his hopes "I destroying our Fleet -supp
to consisl <»f Carnarvon, Cornwall and Bristol, ami pos-
sibly the Canopus and Glasgow the wireless station,
and then capturing the (<>l<>ny, were dashed to the

go The Battle of the Falkland Islands

ground. From survivors it appears that one of the
Canopus's shells had ricochetted, striking the Gneisenau
at the base of her after funnel ; it was also claimed
that a piece of another hit the Niirnberg — good shooting
by indirect fire at such a range, with guns of an old
type and improvised fire-control arrangements.

Officers of the Canopus, who were in the observation
station ashore, saw through the telescope of their theo-
dolite the men on board the Gneisenau fallen in on
deck ; they could be distinguished, quite plainly, dressed
ready for landing, in order to capture the wireless station
under cover of their ship's guns. But when the Canopus
opened fire with her first two projectiles they lost no
time in scuttling away to their action stations.

An amusing incident occurred on board the Canopus
when the enemy first hove in sight. The stokers off
watch climbed up inside the foremost funnel to see
what was going on and sat round the edge, feeling quite
secure as they knew the ship was ashore — hard and fast.
They very soon came down, however, when they were
informed that the boilers of that funnel were being
lit up and the ship going to sea.

At 9.40 a.m. the Glasgow went out to join the Kent
in observing the enemy's movements. Five minutes
later the squadron weighed, with the exception of the
Bristol, who had all her fires out to clean boilers. She
was ready three-quarters of an hour later, however,
which must have constituted a record for ships of her
class. The Carnarvon, Inflexible, Invincible, and Corn-
wall proceeded out in the order named, the Inflexible
ramming a sailing pinnace belonging to the Cornwall,

Enemy in Sight 91

half full of stores, on her way through the line of mines ;
fortunately a barrel of beer belonging to the wardroom
officers had previously been rescued ! The Macedonia
was ordered to remain behind in Port William. It was
wry clear with a slight north-westerly breeze — ideal
conditions for a long-range action.

The last of our line cleared the harbour about 10.30
a.m., when the five enemy ships could be seen hull down
on the horizon to the S.E., 12 to 13 miles off, steaming off
in the hopeless attempt to escape. The signal " General
chase " was flying from the Invincible, and the magnificent
spectacle of our ships, each with four or five white
ensigns fluttering in the breeze, all working up to full
spued, will always live in the memory of those who
witnessed it on that eventful day.

The surprise and horror of the Germans at seeing
our two battle-cruisers for the first time was testified
by the survivors, who said, " They tried not to believe
it." It must have been an awful moment finding them-
selves suddenly face to face with almost certain de-
struction. First of our ships came the little Glasgow,
dashing along like an express train, then the two huge
battle-cruisers going about 25 knots, belching forth
volumes of dense black smoke as they made use of
their oil fuel to quicken their fires, followed by the Kent,
Carnarvon, and Cornwall doing about 22 knots.

The Admiral reduced speed for an hour to 20 knots
at 11. 15 a.m., to allow the " County" cruisers to catch
up, for it wa.-, evident that we were rapidly gaining on
the enemy, as we sped along on ;ui easterly eour.se. The

Glasgow dered to keep three miles ahead of the

92 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

Invincible. There was now an opportunity to get out of
coaling kit and have a hasty wash. The ship's com-
panies were consequently sent to dinner early, acting on
the good old maxim that a man always fights better on
a full stomach ; but the excitement was too intense for
most men to have more than a bite, and they were
mostly to be seen crowding about the ship's decks
munching a hastily made sandwich.

At 11.27 A-M- tne Bristol reported that the smoke
of three steamers, enemy transports, had been sighted
from the signal station at Point Pleasant to the south-
ward of the Island, whereupon the Commander-in-Chief
ordered the Bristol and Macedonia to destroy them. They
arrived to find only two, both big colliers, the Baden
and Santa Isabel ; the Bristol took off the crews and
then sank the vessels. Half an hour later the Bristol
learnt the news of the result of the action, and that the
sacrifice of their valuable cargoes had been unnecessary.
The Macedonia, who was first upon the scene, sighted
smoke on the horizon, but could see no ship. Rumour
had it that this third ship was the Seidlitz, and that she
had a landing party of armed men and field guns on
board, but this has never been substantiated in any way.

The Glasgow was ordered back, and at 12.20 p.m.
the Commander-in-Chief decided to attack the enemy
with the battle-cruisers, whose speed was increased to
25 knots. The enemy were steaming in two divisions
in quarter-line, first the Gneisenau and Niirnberg on
the left of the line, then the Schamhorst (flag), Dresden,
and Leipzig ; the latter being astern of the remain-
der of their ships, who were on the starboard bow of

Enemy in Sight 93

our squadron, became the first target. " Action "
was sounded, and at once not a soul was to be seen
about the decks, each man being busy at his appointed
station. The Admiral hoisted the signal " Open fire "
at 12.47, an<3 eight minutes later the Inflexible fired
at the Leipzig the first round of the action ; the In-
vincible followed almost immediately afterwards. Both
ships were now going their full speed, nearly 27 knots,
and firing slowly and deliberately at the great range
of 16,000 yards (over nine land miles). The huge
columns of water, over 150 feet high, thrown up by
our 12-inch projectiles, which weigh 840 lb., some-
times completely blotted out the enemy target at this
distance. Owing to the German ships being end-on,
it was difficult to get the direction, but our shots were
falling very close to them at times, and soon produced
a drastic change in their movements.

Admiral von Spee is said to have now made this
signal to his ships : ' The armoured cruisers will
engage the enemy as long as possible, the light cruisers
are to use every endeavour to escape." Acting on
this, at 1.20 p.m. the Dresden, the Niimberg — which
one of our battle-cruisers claimed to have hit — and
the Leipzig turned away to the southward, the posi-
tion- of the -hips being roughly as shown in the plan
(p. 94 . The Schamhorst and Gncisenau will be seen
turning to port to engage the battle-cruisers, which
iinultaneously on to a parallel course, whilsl
the remainder of our squadron, except the Carnarvon,
which presumably had orders to proceed with the Com-
mander-in-4 hief, tnrn< d and gave chase to the Dresden,

94 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

Leipzig, and Numberg. The Carvarvon was, of course,
unable to keep up with the big ships, and did not get
into action until later ; she was now 10 miles astern, and
altered course to port to cut a corner and join the Flag.
All this while the " County " cruisers were coming
along with all possible speed. The Glasgow was
stationed clear of the battle-cruisers, which were

ROUGH DIAGRAM OF ACTION OIF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

8T? DECEMBER, 1914.

"CARNARVON*

"Ni/RNBERGl,,.c\$^

Diagram showing <?*.. ^w

position at 120p.m. "jjtf*1 ii :Vg^
weather conditions excellent v t *%,»

Wind N.W

followed by the Kent, Cornwall, and Carnarvon.
When the action commenced the crews of these ships
had the most perfect view of a modern naval engage-
ment fought at long range. As an officer in the Kent
described it : "We were spectators in the front row
of the stalls, as it were, so close that we could almost
touch the actors on the stage, yet so far that no stray
missile disturbed the comfort of our view. The best

Enemy in Sight 95

in the house at a performance of one of the few
remaining spectacles which cannot be bought for money."

Imagine a calm, smooth sea, the sun shining and
not a cloud in the sky, the ship steaming at something
owr 23 knots, and the men crowded on the turrets
and in every available corner, tier upon tier, for all
the world as if looking on at a cup tie at the Crystal
Palace. ... It was a wonderful sight. The big ships
buried their sterns in the sea, throwing up the seething
water in their wakes as they dashed onwards. The
bright flashes of their guns showed up strikingly, fol-
lowed successively by the dark brown puffs of cordite
smoke ; the seconds were counted until the reports
were heard and huge columns of water thrown up by
the splashes were seen. Many of the men had had
friends in the Good Hope and Monmouth whose fate was
fresh in their minds. " Give 'em one for the Mon-
mouth ! " and " Go on, boys, give 'em hell — let the
blighters feel what it's like ! " were shouted quite un-
consciously, punctuated by loud cheers when a salvo
pitched perilously close to the enemy ships. Of course,
the majority realised our superiority, but those in
authority must have felt a pride in such men who gave
the impression they would face odds with intrepidity.

The battle now divided itself into two separate
engagements, the battle-cruisers and the Carnarvon,
which were engaging the two enemy armoured enn
and the Cornwall, Kent, and Glasgow, which gave chase
to the light cruisers. Later, a third action developed
when the Kent wenl after the NUrnberg. Each <>f the e
will be taken in turn and described separately.

CHAPTER XI

THE BATTLE-CRUISER ACTION

" Are hell-gates burst at last ? For the black deep
To windward burns with streaming crimson fires !
Over the wild strange waves, they shudder and creep
Nearer — strange smoke-wreathed masts and spare, red spires
And blazing hulks."

— Alfred Noyes {Drake).

A few minutes after the German light-cruisers turned
away to the S.S.E. in accordance with his orders, Admiral
Count von Spee, apparently deciding to accept the in-
evitable, determined to try and close so as to get into
the effective range of his 8.2-inch guns. With this in-
tention, his two armoured cruisers turned in succession
about 80 degrees to port, which brought them into
line-ahead with the Gneisenau leading, and then opened
fire at 1.30 p.m. But he had reckoned without his
host, as this very obvious manoeuvre did not at all suit
Admiral Sturdee's book, who was acting on the principle
that ammunition is cheaper than human life, and was
resolved to fight at his own chosen range. Our ships,
therefore, eased speed to 24 knots, and turned together
away from the enemy to port, which brought them at
the same time into line ahead with the flag ship Invincible
in the van.

The two squadrons were on nearly parallel courses
{see facing page 79) . The Inflexible had checked fire for

96

The Battle-Cruiser Action 97

a while, but now reopened on the Schamhorst at a
range of 14,500 yards. Both the enemy ships concen-
trated their fire on the Invincible at this time, whilst
ours fired each at his opponent. The respective arma-
ments are seen from the following:

Name Tonn

Armament

Completion

Armour Belt

:ble )
Inflexible i " " 7'"5 ' "

I2*l

26

f 1909 •
" (1908 .

. 7 to 4 in.

I16-4* 1

. 7 to 4 in.

10,850 . ,

4-7-5* •
6-6*

--

. . 1903 . .

7 to 4 in.

r$t )

> . . 11,420

f 8~S~" )

(23.5

1908

6 to 3 in.

• • &-5.9'[-

1
U3.8

Gneitenau )

[ 20-3.4* )

.. 1908 ..

6 to 3 in.

Compiled from " Brasscy's Naval Annual."

As Admiral Sturdee edged away and did not
allow the range to get below 13,500 yards, the fire
of the Germans was not effective. A gunnery officer
stated that their fire control was efficient, and
that their salvoes, fired frequently, fell well together,
the spread being about 200 yards. They had been
firing about ten minutes when the Schamhorst went
ahead and took the lead, so our ships changed
targets. For a short time both German ships now fired
at the Inflexible, but without result ; soon afterwards
they again honoured the Invincible with their attentions,
and, getting the range, scored their first hit about 1.45
P.M. The range was now increased, spotting the fall
of -hot became more and more difficult, and finally
smoke interfered with our gunfire. At 2 p.m. the
of the enemy was 16,450 yards. Ten min-
later von turned right away and made a

id • mpt to escape, a he had been unable
1 to cl quarters. We turned gradually after

98 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

him, but as he continued to turn away, in the words
of Admiral Sturdee, " A second chase ensued." All
firing ceased, and there was an appreciable lull in the
proceedings.

Of the damage to the Schamhorst at this time
no estimate can be formed, but survivors from the
Gneisenau stated that they had three direct hits, re-
sulting in fifty men being killed and wounded. To the
uninitiated this may seem to be poor shooting ; but
the difficulty of seeing clearly enough to make accurate
corrections to the gunsights, the extreme range, and
the disturbing effect of the enemy's fire must all be
taken into account. Doubtless, too, there were several
hits of an insignificant nature on the upper works and
rigging that were not taken into account. It was
impossible to tell at such a long range whether we scored
a hit unless a fire resulted.

The efficiency of the engine-room staff was now put
to the test ; they nobly responded, with the result that
our big ships attained a greater speed than they had
ever done before.

At this juncture a full-rigged sailing ship appeared
on the port hand of our battle-cruisers ; she was painted
white, and her sails were shining as if bleached in the
bright sunlight ; with stunsails and every stitch of
canvas spread she sailed majestically along, looking a
perfect picture. So close was she that the Admiral was
forced to alter his course to pass a couple of miles clear
of her, so that the enemy's shell ricochetting should not
hit her. Truly it must have been a thrilling and dramatic
moment for her to find herself an involuntary witness

The Battle-Cruiser Action 99

of such a wonderful spectacle ! Imagine her consterna-
tion at being plunged suddenly into the middle of a
red-hot naval action between powerfully armed modern
men-of-war, with shell falling in the water quite close
alongside.

The distance of the retreating enemy was rapidly
decreasing, until at 2.45 p.m. Admiral Sturdee gave the
order to open fire at a range of about 15,000 yards.
Von Spec held on his course in the vain hope, apparently,
of drawing us on, so that by a sudden turn made later
he might " get to grips." Eight minutes afterwards the
Germans were forced to turn to port towards us, forming
into line-ahead and opening fire as soon as they came
round. We hauled out once again on to an almost parallel
course. The range had appreciably dropped, and was
at one time under 12,000 yards. Things now became
fasl and furious, shot and bursting shell were every-
where- in the air, and our 12-inch guns were doing terrible
ution. " It was like hell let loose," said a petty
officer in the flagship, which was hit several times. The
German gunnery was not nearly as good as it had been
in the first phase of the engagement, whilst we had settled
down to business and were, on the whole, more accurate
than before. An officer in the Inflexible remarked that at
tin time several of the enemy's shell fell between our

hips, and that as his ship approached these yellow-
green patches, he wondered whether the debatable

a that do two projectiles ever hit the same spot
would prove a< curate.

'I!i rnhorst was badly hit al ; P.M., starting

a hie forward, but she Continued to blaze away; the

ioo The Battle of the Falkland Islands

Gneisenau also bore signs of the severe treatment she
had received from the Inflexible. The Invincible now
met with some damage, and suffered by far the most
as the enemy's fire was naturally concentrated on
her. The wind had increased, and was blowing the
smoke across the guns, impeding our gunners, and the
Carnarvon was coming up astern, so at 3.18 Admiral
Sturdee executed a sudden manoeuvre by putting his
helm over to starboard, turning completely around,
and crossing his own track so as to steer roughly S.W. ;
this put the enemy completely off the range, and also
forced him five minutes later on to a parallel course,
in order to avoid the alternative of being raked fore
and aft. As both our ships had altered course together,
their respective positions became reversed — the In-
flexible leading — and they presented their port sides
to the enemy {see facing p. 79). The Carnarvon cut
the corner and came up on the off side of the battle-
cruisers, in accordance with Admiral Sturdee's orders,
as her guns were useless at ranges exceeding 12,000
yards. The Scharnhorst, who had already had a bad
hammering from the flagship, was now subjected to
the concentrated fire of our two big ships for a very
short time, during which the Gneisenau was lost sight
of in her consort's smoke. At 3.30 p.m. the Scharn-
horst's fire had slackened perceptibly, and one shell had
shot away her third funnel.

The Invincible now engaged the Gneisenau, who was
not nearly so badly damaged and was firing all her
guns. In fact, all ships were at it as hard as they could
go, but the Inflexible came off lightly on account of

The Battle-Cruiser Action 101

the plight of her opponent. The noise was indescrib-
able, shell were hurtling through the rigging; when one
actually struck and burst, the whole ship quivered and
staggered, while the crash of steel plates falling, and
splinters of shell striking the upper works, sounded like
hundreds of empty tins being hurled against one another.

The Scharnhorst was clearly in a very bad way, and
looked, as she was, a perfect wreck. Masses of steel
twisted and torn as if growing out in all directions
like the roots of a tree, clouds of steam were going up
sky High, and she was blazing fore and aft. The Admiral
says, " At times a shell would cause a large hole to
appear in her side, through which could be seen a dull
red glow of flame." She was 14,000 yards distant. Up
till quite near the end, however, she continued to fire in
salvos, her starboard guns having only been in action
since the last turn was made. At 3.56 p.m. the Com-
mander-in-Chief decided to close in and give her the
coup dc grace, which enabled the Carnarvon to get into
action and open fire for the first time. By 4 p.m. both
the Scharnhorst' s masts, as well as her three funnels,
shot away, and she was listing heavily to port.
She struggled on hopelessly and went over more and
more, until at 4.10 p.m. she was on her beam ends.
! seven minutes she remained in this position, her
•ill going round, and then suddenly sank like

tone, with her Hag still Hying.

Shortly before the German flagship sank, our ships

( h> ' ked lire and then opened on the Gneisenau. It will

en from the plan of the action that at the time the

Invincible turned two complete circles in a sort of figure

102 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

of eight, the Gneisenau hesitated for a minute or two
as to whether she should stand by her consort to save
life. Under the impression, apparently, that our flagship,
which had turned towards the Scharnhorst, was about
to pick up survivors, the Gneisenau passed on the far side
of the sinking ship and opened a heavy and well-directed
fire on the Inflexible. We were now three against one,
who was, nevertheless, determined to sell herself as
dearly as possible. It was a gallant attempt.

The distance was fortunately too great to see clearly
the wretched survivors of the Scharnhorst left struggling
hopelessly against their fate, but it brought the dark
side of war very vividly into notice for the first time.
A quarter of an hour after she sank the Carnarvon passed
over the exact spot, but neither survivors nor wreckage
were to be seen.

The weather now changed, a light drizzling mist
obscuring the former visibility. It was obvious that
there could be only one end to the fight now in pro-
gress, and that it could not long be delayed. At 4.15
p.m. the Invincible opened fire on the Gneisenau, which
shifted her target from the Inflexible and fired at the
flagship with creditable precision. She was " strad-
dling " the Invincible at 4.25, the range being about
10,000 yards, so this was increased. During the next
quarter of an hour our flagship was hit three times,
but the German was taking terrible punishment. At
4.47 she ceased firing ; her colours had been shot away
several times, but she had hoisted them again and
again. Now, however, no colours were to be seen, so
it was only natural to conclude she had struck, though

The Battle-Cruiser Action 103

it was afterwards ascertained that she had no more
left to hoist. Our ships turned to avoid getting too
far off, when, to the surprise of all, she suddenly fired
off a solitary gun, showing that she was still game.
Unlike her late consort, which looked a perfect wreck
for some time before actually sinking, she had to all
appearances suffered very little. At 5.8 p.m., however,
her foremost funnel went by the board.

The carnage and destruction wrought in the Gnciscnau
by our three ships were terrible, and it was astonishing
what a deal of hammering she was still able to bear.
That her casualties at this time were very heavy was
ad doubt, as shell were to be seen tearing up her
decks as they burst, while the upper works became
a veritable shambles. It was not till 5.15 that the
doomed ship, being badly hit between the third and
foirth funnels, showed real signs of being in extremis.
She was still firing, however, and even scored an effec-
tive hit — the last one she was to get — about this
)d.

At 5.30 she was obviously dead beat and turned
towards our squadron with a heavy list to starboard,
afire fore and aft, and steam issuing in dense clouds
from all directions. Admiral Sturdee now ordered
" Cea=e fire," but before the signal could be hoisted
enau opened fire again, and continued to keep
it up with her one remaining undamaged gun. This
1 until it was silenced, when our ships clo

in on her. The ensign Hying at her foremast head was
hauled d >C'. bul the one at her peak was left

Hying. Five minutes later she again hied, but only

104 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

one solitary round, after which she maintained silence.
The signal was made to cease firing immediately after-
wards, when it was evident that her gallant struggle
was at an end.

She now heeled over quite slowly, giving her men
plenty of time to get up on deck. At 6 p.m. our ships
were perhaps 4,000 yards off, and the Germans could
be seen gathering together on her " forecastle quarter
deck." Remaining on her beam ends for a few seconds,
during which the men were seen clambering about on
her side, she quite gently subsided and disappeared
without any explosion, although a film of steamy haze
hovered over the spot where she sank. The bow re-
mained poised for a second or two, after which she
foundered at 6.2 in latitude 520 40' S., longitude 560 20'
W., having withstood the combined fire of our ships
for an hour and forty-five minutes.

The sea was no longer quite calm, and a misty,
drizzling rain was falling. Closing in hastily, every
effort was made to save life, and boats were got out
and lowered. This is no easy job after an action, as
the boats are turned inboard, resting on their crutches,
and are kept partially filled with water in case a shell
might strike them and cause a fire. This water must
first be drained out, then the weight of the boat is hoisted
on to the slips to enable it to be swung outboard, which
is not easy if the ship has been hit near the water-line,
causing a list. Finally, several of the boats are certain
to be riddled with shell splinters.

A midshipman, describing the scene that followed,
writes, " We cast overboard every rope's end we can

The Battle-Cruiser Action 105

and try our hands at casting to some poor wretch feebly
struggling within a few yards of the ship's side. Missed
him ! Another shot. He's further off now ! Ah ! the
rope isn't long enough. No good ; try someone else.
He's sunk now ! "

The men, however, had not yet heard of the rough
weather during the Coronel action, and still thought
that the Germans might have saved our poor fellows
there. Lines were thrown over with shouts of, " Here,
Sausage, put this round your bell}-," and the like. Taking
into consideration that it was estimated some 600 men
had been killed or wounded, and that the temperature
of the water was 400, it was fortunate that as many as
170 officers and men were rescued. The gallant Admiral
Count von Spee, whose conduct bears out the best
traditions of naval history, and his two sons, all lost
their lives in the course of the day.

A curious feature of this action was the terrific
damage done by 12-inch lyddite shell. One of the
(jneisenaus turrets was severed from its trunk and blown
bodily overboard. Nearly every projectile that hit
caused a fire, which was often promptly extinguished
by the splash of the next one falling short. Indeed, it
stated by the prisoners that the guns' crews in
the German ships were frequently working their guns
up to their knees in water, and towards the latter
pari of the engagements wire unable to lire on
account of the volume of water thrown up by shori
shot .

I be //.- incible had been hit about twenty-two times,
but the lighting efficiency of the ship was not affected.

106 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

Eighteen of these were direct hits, two being below
the water-line on the port side, one of which flooded
a bunker and gave her a list to port. There were no
casualties, however, amongst her complement of 950,
The Inflexible was only hit directly twice ; she had one
man killed and three slightly wounded. Her main
derrick was cut in two, so that she was unable to use
her steam boats. The few casualties speak more elo-
quently than any words of the tactics adopted by
Admiral Sturdee in putting to the greatest possible use
the heavier armament at his disposal.

The Invincible had some interesting damage. One
8.2-inch shell burst and completely wrecked her ward-
room, making a gigantic hole in her side. Two others
hit the stalk of her after conning tower and burst, but
did no damage to the inmates, who only complained of
the fumes being sweet and sickly, leaving an unpleasant
taste which, however, soon wore off. Another interesting
case was the extraordinary damage done by a spent
projectile falling at an angle of fifty degrees. Passing
close under her forebridge, it cut the muzzle of
one of her 4-inch guns clean off, after which it passed
through the steel deck, through a ventilating trunk,
through the deck below, and finished up in the
Admiral's storeroom — side by side with the cheese,
which put the finishing touch to its career. Another
shell caused a nasty hole on the water-line, seven
feet by three, which was found to be beyond the capa-
bilities of the ship's staff to repair temporarily. The
bunker had to be left flooded, all the surrounding bulk-
heads being carefully shored up and strengthened until

The Battle-Cruiser Action 107

she returned to England. In "A Naval Digression"*
" G. F." says : " On a part of the main deck one might
have imagined for a second that a philanthropist had
been at work, for there, strewn about, were a thousand
odd golden sovereigns ; a shell had come through the
upper deck, and, visiting the Fleet-Paymaster's cabin,
had ' upset ' the money chest. It had then gone through
the bulkhead into the chaplain's cabin next door, and
finally passed out through the ship's side, taking with
it a large part of the reverend gentleman's wardrobe,
and reducing to rags and tatters most of what it had
the decency to leave behind."

The Commander of the Gneisenau was picked up by
the Inflexible, and gave some interesting details. De-
scribing the time when the Canopus fired at the Gneisenau
and NUrnberg on their first approach to Port Stanley,
he told us that he said to his Captain, " Captain, we
must either fight or go faster," adding that in his opinion
the day would have ended very differently had they
come up boldly off the mouth of the harbour and bom-
barded our ships at anchor before they were able to
get out. There can be no doubt that the issue would
have been the same, but the Germans might have been
able to inllict some serious damage, especially to those
ihips Lying nearest the mouth of the harbour, who
would have masked the battle-cruisers' fire. However,
his Captain elected to run, so they went " faster."

During the action he had to go round the ship with
the Ore-master, putting out any fires that were dis-
re& Whilst going his rounds during the engage-
• " E l'i Magaxin

108 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

ment he found a stoker near one of the drinking tanks
on the mess deck, who said he had come up to get a
drink of water. The Hun Commander told him that
he had no business to leave his post, and, drawing his
revolver, shot him dead where he stood.

A curious yarn is connected with Admiral Stoddart,
who was in the Carnarvon. He had a distant cousin
in the German Navy whom he had never met and about
whose career he had frequently been asked in years
gone by. This cousin of his was one of those saved
by the Carnarvon, and when he got aboard he said,
" I believe I have a cousin in one of the British ships.
His name is Stoddart." To rind he was the Admiral
on board that very ship must have indeed given him
what the sailor terms " a fair knock out." He stated
that practically every man on the upper deck of the
Gneisenau was either killed or wounded, and that it
was a feat of the greatest difficulty to climb across the
deck, so great was the havoc wrought in all directions.

Another officer, who was stationed in one of the
8.2-inch turrets, had a remarkable experience. The
turret was hit by a 12-inch shell, and he emerged the
sole survivor. He then went on to a casemate, which
was also knocked out and most of the crew killed. Try-
ing a third gun, he was perhaps even more fortunate,
as it was also hit by a 12-inch shell, and the same thing
happened, but shortly after the ship sank and he was
saved ! This hero was a fat, young lieutenant, who appar-
ently drowned his sorrows the evening before he quitted
the Carnarvon. Before retiring to bed he stood up
in the mess, drink in hand, bowed blandly to everyone

The Battle-Cruiser Action 109

and said, with a broad smile on his fat face, " Gentle-
men, I thank you very much — you have been very
kind to me, and I wish you all in Hell ! "

The wisdom of Admiral Sturdee's orders to the
Carnarvon to keep out of range of the Germans was
brought home by an officer survivor of the Gnciscnau,
who said that they knew they were done and had orders
" to concentrate on the little ship and sink her if she
came within range ! "

Upwards of 600 men had been killed or wounded
when the Gnciscnau s ammunition was finally expended.
The German captain " fell-in " the remainder and told
them to provide themselves with hammocks or any
woodwork they could find, in order to support them-
selves in the water.

A certain number of the German sailors that were
rescued from the icy ocean succumbed to exposure and
shock, though the proportion was very small. They
were given a naval funeral with full military honours
and were buried at sea the day after the battle. When
the funeral service was about to take place on the quarter-
deck of one of our warships, the German prisoners were
told to come aft to attend it. On rounding the supcr-
ture, however, the leading men suddenly halted
1, brought up aghast with fright at the sight of
guard of armed marines falling in across the deck,
who were about to pay the last tributes of military
honours to the dead. When ordered on, these terrified
Hun- point blank refused to move, being convinced
thai the Marine Guard was there in ord< 1 »1 them !

CHAPTER XII

THE END OF THE " LEIPZIG "

" War raged in heaven that day. . .
. . . Light against darkness, Liberty
Against all dark old despotism, unsheathed
The sword in that great hour."

— ALFRED No YES (Drake).

It will be recollected that during the chase the battle-
cruisers were firing at the Leipzig before the main battle
with Admiral von Spee took place. This compelled
the Germans to divide into two separate squadrons,
since a direct hit from a 12-inch gun might easily prove
fatal to one of their light-cruisers. Foreseeing that this
manoeuvre was likely to occur, Admiral Sturdee had
directed the Cornwall, Kent, and Glasgow to follow in
pursuit. No time was lost, therefore, in giving chase
to the enemy light-cruisers when they turned off to
the S.S.E. at 1.20 p.m., the Glasgow leading the way
at 26 knots, followed by the Kent and the Cornwall
keeping neck and neck and going about 23! knots.
The Dresden led the enemy light-cruisers with the Leipzig
and N umber g on her starboard and port quarter re-
spectively.

In the ever-increasing distance between our two
squadrons, the main battle could still be seen through
field glasses, which made the necessity for turning away
from a spectacle of such absorbing and compelling

no

The End of the Leipzig in

interest all the more tantalising. But there was solid
work to be done, requiring concentration, thought, and
cool judgment.

A stern chase is proverbially a long one, and the
difference in speed between our ships and the Germans'
was not sufficient to justify any hope of getting to
business for at least two hours, as the slowest enemy
ship was probably doing 23 knots at this time. Every
effort was now made to go as fast as possible, and the
Cornwall and Kent had quite an exciting race as they
worked up to 24 knots or slightly more — a speed actually
exceeding that realised along the measured mile when
• ships were new. The engine-room staffs on both
ships " dug out for all they were worth," and the keenest
rivalry prevailed.

It was very evident that a long chase lay before us,
for the Glasgow was the only ship of the three that had
a marked superiority in speed to the enemy. The
Cornwall and Kent were gaining very slowly but surely
on the Leipzig and Niimbcrg, but were losing on the
Dresden.

The <ncmy kept edging away to port continually,
and about 2.15 we passed over the spot where later in
thi day the Gneisenatt was sunk by our battle-crui

About 2.45 p.m. the positions of the ships were as
plan [see page 112). The Leipzig was the centre
and rearmost ship, with the Dresden some four to five
miles on her starboard bow, while the Niimbcrg was
about a mile on her port bow. Both these ships were
diverging slightly from the Leipzig, spreading out in
I .1 f.ui to e cape being br< »ugh1 to action.

ii2 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

The Cornwall and Kent were some eleven miles astern
of the Leipzig, and the Glasgow was four miles distant
on the starboard bow.

As the Glasgow drew ahead she edged over to star-
board in the direction of the Dresden. About 3 p.m.
she opened fire with her two 6-inch guns on the Leipzig

r

CARNARVON
O (nag)

ast Falkland Id. jf "INFLEXIBLE'^ &

' OpePemtnta \ "CNEISENATffr &SW£§ajr

«,, C-in-C

"SCHARNHORST
(Flag)

Diagram showing
position at 2.45 p.m. .
weather conditions not so good
wind and rain from N. W.

1 Sea mile=2 000 yards.

"CORNWALL^ y'kENT"

"glasgoWq in ,
opened tire < , 8

■■^LEIPZIG

L_

at 12,000 yards, in the hope of outranging her and
reducing her speed, so that the Cornwall and Kent might
come into action. The Leipzig, however, held on her
course, and replied to the Glasgow's fire, though it was
evident that she was at the limit of her gun range.
The firing was spasmodic and not very effective.

The Glasgow's speed was so much superior to that
of the enemy that she soon closed the range very appre-
ciably, and^ the Leipzig was seen t& straddle her with

The End of the Leipzig 113

her salvoes on more than one occasion. The Glasgow
therefore altered course outwards,- at the same time
tiring her after 6-inch gun, and then, having opened the
range, turned up on to a roughly parallel course with
the German. The duel between these ships continued
intermittently.

The Cornwall and Kent were still keeping fairly level,
and had closed in to a distance of about half a mile
from one another. The chase continued, each minute
seeming an age, as the range-finders registered the slowly
diminishing distance of the enemy. The crews watched
the proceedings from the forecastles with the greatest
interest ; now and again a half-smothered cheer would
break out when the Glasgow's shots fell perilously near
the mark. When the bugle sounded " Action," the
men responded with a spontaneous cheer as they rushed
off at the double to their appointed stations. Their
spirit was fine.

Captain J. Luce, of the Glasgow, was the senior naval
officer of our three ships, and at 3.20 p.m. signalled the
Cornwall to ask, " Are you gaining on the enemy ? '
To which a reply was made, " Yes — range now 16,000
Is." A quarter of an hour later the Glasgow ceased
[or a while. Captain W. M. Ellerton, of the Corn-
wall, now made a signal to the Kent: " I will take the

tre target (Leipzig) if you will take the left-hand
Siimberg), as we appear to be gaining on both of
them." The Glasgow again opened lire on the Leipzig
a1 ;. 45, bul her shots falling short, she very soon after-
wards ceased fire. At 4.6 the Glasgow and I. a'/'

I at one- another, and shortly afterwards the former
1

ii4 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

was hit twice ; an unlucky shot, descending at a steep
angle, killed one man and wounded four others.

Captain Luce now found himself face to face with
a difficult decision, which had to be made promptly-
Was he to use his superior speed and endeavour to cut
off the Dresden or not ? He decided to assist the Corn-
wall and Kent in order to make sure of the destruction
of the Leipzig and Numberg. At 4.25 p.m. the Glasgow
turned to starboard away from the action and took
station on the port quarter of the Cornwall, who had
by that time come into action with the Leipzig.

During this period the Cornwall and Kent had been
gaining fairly rapidly on the Leipzig and slowly on the
Numberg, though losing on the Dresden, who was easily
the fastest of the three German light-cruisers. The
latter kept edging away gradually to starboard, out-
distancing her pursuers, and finally made good her
escape without firing a single shot.

At a quarter past four the Cornwall and the Kent
opened fire on the Leipzig almost simultaneously at a
range of 10,900 yards. The effect of this was that the
German altered course slightly to starboard and was
followed by the Cornwall, while the Kent went after
the Niirnberg, as had been arranged.

The Leipzig now directed her fire on to the Cornwall.
At the outset we were astounded to find that her pro-
jectiles were falling over us at this distance, but she
soon found this out, and most of her splashes were
well short for some minutes. As the range diminished
the firing became more accurate, and it was possible
to judge of its effect. It was not till 4.22 that the Corn-

The End of the Leipzig 115

wall scored her first visible hit, which carried away the
enemy's fore-topmast, killing the gunnery lieutenant
and disabling the lire control. The enemy thereupon
altered course away slightly to starboard, at which we
made a bigger turn in the same direction, so as to cut
him off, as well as to cross his course the more rapidly
in the event of his dropping mines overboard. This
manoeuvre brought the range down to 8,275 yards at
4.56, when he scored some hits. Captain Ellerton then
turned away to starboard to give the enemy a broad-
side, at the same time opening the range, which com-
pletely upset the accuracy of the Leipzig's fire.

The Glasgow took up her self-appointed station on
the port quarter of the Cornwall (see Plan, p. 112), and
the action developed into a running fight between our
two ships and the Leipzig, who concentrated her fire on
the Cornwall, which, however, had superior armament:

Name Tonnage Armament Speed Completion

9,800 .. 14-6" .. 23.68 .. 1904

Glasgow 4,800 . . 2-6"

10-4* •■ 25.8 .. I900

3,200 .. 10-4. 1" .. 23.5 .. 1906

I rom " Brassi y's N.t\ .il Annual."

Misl and a light drizzling rain now set in, so
we broke into independent firing on account of the
difficulty of spotting the fall of shot. The range
opened to 9,800 yards, and still we were being hit,
which clearly showed the efficiency of the German
4.1-mch gun. Our course soon took us out of range,
so we again turned towards the enemy, ceasing fire
from 5.12 to 5-29 '' M- ''n was analogous to the in-
I that occurred in the battle-cruisers' action, and

n6 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

is significant ; both took place on the same day, and
both were due to the same cause — namely, the idea of
making full use of the heavier armament in our ships,
and thus eliminating the risk of incurring unnecessary
casualties.

Shortly after 5.30 p.m. the Cornwall was hit no fewer
than nine times in as many minutes at a range of over
9,000 yards, so course was again altered to starboard,
a broadside being fired as the ship turned. We con-
tinued these tactics, closing in and firing the foremost
group of guns and then turning out again as soon as
we had got in too close, at the same time getting in
broadside fire, by which we managed to score a number
of hits with common shell.

Fire was checked at 5.46, slow salvoes being resorted
to on account of the difficulties of spotting. At this
time a heavy thud was felt forward, which made the
whole ship quiver ; a shell had landed in the paint room,
where it burst and made rather a mess of things. No
material damage resulted, and there was fortunately
no fire. At 6.15 we started using lyddite instead of
common shell, having again decreased the range. The
result was stupendous, the dark smoke and flash caused
by those projectiles as they struck could be plainly
seen, and not long afterwards the enemy was on fire.
His return fire began to slacken appreciably, though
he still managed to get a hit every now and again. Cap-
tain Ellerton decided to close and went in to nearly
7,000 yards, turning and letting the German have it
from the port broadside.

It was now 6.35, and the news came through by wire-

The End of the Leipzig 117

less from the flagship that the Scharnhorst and Gneiscnau
had been sunk. It passed round the ship like lightning,
even penetrating the watertight bulkheads in some
miraculous manner, and cheered up all hands tremend-
ously.

Keeping the range between 7,000 and 8,000 yards,
our ships continued to do great damage, and at 6.51
the enemy was seen to be badly on fire forward. In
spite of this he continued to fire with great spirit, and
even registered a few hits between 6.55 and 7.45 p.m.
Then his firing stopped completely, and it was observed
that he was on fire the whole length of the ship. The
scuttles showed up like a series of blood-red dots gleam-
ing from the ship's side, the whole of the foremost funnel
and part of the centre one had disappeared, the upper
works were severely damaged, while smoke was issuing
here and there. The ship, indeed, presented a sorry
spectacle.

All this time the Glasgow, which was still on the
quarter of the Cornwall, had also been busily engaged
with the Leipzig, but at a greater range.

We ceased firing at 7.10, thinking that the enemy
would strike his colours ; but not a bit of it, so three
minutes later we reopened fire with reluctance, though
only for a couple of minutes. We closed in to 4,700 yards,
turning 16 points in order to keep well out of tor-
pedo range, and gave him a few more salvoes of lyddite
with our starboard guns. The light was beginning to
wane, and though twilight is very prolonged in flux-
ions during the summi i", it would soon have
been too dark to sec through the telescopic sights. At

n8 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

7.43 an explosion took place on board the Leipzig ;
three minutes later the mainmast went slowly over,
and finally collapsed with a crash. We waited to give
her an opportunity to haul down her colours and
surrender, and then opened fire again just before 8 p.m.
At last, at 8.12, the Germans sent up two green
lights as signals of distress, at which we both imme-
diately closed in, stopped, and proceeded to get out
boats. Darkness fell rapidly, and searchlights were
turned on to the enemy, lighting up the ghastly scene
where men could be seen jumping clear of the ship
into the icy-cold water. The Leipzig was heeled over
to port, almost on her beam ends ; she only had a
bit of one funnel left, and all the after part of the ship
was in flames. The fire on her forecastle had also
burst into flame. Thick clouds of white steam
escaping, showed up against the dense black smoke,
and increased the dramatic effect. Our little boats
became visible in the beams of the searchlights, as they
rowed round to pick up survivors. At 9.21 p.m. a
shower of sparks suddenly announced an explosion,
directly after which the Leipzig foundered. Several of
our boats were holed, and we only succeeded in saving
six officers and nine men between the two of us, all
of whom, however, survived the extreme cold. They
told us that before the ship was abandoned the Kings-
ton valves had been opened.

No further casualties had occurred on board the
Glasgow since those already mentioned, as after joining
the Cornwall she had not come under direct fire, although
some projectiles intended for the latter did hit her.

The End of the Leipzig 119

The Cornwall was even more fortunate in having no
casualties at all except, for a solitary pet canary, in
spite of having eighteen direct hits not counting splinter
holes, of which there were forty-two in one funnel alone.
This absence of casualties, which was also a feature
of the battle-cruiser action, speaks for the efficient
handling of the ship by Captain Ellerton.

Survivors stated that von Spee was originally going
direct to the Plate to coal, but that having captured
a sailing vessel full of coal at Cape Horn, he changed
his plans and decided to attack the Falkland Islands.
It was also stated that the Leipzig had a large amount
of gold on board.

One of the survivors rescued by the Cornwall was
a naval reservist, who in time of peace had occupied
the post of German interpreter to the Law Courts at
Sydney, in Australia. When hauled into the boat the first
words he used as soon as he had recovered his breath
were : " It's bloody cold " in a perfect English accent.
It is a well-known fact that sailors rarely make use of
bad language, and the bowman who had hauled him
out of the water is said to have fainted ! Evidently the
language of the Law leaves much to be desired.

The torpedo lieutenant of the Leipzig was amongst

■ saved by the Cornwall. When brought along-

shausted to clamber up the ship's side

unaided, but when he reached the upper deck be pulled

him ther and stood to attention, saluting our

When he came into the ward-

. cplained thai lie had been on board

before a.-> a guest at dinner at the tunc that the ship

120 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

paid a visit to Kiel for the regatta in 1909, adding that
he little expected then that his next visit would take
place under such tragic circumstances.

This officer surprised us all by suddenly asking when
the Cornwall had had bigger guns put into her, and
went on to say that when we fired our " big guns " —
meaning when we started to use lyddite shell — the
damage was appalling, arms and legs were to be seen
all along the decks, and each shell that burst started
a fire. He went on to say that the Cornwall's firing
was very effective and accurate, but doubtless most
of the prisoners told their captors the same thing. We
explained that the armament had not been changed
since the ship was originally built. He also told us
that the German captain had assembled all the ship's
company when their 1,800 rounds of ammunition were
expended, and said, " There is the ensign, and any man
who wishes may go and haul it down, but I will not
do so." Not a soul moved to carry out the suggestion,
but about fifty men, having obtained permission, jumped
overboard and must have perished from the cold.
There were only eighteen left alive on board at the
end, so far as he could judge, and of these sixteen
were saved. All the officers carried whistles, which
accounted for their being located in the water so
easily.

The prisoners naturally wished to glorify themselves,
their captain, and their shipmates in the eyes of their
fellow-countrymen, before whom they knew that these
stories would eventually be repeated. Therefore these
yarns about the ensign, the men jumping overboard,

The End of the Leipzig 121

and the opening of the Kingston valves must be taken
with a grain of salt.

The Cornwall had one or two interesting examples
of the damage done to a ship by modern high-explosive
shell. The most serious was a shell that must have
exploded on the water-line, as the ship was rolling,
for the side was afterwards found to be indented
5 inches at a position 5 to 6 feet below the water-line,
and consequently below the armoured belt, a cross
bulkhead being at the precise point of impact. Curious
as it may appear, even the paint was untouched, and
there was no sign of a direct hit from outboard, except
for the bulge that remained and the starting of a good
many rivets from their sockets. The cross bulkhead
behind was buckled up like corrugated iron, and the
coal bunkers, which had been empty, were flooded,
giving the ship a heavy list. When we got into Port
William we managed to keel the ship sufficiently to
enable our carpenters to get at the leak, and they suc-
ceeded in completely stopping it in two days, working
day and night — a line performance, for which Mr.
•rd, the carpenter, received the D.S.C., whilst his
staff were personally congratulated by the Commander-
in-Chief.

Another shell passed through the steel depression
rail of the after 6-inch turret, by which it was deflected
through the deck at the junction of two cabin bulk-
Is; it next penetrated the deck below and finally
burst on the ship's side, causing a large hole. An amus-
ing incident was connected with this. The projectile
cut a fire-hose in half, the business end of which was

i22 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

carried down the hole into one of the officer's cabins,
where it continued to pump in water for the remainder
of the action. At the end of the day this officer found
all his belongings, including his full dress and cocked
hat, floating about in two or three feet of water.

Another officer was seated on a box in the ammuni-
tion passage waiting for the wounded, when a shell
struck the ship's side close by him, the concussion
knocking him off. Getting up, he saw the doctor near
by, and thought he had kicked him, so asked him angrily
what the blazes he thought he was doing. It was not
until after a long and heated argument that he could
be persuaded to believe that he had not been the victim
of a practical joke.

In another case a shell shot away the fire main imme-
diately above one of the stokeholds, which was flooded.
Stoker Petty Officer W. A. Townsend and Stoker John
Smith were afterwards both decorated with the D.S.M.
for " keeping the boiler fires going under very trying
circumstances."

It was mentioned before that some ships had leave
to open up their machinery for repairs. The Cornwall
was to have steam at six hours' notice, and had the low-
pressure cylinder of the port engine opened up and
in pieces for repairs when the signal to raise steam
was made. Chief Engine Room Artificer J. G. Hill
was awarded the D.S.M. "for his smart performance
in getting the port engine, which was disconnected,
into working order." It will have been noticed that
the ship was steaming 20 knots two and a half hours
after the signal to raise steam. This was a remark-

The End of the Leipzig 123

able performance, and reflected great credit on her entire
engineering staff.

A signalman, Frank Glover, was given the D.S.M.
for " carrying out his duties of range-taker in a very
cool manner during the whole of the action." He was
in an entirely exposed position on the fore upper bridge.

More has been said about the part taken by the
Cornwall, as the writer was on board her, and most of
the incidents described came under his personal observa-
tion. They are, however, typical of the conduct of the
officers and men in the other ships that took part.*

* The ScyJliiz — the German auxiliary that escaped — took in the wireless
signal announcing the victory and actually heard the firing of the Cornwall
and the Glasgow on her beam about four miles off. She managed to escape
under cover of the fog by steering to the south, but it was a near thing.

CHAPTER XIII

THE SINKING OF THE " NURNBERG "

" While England, England rose,
Her white cliffs laughing out across the waves,
Victorious over all her enemies."

— Alfred No yes (Drake).

We must now go back to the commencement of the
action with the Leipzig. At 4.30 p.m., in accordance
with a signal made by the Cornwall, the Kent branched
off in pursuit of the N umber g and was soon out of sight.
Thus a third fight developed through the high speed
attained by the Kent, which enabled her to catch up
and force action on the Nurnberg. The following
description has been largely compiled from a narrative
written by an officer in the Kent, while from
the particulars undernoted concerning the ships two
important features stand out : the speed of the two
ships was nearly equal, and the German was built five
years later than her opponent, and therefore should have
been able to maintain her speed with less difficulty.

Name Tonnage

Kent 9,800

Nurnberg 3,396

" Brassey's Naval Annual."

In the course of the afternoon the weather
became misty, so that it seemed imperative to get to

124

A rmament

Speed

Completion

14-6"

23.7

1903

10-4. 1"

23.5

1908

8-2.1"

The Sinking of the Nurnberg 125

close quarters as rapidly as possible. That this was
fully realised and acted upon is shown by what was
written by an officer in the Kent : " In the last hour
of the chase, helped by a light ship and a clean bottom,
by the most determined stoking, by unremitting at-
tention to her no longer youthful boilers — in short, by
the devotion of every officer and man in the engine and
boiler rooms, the Kent achieved the remarkable speed
of 25 knots."

Both ships were steering a south-easterly course
at 5 p.m. when the Kent got within range of the Nurn-
berg, which opened fire with her stern guns. The chase
had in all lasted nearly seven hours, so the sound of
the enemy's guns proved doubly welcome, since it
brought home the fact that the German was now trapped.
The fall of the enemy's shot was awaited with that
eagerness combined with anxiety which only those
who have undergone the experience can fully realise.
Accurate ranges were hard to take on account of the
abnormal vibration caused by the speed at which the
ship was travelling, but it was expected that the enemy's
first salvoes would fall short. But not a sign was to be
seen anywhere of these projectiles. Where, then, had
they gone ?

Officers glanced round the horizon to make quite
certain that the enemy was not firing at another ship,
but nothing else was in sight. A light, drizzling rain
falling, so that it was not till the third salvo thai
the splashes were discovered astern of the ship. This
bore out the experience of the Cornwall and din
which had al 0 been astonished at the Long range of the

126 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

German 4.1" gun, which is said to be sighted up to
12 kilometres (13,120 yards).

Nine minutes after (5.9) the Kent opened fire at
11,000 yards with her fore turret, but the shots fell
short. Altering course slightly to port, she was able
to bring her two foremost 6-inch on the starboard side
to bear, making four guns in all. The light was poor,
and both ships had difficulty in seeing well enough to
correct the gun range at this distance. Thus this open-
ing stage of the combat was not very fruitful of results
as far as could be judged, though survivors subsequently
stated that the Kent scored two effective hits, one of
which penetrated the after steering flat below the water-
line and killed all the men in it with one exception.
On the other hand, the enemy (missing mainly for de-
flection) only got in one hit during the same period.

About 5.35 two boilers of the N umber g burst in
quick succession, apparently from excess of pressure
due to her strenuous efforts to escape. This reduced
her speed to 19 knots, when all hope of averting disaster,
even with the aid of several lucky shots, was shattered
at one fell swoop. The Kent now gained very rapidly on
her opponent, and all anxiety as to the chase being
prolonged until dark was dispelled.

Realising the hopelessness of continuing the attempt
to escape, the German decided to fight it out, and
altered course ten minutes later 90 degrees to port (see
Plan). The Kent turned about 70 degrees to port,
so that both ships were on converging courses, and
able to bring every gun on the broadside to bear. The
running fight was over, and the action developed during

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128 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

the ensuing quarter of an hour into as fierce a duel as
it is possible to imagine, with the range rapidly de-
creasing from 6,000 to 3,000 yards and all guns firing
in succession, keeping up one continuous thunder. The
Kent now started using her lyddite shell. As was only
to be expected, a good deal of damage resulted. In
a very short time a fire broke out near the German's
mainmast, followed a little later by the fall of her
main-topmast, which bent gracefully forward like a
sapling, and then fell with a crash. Both ships were
firing their guns independently, not in salvoes, and
in consequence the sequence of the discharges was
almost unbroken. A fearful din resulted, which was
as loud as it was penetrating, and soon began to have
an irritating effect on the nerves. The incessant clang-
ing and clashing jarred horribly and gave the impression
that the ship was being continually hit ; in fact, those
below began to think that matters were not going too
well from the constant concussions and severe jolts
that were felt, until they were reassured by the optimistic
and cheering bits of news passed down through the
voice-pipes. The Kent's fore-topgallant-mast now sud-
denly fell over, fortunately remaining suspended in mid-
air by the stays ; a chance shot had cut right through
the heel.

From the rate of fire maintained at such a short
range it was patent that matters would soon be brought
to a finish so far as the Niirnberg was concerned. By
6.5 p.m. her fore-topmast had disappeared, she was on
fire in two or three places, and her speed was still further
reduced. She turned away, as if to escape such heavy

The Sinking of the Nurnberg 129

punishment, the details of which could be plainly ob-
served at this short distance. Her upper deck was a
veritable shambles, and most of the guns' crews, only
protected by gun shields, had been killed. In the
words of one of the Kent's officers, " her foretop and
foremost funnel were so riddled that they appeared to
be covered with men " ; the torn and twisted steel
sticking out in every direction caused this paradoxical
illusion. Only two of her guns on the port side remained
in action.

On the other hand, the Kent herself had by no means
come out unscathed. In addition to the hits already
mentioned, there were many more that had struck the
ship's side and boat deck on the starboard side, but no
fires of consequence had taken place, nor had there been
any hits on the water-line of a vital character. One
of the enemy's shells burst just outside the midship
casemate situated on the main deck. Only fragments
entered, but there were ten casualties, most of them
burns ; one man was killed instantly, and he remained
in the same position after death with arms bent for
holding a cordite charge. A small fire was caused, and
the flames passed down the ammunition hoist to the
passage below, igniting a charge which was hooked on
• be hoisted. Had it not been for the prompt
;n tion of Sergeant Charles Mayes, of the Royal Marines,
complete destruction might easily have followed. With
the greatest presence of mind, he immediately isolated
the cordite charges in the vicinity, closed the sliding
scuttle in the hoist, and at the same time ordered his
men to run for the nearest hoses to flood the compart-

J

130 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

ment. The fire was extinguished before it could get a
hold, and for this brave deed he was awarded the Con-
spicuous Gallantry Medal and an annuity of £20.

The Niirnberg executed a sudden and unexpected
manoeuvre at 6.10 by turning inwards as if about to
ram her opponent. Continuing the turn, however, she
eventually passed astern of the Kent and brought her
starboard guns into play for the first time. During this
manoeuvre, and while in an end-on position, two of our
shells burst almost simultaneously on her forecastle,
causing a fire and putting the guns there out of action.

In reply to this manoeuvre the Kent turned to a nearly
opposite course. It will be realised from the plan that
the Kent was travelling well over twice as fast as her
opponent at this time, and that her port guns were now
brought into action. The courses of both ships were again
roughly parallel, the Kent taking care to avoid getting
on the beam of the Niirnberg, which would have afforded
the latter an opportunity of using her torpedoes.

From now on the distance between the two ships
gradually increased.

The German's fire was very spasmodic, and it was
evident that she could not last much longer. By 6.25
her engines were apparently stopped, for she was barely
moving through the water. She was now badly bat-
tered and scarcely recognisable as the ship of an hour
and a half before. The Kent had to turn right round
again to keep somewhere near her, and continued to fire
at her with devastating effect.

At 6.36 the enemy ceased fire altogether, the Kent
followed suit, and for a short while awaited develop-

The Sinking of the Niirnberg 131

mcnts. Being now on tiro all along her fore part, the
German ship looked a complete wreck, and showed
not a vestige of life as she lay helpless on the water.
She had a list, and was at a dead standstill. In vain
the Kent waited for her to strike her colours, and so, as
she showed no signs of sinking, opened fire once more,
slowly closing and keeping well before her beam, firing
at her with all guns that would bear. Not till 6.57 did
she haul down her colours, whereupon all firing ceased.

On examination it was found that nearly all the
Kent's boats were splintered or smashed up by the
enemy's fire, and there were only two that could be
temporarily patched up in a short space of time. While
the necessary repairs were in progress, the Niirnberg,
which had been heeling over more and more, turned over
on her starboard side, and in a deathlike silence dis-
appeared beneath the surface at 7.27 p.m. Captain
J. D. Allen, in writing of his men, says, " No sooner had
she sunk than the Kent's men displayed the same zeal
and activity in endeavouring to save life as they had
done in fighting the ship. Boats were hastily repaired
and lowered, manned by men eagerly volunteering to
help. Unfortunately, the sea was rough and the water
very cold, so we only succeeded in picking up twelve
men, of whom five subsequently died." The search
for the survivors was continued till 9 a.m. It is said
that even the living were attacked by albatrosses.

\\'hil<- the ship was sinking a few German seamen
gathered at the stern and waved their ensign to and
fro before going down with the ship.

Kent was hit thirty- seven times altogether, but

132 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

suffered no damage affecting her seaworthiness. Her
wireless telegraphy transmitting instruments were
smashed to pieces by a shell, which passed through
the wireless office. She was thus unable to report the
result of her action, and caused the Commander-in-
Chief some anxiety regarding her fate. The receiving
instruments, however, were intact, so all the wireless
signals made by the Commander-in-Chief inquiring as
to her whereabouts were taken in and read, though
she was powerless to reply. The upper works on the
starboard side presented a sorry spectacle, but the
armour, though hit, was unpierced. Only two shots
burst against the unarmoured part of the ship's side,
one making a hole about four feet square just before
the foremost starboard 6-inch gun on the main deck,
and the other a hole of about equal size on the same
side immediately below the after shelter deck.

A German officer who was saved said that they had
heard by wireless that the British had " blown up the
harbour " at the Falklands, and had fled to the west
coast of Africa ! He also stated that the Niirnberg
had not been refitted for three years, and that her
boilers were in a very bad state, which was borne out
by some of them having burst during the chase.

Each seaman 6-inch gun's crew had five Royal Naval
Reservemen in it, and their conduct speaks volumes for
the all-round efficiency of the men that the Navy has
drawn from the Reserve during the War.

The total casualties in the Kent amounted to 16 men,
5 of whom were killed, whilst 3 of the wounded after-
wards died of their wounds.

The Sinking of the Nurnberg 133

Commander Wharton, of the Kent, gives a remark
ably realistic description of the closing scenes : "It
was strange and weird all this aftermath, the wind
rapidly arising from the westward, darkness closing
in, one ship heaving to the swell, well battered, the
foretop-gallant-mast gone. Of the other, nothing to
be seen but floating wreckage, with here and there a
man clinging, and the ' molly-hawks ' swooping by.
The wind moaned, and death was in the air. Then, see !
Out of the mist loomed a great four-masted barque
under full canvas. A great ghost-ship she seemed.
Slowly, majestically, she sailed by and vanished in
the night." This was the same ghost-ship that had
appeared in the middle of the action fought by the
battle-cruisers — a very fitting apparition, which up-
holds the legend that one always appears at a British
naval engagement. Meeting one of the officers of this
sailing vessel later on in the Dardanelles, it was revealed
that she had been out at sea so long that she was un-
aware that war had even been declared, until she sud-
denly found herself a spectator of two naval actions
on the same day.

A silk ensign, presented to the ship by the ladies
of Kent, was torn to ribbons in the course of the day.
Th<- pieces, however, were carefully collected by Cap-
tain J. D. Allen, and returned to the donors, who sewed
them together. This ensign now hangs in Canterbury
Cathedral. A new silk ensign was given to the ship
by the ladies of the county of Kent, and was hoisted
on the first anniversary of the battle, December 8th,
*9*5

CHAPTER XIV

AFTERMATH

..." England
Grasped with sure hands the sceptre of the sea,
That untamed realm of liberty which none
Had looked upon as aught but wilderness
Ere this, or even dreamed of as the seat
Of power and judgment and high sovereignty
Whereby all nations at the last should make
One brotherhood, and war should be no more."

— ALFRED NOVES (Drake).

The battle of the Falkland Islands was, perhaps, more
like the old-time naval engagements fought by sailing
ships of the line than any other naval battle that is
likely to take place nowadays. There were no sub-
marines, no destroyers, no aeroplanes or Zeppelins, nor
any other of the manifold death-dealing devices that
tend to make war so much more hideous than in days
gone by. In a word, it was open fighting. Not a
torpedo was fired. Not even a mine was dropped,
if the survivors who stated that the German ships did
not carry them can be believed. There were a few
anxious moments when zinc cases were seen floating
on the surface ahead, glistening in the sunlight, but
they turned out to be empty cartridge cases that the
enemy had dropped overboard.

There were three very general feelings that followed
on after the battle : firstly, that we had at last been

i34

Aftermath 135

able to achieve something of real value ; secondly, that
it was quite as good as a fortnight's leave (the most
one usually gets in the Navy) ; and thirdly, that the
war would now soon be over. In a similar manner,
after a local success on land, the soldiers at the be-
ginning of the war frequently hoped that it might bring
matters to a conclusion. Thus do local events in war
assume an exaggerated importance.

There can be no two opinions as to the decisive
nature of this battle. In the course of a single day,
the whole of this German squadron, together with two
colliers, had been destroyed with the exception of the
light cruiser Dresden. A comparison of the difference in
the casualties points not only to its decisiveness, but also
to the success of Admiral. Sturdee's dispositions and
methods of bringing the enemy to action. It was a
strategic victory.

The German Admiral found himself very much in
the same position as Admiral Cradock at Coronel, with
one important difference. Cradock sought action de-
spite the many odds against him, whereas von Spee
tried to run when he found he was outclassed.
Sir Henry Newbolt puts the proposition admirably.
Alt. 1 remarking that running is the game of the losing
side, he says, " You have only to consider what it would
been worth to Germany to have had a Cradock
flying In flag in the Scharnhorst on that Dei ember 8th.
You 'an imagine him, when the great battle-cruisers
came out oi harbour, signalling, ' I am going to attack
the enemy now,' and going straight to inert them at
full speed. Their steam was not yet up --he could

136 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

have closed them then and there. What a fight that
would have been ! No impotent scattering flight, no
hours of burning misery, with ships turning this way
and that, to bring their guns to bear upon an enemy
beyond their reach ; but a desperate short-range action
with every shot telling — a chance of dealing the enemy
a heavy blow before the end, and the certainty of leaving
a great tradition to the Service."

Directly the Gneisenau was sunk, wireless signals
were made by the Commander-in-Chief asking where
the Dresden was last seen, and in what direction she
was heading at that time. It will be recollected that
she had the speed of our armoured cruisers and got clean
away without firing a single round, having been last
seen by the Glasgow steering away to the S.S.W.
Later signals were made calling up the Kent, as no one
knew what had happened to her, since she was last
seen going after the Niirnberg. These calls were re-
peated again and again without result on account of
her damaged wireless, and it was not till the afternoon
of the following day that all anxieties were allayed by
the Kent arriving at Port William, bringing with her
the news of another brilliant success.

The problem of the moment, therefore, was to com-
plete the victory by rounding up the Dresden as soon
as possible. Should she escape now and take refuge
in one of the innumerable inlets or channels that abound
in the unsurveyed localities of the southern part of
South America, clearly it would be a matter of great
difficulty to catch her. With his characteristic energy*

Aftermath 137

Admiral Sturdee did not lose a moment in following up
his victory. The Carnarvon was despatched to escort the
Or a ma and colliers coming south from the base to Port
Stanley. The two battle-cruisers Invincible and Inflexible
proceeded with all haste to Staten Island, and thence made
a careful search for the Dresden in the numerous bays
around Tierra del Fuego. The Glasgow was ordered to the
Straits of Magellan in the hope that she might intercept
her, whilst the Bristol searched for both the Dresden and
the Kent to the southward of the Falklands. Owing
to lack of coal, the Cornwall was obliged to return to
harbour, and was the first ship to arrive there on Decem-
ber 9th ; she was followed shortly afterwards by the Kent.

During the night of December 8th a thick fog came
on, which made the navigation of those of our ships
endeavouring to make land no easy matter. Magnetic
compasses are apt to be considerably affected by gun-
fire, and consequently the dead-reckoning positions of
our ships were by no means to be relied upon, and were
not sufficiently accurate to give confidence in approach-
ing an indented coast like the east side of the Falklands.

Sad to relate, not a vestige of the Dresden was seen by
any of our ships that were scattered in the search for her.
She was careful to abstain from using her wireless, even
though there must have been several German supply
ships in the vicinity who would urgently require to be
informed of the annihilation of their squadron. This
quest entailed travelling at high speed, so shortage of

I and oil fuel forced our ships to return one by one.
l>y the evening of December nth the whole squadron
had once again reassembled at the Falkland

138 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

Congratulations now poured in from all parts of
the world, and were promulgated by the Commander-in-
Chief. The Governor of the Falkland Islands, the Hon.
William Allardyce, C.M.G., visited the flagship and
congratulated Admiral Sturdee, together with the whole
of our squadron, in glowing terms on behalf of the
colony. Admiral Sturdee issued an interesting Memo-
randum, which is given in toto, calling attention to
the urgent necessity for completing the victory by
running the Dresden to earth. These messages are
given in Part III.

Casualties in any decisive modern naval engage-
ment are frequently very one-sided, one fleet suffer-
ing enormous losses whilst the other escapes with
comparative immunity. This battle proved no ex-
ception to this rule. In the British squadron, the
Invincible and Cornwall had no casualties, though
they both had a big share of hits. The Carnarvon
and Bristol were untouched. The Inflexible had I
man killed and 3 slightly wounded. The Glasgow
had 1 man killed and 4 wounded through a single un-
lucky shot. The heaviest casualties occurred in the
Kent, who had 5 men killed and n wounded, 3 of whom
subsequently succumbed to their wounds ; most of
these were caused by the bursting of one shell. She
was hit thirty-seven times, and went in to a much
closer range than the remainder of our ships. The
squadron, therefore, incurred a total loss of 10 men
killed and 15 wounded, whilst the Germans lost some
2,260 men all told. The crews of their ships totalled
2,432 officers and men, and were estimated as follows :

Aftermath

139

Scharnhorst

872 Gneisenau

•• 335

X urn berg

. . 384 Leipzig

•• 34i

The prize bounty amounted to the sum of £12,160,
to be divided amongst the officers and crews of the
Invincible, Inflexible, Carnarvon, Cornwall, Kent, and
Glasgow, being calculated at the usual rate of £5 per
head. In the course of the Prize Court proceedings
the following reference to the German Admiral Count
von Spee was made in regard to his action at Coronel :
' Whatever others might have thought of this twist
of the lion's tail, it appeared that the German Admiral
was under no delusion. ... It was perhaps as well
to put on record that the German Admiral, when he
took his fleet into Valparaiso, refused to drink the toast
of ' Damnation to the British Navy,' and apparently
had a premonition that his end was very near."

The prisoners of war were all sent home in the Mace-
donia and the storeship Crown of Galicia, but not before
Admiral Sturdee had given them to understand in the
firmest possible manner that if any man was found
tampering with the ship's fittings, or was discovered
out of that portion of the ship allocated to his use, he
would be very severely dealt with.

The few days spent at Port Stanley after the battle
will .ilv..i\ live in tin- memory of those who were pre-
sent. They were days full o\ hard work, combined with
visits to friends and intere ting dia ussions on individual
The interest ol meeting, boarding, and
going over othei ships to view the shot holes may be
mcd. Reports and plans had to be made out.

140 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

Several ships had to be heeled over to get at the dam-
aged part, and presented a comic appearance, the Corn-
wall being so far over as to look positively dangerous.
All ships had to coal and were busy at it night and
day. Few will forget those night coalings— ugh !— in
a temperature of forty degrees, with a bitterly cold
wind accompanied almost invariably by occasional squalls
of hail and rain.

Those cheers we gave one another will not be for-
gotten ; they rang true, being full of pent-up enthusiasm,
and, as Mr. John Masefield says, " went beyond the
guard of the English heart."

Unfortunately, subsequent events have made it
impossible to recall this overwhelming victory without
a feeling of sadness due to the loss of the gallant In-
vincible in the battle of Jutland. One description of
that battle says that four of her men succeeded in board-
ing a raft, and as one of our ships passed, taking them
at first for Huns, the narrator adds, " The four got up
on their feet and cheered like blazes. It was the finest
thing I have ever seen." Most of her crew were lost,
but we have at least the satisfaction of knowing they
died as heroes.

CHAPTER XV

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE SAILOR IN ACTION

" Mother and sweetheart, England ; . . .

. . . thy love was ever wont

To lift men up in pride above themselves

To do great deeds which of themselves alone

They could not ; thou hast led the unfaltering feet

Of even thy meanest heroes down to death,

Lifted poor knights to many a great emprise,

Taught them high thoughts, and though they kept their souls

Lowly as little children, bidden them lift

Eyes unappalled by all the myriad stars

That wheel around the great white throne of God."

— ALFRED No YES (Drake).

The naval man is often confronted with the question :
" What does it feel like to be in an action at sea ? "
This is undoubtedly very difficult to answer in any-
thing approaching an adequate manner. There are
various reasons for hesitancy in reply. Broadly speak-
ing, the answer depends on two main factors, environ-
ment and temperament, but then- are many minor points
depending on the experience, education, and character
of the man in question that at the same time vitally
affect it. An attempt to generalise, therefore, is sure
to be open to criticism. It is consequently with much
diffidence that the following ideas are set forth, in the
hope that they may assist the landsman to appreciate,
in some slight degree, 'he various pout •! view of the
officers and men who right our warships.

141

142 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

There is obviously a wide difference in the outlook,
and consequently in the working of the mind, of the
man behind a gun, or in any other position where he
can see and hear how matters are progressing, and the
man buried in the bowels of the ship, who is stoking,
working machinery, or engaged in the supply of ammu-
nition. When once the action has begun, the former will
probably never give a moment's thought to his own safety
or that of the ship he is in, whilst the latter, during
any intervals that may occur in his work, can only
think of how things are going with his ship. Lastly,
there is a very divergent view between the man who
knows he is going into a battle such as that fought off
the Falkland Islands, where our ships possessed a marked
superiority, and the man who was present, say, at
Coronel, where the conditions were reversed.

During an action, the captain of a man-of-war is
usually in the conning-tower, where he is surrounded by
several inches of steel. A good all-round view is ob-
tained through a slit between the roof and the walls.
From this point of vantage he can communicate with
the gunnery control positions, the gun positions, engine-
rooms, torpedo-rooms, and, in fact, with every por-
tion of the complex machine represented by a modern
warship. Having spent a number of years at sea, he
has frequently pictured to himself what a naval engage-
ment would be like, but it is very problematical whether
he has ever taken the trouble to analyse what his own
feelings would be ; in any case, his imaginations were
probably both far from the reality. When approaching
the scene of action he most likely gives a passing thought

The Psychology of the Sailor 143

to his kith and kin, but his responsibility will be too great
to admit of his feelings taking hold of him, and his
thoughts will afterwards be concentrated entirely on
the work in hand. During the action he is watching
every movement with the utmost keenness, giving a
curt order where necessary as he wipes from his face
the salt water splashed up by a short projectile. His
nerves and even his muscles are strung up to a high
pitch of tensity, and he loses himself altogether in
working out the problem before him.

The gunnery officer in the control position on the
foremast is, of course, in a much more exposed position ;
without any armour protection to speak of. Doubt-
less there flashes across his mind a hope that he will
come through without being picked off by a stray shot.
The thoughts of the men with him, and those of the
men working the range-finders, who also have practically
no protection, will probably be very similar to his. But
when approaching the enemy, all their attention is
needed to acquire as much information as possible, in
order to get an idea of his approximate course and speed.
Later, all their faculties are exercised in determining
the corrections to be made to the sights of their guns
as regards range and deflection, so as to hit the enemy,
and in giving the orders to fire.

The navigation officer, notebook in hand, is with
the captain in the conning-tower, and his thoughts are
col far diffi rent. His attention is riveted on the course
ol the ship and any impending manoeuvre thai he may
presume to be imminent or advisable. In some of the
older ships, where the quartermaster steers from the

144 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

conning-tower, his observation is often made more irk-
some by salt-water spray getting into his eyes and pre-
venting him from seeing the compass clearly.

With the commander and others who may be below
in the ammunition passages in the depths of the ship,
the one thought obsessing the mind to the exclusion
of almost everything else will be : " What is happening,
and how are we getting on ? " Passing up ammunition
is no sinecure ; it is invariably a warm job down below.
Stripped to the waist, hard at it, and perspiring freely,
many a joke is cracked in much the same spirit as in-
spires Tommy in the trenches. Now and again a bit
of news comes down and is passed along like lightning
from mouth to mouth. For example, in one case a
shell hits one of our ship's funnels, and it has gone by
the board with a frightful din, as if hell were suddenly
let loose ; the news is passed down to the commander
i n the ammunition passage, to which he cheerily replies :
" That's all right ; we have plenty left, haven't we ? "
Again, a shell strikes the hull of the ship, making her
quiver fore and aft and almost stop her roll ; naturally
the effect of this is felt down below far more than on
deck, and though some may wonder whether it has
struck on the waterline or not, there is merely a casual
remark that the enemy is shooting a bit better.

The engineer officers in the engine-rooms are con-
stantly going to and fro along the greasy steel floors,
watching every bearing and listening intently to every
sound of the machinery in much the same way as a
motorist listens to hear if his engine is misfiring. They,
too, are longing for news of how the fight is going on

The Psychology of the Sailor 145

as they keenly watch for any alteration of the engine-
room telegraphs, or of the hundred and one dials show-
ing the working of the various engines under their
charge.

The stokers, stripped to a gantline, and digging out
for daylight, are in much the same position as those
passing up ammunition, save that they seldom, if ever,
get a lull in their work in which to indulge their thoughts.
Those trimming the coal in the boxlike bunkers have
perhaps the most unenviable task. Breathing in a
thick haze of coal dust, black from head to foot, they
work on at full pressure in these veritable black holes,
without the chance of hearing any news of what is
going on " up topsides."

Every man in the ship is working at his appointed
station during an action — even the cooks are busy assist-
ing with the supply of ammunition — everyone is be-
hind armour, or below the waterline, with the exception
of those few whose duties do not permit of it. This fact
accounts for the comparatively few casualties in the
ships that come out the victors in a sea fight, in spite
of the tremendous havoc done by a shell bursting in
the vicinity of cast steel, which throws up multitudes
of splinters in all directions.

The guns' crews are all working at their respective
weapons, sometimes wading in water if .1 heavy swell
falls short close to them. Yet they see the result of
th< 11 work, and every bit of damage done to the enemy
is invariably put down to the handiwork of their in-
dividual gun. They may be said to be having the time
of their livi in .1 successful action. During a lull, the

146 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

enemy's fire is heavily criticised ; suggestions as to
the corrections that should be applied to his gunsights
in order to get a hit are calmly made as they watch
the splashes of his projectiles, and are as soon contra-
dicted by some other authority who suggests something
different. When their own ship is hit a remark is made
to the effect — " That was a good 'un ! " from the coldly
calculating point of view of the expert. Unaccountable
as it may seem, during artillery fire at sea there is usually
this irrepressible desire to figure out the corrections needed
for the enemy's gunsights in order that he may register
a direct hit. Several of our naval officers testified to
this strange phenomenon at Gallipoli, when undergoing
a bombardment from Turkish forts and batteries, and
added that they were held fascinated in doing so.

On the other hand, when a shell goes beyond the
ship, at the first shrill whiz-z-z overhead, one calculates
deliberately that the enemy will shortly lower his range,
and, discretion being the better part of valour, the
welcome shelter of a turret, casemate, or conning tower
is speedily sought. It is curious that if the shells are
falling short there is no such concern for the safety
of one's skin. The writer has seen a group of officers
having a spirited argument as to the corrections that
should be made to the sights of a Turkish gun whose
shell fell a few hundred yards short of the ship. It
was not till one screamed past their heads, pitching in
the water on the far side, that they thought of taking
cover. The analogy does not apparently hold good to
the same extent in the sister Service, for on terra firma
the range is registered with fair accuracy, and it is

The Psychology of the Sailor 147

usual to scuttle off to a dug-out as soon as Beachy Bill
or Long Tom opens fire.

A shell from a heavy gun whistling close overhead
seems to recall something of the physical emotion ex-
perienced as a child, when one ventured too high in a
swing. There is a sort of eerie feeling in the interior
which seems to struggle upward to one's throat, thereby
causing a throttling sensation ; and this seems to take
place continuously, though it diminishes slightly as
time goes on.

Another feature that is perhaps worth mentioning is
what the sailor calls " getting a cheap wash." This occurs
incessantly in a naval action, for a large shell fired at
a long range falling into the water close to a ship will
throw up a solid wall of water, often two or three hun-
dred feet in height, so that it is no uncommon thing
to get frequently soused. In the Falkland Islands
battle the men right up in the control tops on the masts
of the battle-cruisers complained of being unable to
work their instruments satisfactorily owing to frequent
drenchings by spray.

The strain that is undergone during a naval action
can easily be imagined, though most men will agree
that they are unconscious of it at the time ; it is not
until everything is over and finished with thai its effects
materialise. In the Navy every officer and man bears
the burden of responsibility, and frequently it is one
upon which may depend the safety of the lives of his
shipmates. I [e may have to execute a manoeuvre of vital
importance — close a watertight compartment, put out
a fire caused by a high explosive shell <>r do any of

148 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

the hundred and one duties that are necessary in a
man-of-war. Newton's law of gravitation tells us that
to every action there is an equal and opposite reaction.
This fundamental principle undoubtedly holds good
in the working of the human mind. The old example
that a piece of cord, gradually stretched tighter and
tighter until its limit of elasticity is attained, sags when
the force is removed, is a very good parallel indeed of
what takes place during and after action so far as the
average fighting man is concerned. His mind, and all
his faculties, have been extended to their full capacity
in concentrating on the work in hand, in seeing that
there is no sign of a hitch anywhere, in forestalling
any possible accident, and in thinking out his own line
of action in any given circumstance that may arise.
The man who has been toiling physically has also been
strung up to the highest possible pitch ; the very best
that is in him has been called forth, and he has in all
probability never done better work, or striven so hard
in his life before.

The bugle call " Cease fire " does not necessarily
imply that all is over ; it may only mean a temporal
cessation or lull in the action ; but when the " Secure "
is sounded, there is no mistaking that the fight is finished.
This is followed by the " Disperse," when all guns are
secured, ammunition returned, and all the magazines
and shell rooms locked up. Then a large number of
the men are free ; orders are given to the engine-room
department regarding the speed required, enabling
some of the stokers told off as relief parties and em-
ployed in trimming coal to be released.

The Psychology of the Sailor 149

As a general rule, however, the guns are kept manned
and speed is not reduced after a modern naval action,
so that the number of men released from duty is com-
paratively small. Perhaps the enemy is sinking, when
the seamen will be engaged in turning out boats pre-
paratory to saving life. The men who are unemployed
watch the sinking of an enemy ship with very different
sentiments. All experience a glow of satisfaction, and
most men will pity the poor wretches who are drowning
or clinging more or less hopelessly to floating pieces of
wreckage. A few are entirely callous, deeming such
emotions a sign of weakness in view of the many
atrocities committed by the enemy. This scarcely
applied after the battle of the Falkland Islands, where
the " Hymn of Hate " and other German propaganda
fostering feelings of enmity had not embittered men's
mind^.

Lastly, there comes the utter physical weariness
both of mind and body, attended by an intense longing
for food, drink, and sleep, accompanied by the pleasant
thought that the war will now soon be over. Officers
crowd into the wardroom to get a drink and something
to eat. The galley fire will be out, for the chef has been
passing up ammunition, so no hot food, tea, or cocoa
will be available for some little time. A walk round the
ship reveals men lying in all sorts of impossible postures,
too done up to bother about eating ; others are crowding
1 the canteen, or getting any food that they can
on the mess deck.

Aft. 1 the battle ol the Falkland Islands one oi the
boy stewards who had been passing up shell during the

150 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

action was found in the ammunition passage, " dead
to the world," lying athwart an old washtub. There
he was, in that stale and stuffy atmosphere, in the most
uncomfortable position imaginable, fast asleep, com-
pletely worn out from sheer exhaustion, with his head
and arms dangling over one side of the tub.

A large number have to continue their labours on
watch in the engine room or on deck, in spite of having
the greatest difficulty in keeping their eyes open. The
extreme tension and strain is over, and it requires a
strong effort to resist the temptation to let things slide
and relapse into a state of inanition.

That the men brace themselves to grapple with their
further duties in a spirit which allows no sign of reluct-
ance or fatigue to show itself, does them infinite credit.
They must look forward nevertheless to the moment when
the ship will pass safely into some harbour guarded by
net-defence from submarine attack, where all the guns'
crews are not required to be constantly awake at their
guns, and fires can be put out. Then, after coaling,
prolonged and undisturbed sleep may be indulged in
to make up for the lost hours, and " peace, perfect
peace," will reign — for a while.

CHAPTER XVI

von spee's aims and hopes

The British Public and our gallant Allies have no doubt
fully appreciated the commercial importance of the
battle of the Falkland Islands. The relief that was
thereby given to our shipping and trade not only in
South American waters, but throughout our overseas
Empire, can only be realised by those who have large
interests therein. British trade with South America
was iirst upset by the exploits of the Karlsruhe, later
on prestige was still more affected by the Coronel dis-
aster, and, finally, most of all by the expectation of
the arrival of von Spee's squadron in the Atlantic. The
freedom since enjoyed by our merchant shipping on all the
seL-trade routes of the world was in great part due to the
success of this portion of our Navy, the blockade having
been firmly established by our powerful lleet in home
waters. The toll of ships sunk and captured in the early
months of the war would have been much greater, trade
would have been seriously dislocated for the time being,
ar.d the pinch of a shortage in food supplies would
probably have been felt had it not been for this very
opportune victory.

What were von Spee's intentions after the destruction
of Admiral Cradock's squadron we shall probably never
know, but it is evident tli.it he could not remain in the
Pacific , it ih fairly certain, also, that he intended to seize

1 I

152 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

the Falkland Islands if he found them insufficiently
guarded, as he had reason to infer was the case.
Obviously the most tempting course then open to him,
whether he took the Falklands or not, was to hold up
our trade along the whole of the east coast of South
America. But the possibility of doing this was diminished
by his fatal delay after Coronel, before makingamove. Had
he acted at once he might have been able to do this with
impunity for at least a month, by dividing up his squadron
into small units. His coal and other supplies would have
been easily assured through the armed merchant cruisers
Prinz Eitel Friedrich and Kronprinz Wilhelm, organising
the colliers and shoreships along these coasts. The Kron-
prinz Wilhelm had been operating for months past on the
north coast of South America in conjunction with the Karls-
ruhe, and therefore already knew the tricks of this trade.

Had he been permitted to pursue this policy, von
Spee was inevitably bound to touch on the delicate
subject of neutrality in arranging supplies for so numer-
ous a squadron. Now, according to the laws laid down
by Article 5 of the Hague Conference, 1907, " belligerents
are forbidden to use neutral ports and waters as a base
of operations against their adversaries." By Article ;2
it is laid down that in default of any other special pro-
visions in the legislation of a neutral Power, belligerent
warships are forbidden to remain in the ports, roadsteads,
or territorial waters of the said Power for more than
twenty-four hours, except in special cases covered by
the Convention. It is left to the neutral to make regu-
lations as to the hospitality it will afford, and those
laid down by Brazil were that a belligerent vessel was

Von Spee's Aims and Hopes 153

only allowed to visit one of their ports once in three
months for the purpose of obtaining supplies.

Being aware of these conditions, and that neutrality
could not be imposed upon to an unlimited extent, it
follows that von Spee would have been dependent in a
great measure on supply ships which were able to evade
the scrutiny of the neutral authorities — a precarious state
of existence. Coal would be his prime necessity, and he
might have hoped to secure a supply of this from cap-
tured colliers, but he could not depend upon it for such
a large number of ships. Meanwhile, however, very
considerable damage might have been done to our ship-
ping, and it is generally believed the Germans were
optimistic enough to hope that England would be brought
to her knees from starvation by being cut off from both
North and South American ports during this period,
although there was really no ground whatsoever for
such a surmise. Perhaps we shall in the future be care-
ful not to frame so many laws for the conduct of war,
since the Power that neglects these laws rides rough-
shod over her more conscientious opponent.

Such a scheme may have been the natural out-
come of von Spee's success at Coronel. On the other
hand, it is impossible to state with certainty that
he did not intend to go ultimately to the Cape
Good Hope or some other part of Africa, but
the pros and cons have already been discussed, and
it scarcely appears probable. Von Spec, of course,
had no notion of the prompt measure taken by
our Admiralty m dispatching two powerful battle-
cruisers of high speed to these waters without loss of

154 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

time and in complete secrecy, though he must have
concluded that no time would be lost in sending out
reinforcements. Apparently his judgment was here at
fault ; hence the proposed attack on our colony in the
Falkland Islands, the capture of which would have yielded
him coal for his squadron's immediate requirements.

Von Spee is said to have been over-persuaded by
his staff to undertake this latter venture. His movements
here certainly led to the conclusion that he had no
fixed plan. When the Invincible reached Pernambuco
on her way home, there was a strong rumour that three
colliers had been waiting off the coast for the Scharn-
horst and Gneisenau ; this points to the capture of the
Falklands not being included in the original plan. Admiral
Sturdee searched the area for these ships but found nothing.

Both the British and German squadrons refrained
from using wireless, and so had no knowledge of their
proximity during the first week in December. Had the
German ships passed our squadron whilst coaling at the
Falklands, they would in all likelihood have separated,
and would then have had a free hand — for some time, at
any rate — along the east coast, whilst our ships would
have gone round the Horn and searched for them in vain
in the Pacific. The first intimation of their having
eluded our squadron would have been that much of
our shipping would be reported overdue in England
from South American ports (for von Spee would most
assuredly have avoided approaching within sight of
land). This would very probably have been. put down
in the first few instances to the depredations of the
Karlsruhe, whose fate was at this time quite unknown.

Von Spee's Aims and Hopes 155

The Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were sufficiently powerful
to cope with anything which von Spec thought was likely
to be in these seas. As a matter of fact, however, the
battle-cruiser Princess Royal was in North American
waters at this time, having left England in secrecy soon
after the Invincible and Inflexible were dispatched south.

In further support of this theory of what was the
German Admiral's plan of campaign, it may be mentioned
that a fully laden German collier was forced to intern
at a South American port south of the Plate in order
to avoid capture by the Carnarvon and Cornwall, who
were searching the coast there just after the battle of
the Falklands took place. Another collier, the Mera,
put back into Montevideo very hurriedly and interned
herself, and lastly, the tender Patagonia ended her
career in like manner. The presence of all these ships
in this locality is evidence of the organisation arranged
for the supply of the German squadron along this coast,
and precludes the idea of its going to Africa.

There is evidence to show that von Spee picked up
naval reservists for his squadron at Valparaiso, but there
is none to confirm the rumour that he proposed to
occupy the Falkland Islands, retaining a garrison there

: they had been captured. He could never have
d to occupy or to hold them for any length of time.
Baron voa Maltzhan, the manager of a large sheep farm in
Chile, was selected to take command of an expedition con-
sisting of an armed force of some 500 men, whose function
was t<> .1—1 ~t in the capture of the Falkland Islands, but
not necessarily to remain 00 as a permanent garrison.

that can be done to merchant shipping

156 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

and trade by a single hostile ship has been demon-
strated on more than one occasion during this war. If,
therefore, it is presumed that the revised German pro-
gramme was to capture the Falkland Islands, thus
aiming a blow at British prestige, and then to scatter
in the manner suggested so as to hamper or cripple
our trade with the New World as long as possible, it
will then be seen how opportune a victory this was for
the British nation.

Had von Spee escaped being brought to action, it
seems probable that he would have endeavoured to work
his way home in preference to the alternative of internment.

In brief, then, this is a rough outline of events that
" might " — one could almost use the word " would " —
have taken place, had not such prompt steps been
taken by the Admiralty to meet him wherever he went
by superior forces. Von Spee knew he was being cornered,
and is reported to have said so at Valparaiso.

If additional proof of the decision of the Germans
to bring about this war, whatever the cost, were re-
quired, it is to be found in the testimony of a
captured German reservist, who has already been
mentioned in this book. He was German inter-
preter to the Law Courts at Sydney. This man told a
naval surgeon who was examining him after he had
been rescued, when he was still in a very shaken con-
dition and could have had no object in lying, that he
had been called up by the German Admiralty on June
7,6th. In company with several other reservists, there-
fore, he took passage in a sailing ship bound for Val-
paraiso, where he ultimately joined the Leipzig. This

Von Spee's Aims and Hopes 157

tale is corroborated by the fact that von Spee put into
Valparaiso to pick up naval reservists in accordance
with instructions from Germany, which perhaps may
have been the cause of his delay in coming round the
Horn after defeating Admiral Cradock. Other prisoners
informed us that they had been cruising up and down
the Chilian coast in order to meet a storeship from Val-
paraiso with these reservists on board, so as to avoid
being reported. The latter, however, never turned up, so
the Germans were obliged to put in there a second time.

The murder of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand of
Austria and of his wife, the alleged cause of this war,
took place at Serajevo, the capital of Bosnia, two days
after this man was called up by German Admiralty
orders, namely, on Sunday, June 28th, 1914.

A German newspaper, in speaking of the success of
Admiral von Spee at Coronel, also admirably sums up
the issue of the battle of the Falkland Islands : ' The
superiority of our fleet in no way detracts from the
glory of our victory, for the very essence of the business
of a strategist is the marshalling of a superior fleet at
the right place and at the right moment."

" Not unto us,"
Cried Drake, " not unto us — but unto Him
Who made the sea, belongs our England now !
Pray God that heart and mind and soul we prove
Worthy among the nations of this hour
And tin great victory, whose ocean faun
Shall wash the world with thunder till tli.it day
When there is no more sea, and the strong clill
Pass like a smoke, and the last peal of it
Sounds thro' the trumpet "

A 1 ii' in \mvi-, (Drake).

CHAPTER XVII

THE PARTING OF THE WAYS

" Now to the Strait Magellanus they came

And entered in with ringing shouts of joy.

Nor did they think there was a fairer strait

In all the world than this which lay so calm

Between great silent mountains crowned with snow,

Unutterably lonely

From Pole to Pole, one branching bursting storm

Of world-wide oceans, where the huge Pacific

Roared greetings to the Atlantic."

ALFRED No YES (Drake).

The failure to round up the Dresden directly after the
battle was naturally a great disappointment, but our
recent success prevented anyone from feeling it too
keenly. Hearing that the Dresden had suddenly put
into Punta Arenas (Magellan Straits) to coal, Admiral
Sturdee immediately ordered the Inflexible, Glasgow,
and Bristol to go in pursuit of her in that direction
Sailing at 4 a.m. on December 13th, the Bristol arrived
there the following afternoon to find that the Dresden
had left the previous evening at 10 p.m., steaming away
westwards. It was tantalising to have got so close to
her, for she was not heard of again for months after
this. All our ships now joined in the search, during
which every possible bay and inlet was thoroughly
examined. A glance at a large-scale map of this locality
will show the difficulties that had to be surmounted.
There were thousands of possible hiding-places amongst

158

The Parting of the Ways 159

the channels and islands, many of which wore quite
unsurveyed ; and, at first sight, it appeared nearly
impossible to investigate all of these in anything short
of a lifetime.

The Admiralty now ordered the Invincible to go to
Gibraltar. On leaving harbour on the 14th, the Cornwall
gave her a rousing send-off by " cheering ship," to which
she enthusiastically replied. Admiral Sturdee sailed
from Port Stanley on December 16th, to the great
regret of the remainder of the squadron. He called in
at Montevideo, Rio de Janeiro, and Pernambuco en
route, and was received in almost the same spirit in
which Nelson was acclaimed by the Ligurian Republic
at Genoa in 1798.

Rear-Admiral Stoddart in the Carnarvon now took
over the command of our squadron. The Inflexible
continued the search for some days, after which she
also was ordered off and sailed for the Mediterranean
on December 24th. The remainder of our ships were
scattered on both sides of South America and around
Cape Horn.

Few people have the opportunity of realising the
beauty and grandeur of the scenery in this part of the
world, which resembles nothing so much as the fjords
of Norway in the winter time. The depth of water
allows ships to navigate the narrowest channels, where
glacier-bounded mountain^ rise precipitously from the
edge. Once on rounding a headland we came
upon a most unusual sighl : some forty albatrosses were
sitting on the water. Our arrival caused them con-
side able inconvenience and alarm, and it wa tin

i6o The Battle of the Falkland Islands

quaintest sight to see these huge birds with their enor-
mous spread of wing endeavouring to rise, a feat which
many of them were unable to achieve even after several
attempts. All these " fjords " abound in seals — chiefly
of the hairy variety — sea-lions, and every imaginable
kind of penguin. Long ropes of seaweed, usually known
amongst the seafaring world as kelp, grow on the sub-
merged rocks, and are an invaluable guide to the sailor
as they indicate the rocky patches. They grow to an
enormous length, and are to be seen floating on the
face of the water ; in fact, we had many an anxious
though profitable moment in these unsurveyed localities
owing to their sudden and unexpected appearance. At
intervals a sliding glacier would enshroud the face of
a mountain in a dense mist formed by myriads of micro-
scopic particles of ice, which would be followed by
wonderful prismatic effects as the sun forced his way
through, transforming the scene into a veritable fairy-
land of the most gorgeous lights and shades. Towards
sunset the rose-pink and deep golden shafts of light on
the snow-covered peaks beggared all description, and
forced the onlooker literally to gasp in pure ecstasy.
Only the pen of a brilliant word-painter could do justice
to the wealth of splendour of this ever-changing panorama.
The true Patagonian is nearly extinct, and the Indians
inhabiting Tierra del Fuego are of a low social order, very
primitive, and wild in appearance. We sometimes passed
some of these in their crude dug-out canoes, which they
handle most dexterously. Considering the severity of
the climate, the temperature of which runs round about
400 Fahr., they wear remarkably few clothes, and the

The Parting of the Ways 161

children frequently none at all, which accounts for the
hardiness of those that survive.

The difference between the east and west territory of
the Straits of Magellan is very marked. The Atlantic
end is bordered by sandy beaches and green, undulating
slopes backed by mountains, and the weather at this
time of year is generally fine and calm ; whereas the
Pacific side is devoid of all vegetation, glaciers and
mountain crags covered with snow descend nearly per-
pendicularly to the Straits, and it is no exaggeration to
say that it is possible to go almost close alongside these
high walls without any damage to the ship. Here the
weather is altogether different, frequent blizzards are
attended by rough weather, with heavy seas off the
entrance, and it is far colder. The cause of this con-
trast lies in the Andes, which extend down to Cape Horn
and break the force of the strong westerly winds (the
roaring forties) that prevail in these latitudes.

On Christmas Day, 1914, the two battle-cruisers were
on their way to Europe. The Carnarvon spent the day coal-
ing in Possession Bay in the Straits of Magellan. We
were also there in the Cornwall, but were more fortunate
in having finished coaling the previous evening ; how-
ever, we went to sea during the afternoon. It was
scarcely what one would term a successful day, for the
ship had to be cleaned, and it was impossible to decorate
the mess deck, as is the custom. Nevertheless, we had
a cheerful Service, which was followed by Holy Com-
munion, and for the mid-day dinner then- was plenty
Jl pork and plum-duff 1 Unfortunately, .1- has
been i< lated, we were n<>t to gel our mail or our plum-
1.

162 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

puddings for many a long day. The Kent, Glasgoiv,
Bristol, and Orama had poor weather off the coast of
Chile, which did not help to enliven their Christmas.
The Otranto, perhaps, was the best off, having recently
come from Sierra Leone, where she had filled up with
provisions.

The Cornwall was the next ship to be ordered away.
We left Port Stanley on January 3rd, 1915, and sailed
for England to have the damage to our side properly
repaired in dry dock.

It would be tedious to follow in detail the wanderings
of the remainder of our ships, who proceeded with
colliers in company to ferret out every nook and cranny
in this indented coastline. The Newcastle and some
Japanese cruisers operated farther to the north along
the Pacific side. Admiral Stoddart's squadron must
have covered many thousands of miles with practically
no respite in this onerous and fatiguing duty. Their lot
was by no means enviable, they were perpetually under
way, except when they stopped to replenish with coal,
their mails were of necessity very irregular, and they
were seldom able to get fresh food. Imagine, then,
with what joy they ultimately found the termination
of their labours in the sinking of the Dresden !

CHAPTER XVIII

THE LAST OF THE " DRESDEN "

" Tell them it is El Draque," he said, " who lacks
The time to parley ; therefore it will be well
They strike at once, for I am in great haste."
There, at the sound of that renowned name,
Without a word down came their blazoned 1'
Like a great fragment of the dawn it lay,
Crumpled upon their decks. . . .

Au-Rici) NOYES {Drake).

There is remarkably little to tell about this action,
which concludes the exploits of our ships in these waters.
The whole fight only lasted a few minutes altogether —
a poor ending to a comparatively fruitless career, con-
sidering the time that the Dresden was at large. During
the months of January and February, 1915, the search
for her had been carried on unremittingly ; but though
had managed successfully to evade us, she was so
pressed that she was unable to harass or make attacks
on our shipping. That sin- never once attempted to
operate along the main trade routes shows the energy
with which this quest was prosecuted. From the time oi
her escape on December sili till the day on which she
sank, the Dresden only destroyed two sailing v<

■ . made su< h thorough arrangements to « ov< r

•its that no reliable information as to li< 1

wh< rcabouts ever leaked through to oui squadron.

Rumours were I gion, and there were " p< ople who were

163

164 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

prepared to swear that they had seen her." The two
places they mentioned were practically uncharted and
were found to be full of hidden dangers. Acting on
this "reliable" information, the localities were exam-
ined by our cruisers early in March, but it was found
out afterwards that the Dresden had never visited either
of them.

The armed merchantman Prinz Eitel Friedrich had
been much more successful, and had captured and
destroyed ten ships during these two months. Many,
it is true, were sailing vessels, but none the less anxiety
began to make itself felt in local shipping circles, and
the whole position once more became uneasy and dis-
turbed. Early in March the Prinz Eitel Friedrich arrived
at Newport News in the United States with a number
of prisoners on board, which had been taken from these
prizes. She was badly in need of refit, and her engines
required repairs. On learning that one of her victims
was an American vessel, public indignation was hotly
aroused, and but little sympathy was shown for her
wants. Her days of marauding were brought to an
end, for the Americans resolutely interned her.

On March 8th the Kent, in the course of her patrol
duties, sighted the Dresden in latitude 37 S., longitude
80 W. It was a calm, misty morning, which made it
impossible to see any distance. During the afternoon
the haze suddenly lifted, and there was the Dresden,
only ten miles away. The Kent seems to have sighted
the Dresden first, and steamed full speed towards her
for a few minutes before being observed. This interval,
however, did not allow her to get within gun range.

The Last of the Dresden 165

Of course the Dresden, being a far newer and faster
vessel, soon increased the distance between them, and
after a five-hours' chase, finally escaped under cover
of the darkness. This was the first time she had been
sighted by a British warship since December 8th. It
was noticed that she was standing well out of the water,
and this chase must have used up a lot of coal. It was
obvious, therefore, that she would require coal very
shortly, and at a no very distant port.

The Kent proceeded to Coronel to coal, informing
the Glasgow and Orama. A search was organised, and,
as a result of a wireless signal from the Glasgow, the
Kent rejoined her not far from where the Dresden had
been sighted. The Glasgow, Kent, and Orama caught
sight of their quarry at 9 a.m. on March 14th, 1915,
near Juan Fernandez Island. Smoke was seen to be
issuing from the Dresden's funnels as our ships closed
in on her from different directions. She was taken
completely by surprise, and it was evident that there
was no possible escape for her. As our ships approached
she kept her guns trained on them, but did not attempt
to open fire. Then all three British ships fired together,
to which tht* German replied. The official statement
tersely report : "An action ensued. After five min-
utes' lighting the Dresden hauled down her colours and
displayed the white Hag."

Immediately the white Hag was hoisted, all the

Briti-h ships ceased firing. The crew of the Dresden

then began to abandon hex in haste, and were to be

embling on shore. Jusl .1 the la I party of

men were leaving the .hip, the German made

166 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

arrangements to blow up the foremost magazine. Not
long afterwards there was a loud explosion, and the
ship began to sink slowly, bows first. The Dresden's
officers and men had all got well clear of the ship. An
hour later, at a quarter-past twelve, she disappeared
below the surface, flying the white flag and the German
ensign which had been re-hoisted at the last. All the
surgeons and sick-berth staff of the British ships now
attended to the German wounded, who were afterwards
conveyed in the Omnia to Valparaiso, where they were
landed and taken to the German hospital.

Such a tame finish to their labours naturally caused
disappointment amongst our ship's companies, who
expected the enemy to uphold the traditions of Vice-
Admiral von Spee by fighting to the last. The main
object, however, had been achieved, the victory gained
by Admiral Sturdee at the battle of the Falkland Islands
had at last been made complete, and our ships in South
American waters were now free to proceed on other
useful service.

Part III
OFFICIAL DISPATCHES

OFFICIAL DISPATCHES

1

DISPATCH OF THE ACTION
OF H.M.S. "CARMANIA"

September 14th, 1914

The Secretary of the Admiralty communicates the following
for publication. It is a narrative of the action in South
Atlantic on September 14th, 1914, between H.M.S. Car mania
and the German armed merchant ship Cap Trafalgar : —

Shortly after 11 a.m. we made out a vessel, and on
nearer approach we saw there were three vessels, one a
large liner, the others colliers. The latter had derricks
topped, and were probably working when we tiove in sight.
Before we had raised their hulls they had separated, and

making off in different directions. The large v

was, apparently, about our own size, with two funnels painted

nt a Castle liner. After running away for a little

while, the large steamer turned to starboard and headed

irds us. She was then steering about south, and we

ring about south-west. The weather was fine and

sunny, with a moderate breeze from the north-east. Our

[lots, and his apparently about 18. At 8,500

fired a shot across his bows, and he immediately

op ned fire from his starboard after gun. We opened with

all the port guns, and the firing became general We were

well within range, and most of his slid- went 1
Consequently OUT rigging, masts, funnels, derricks, and

1 • -

170 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

ventilators all suffered. He was then well open on our
port side. All our port guns and his starboard guns engaged,
and firing became rapid. Owing to the decreasing range,
his machine guns were becoming particularly dangerous,
so the ship was turned away from him and the range opened.
The ship continued to turn until the starboard battery was
engaged.

Two of our hits were seen to take his deck steam pipes.
He was well on fire forward, and had a slight list to star-
board. One of his shells had passed through the cabin,
under our forebridge, and although it did not burst, it started
a fire which became rapidly worse, no water being avail-
able owing to the fire main having been shot through. The
chemical fire extinguishers proving of very little use, the
fire got such a firm hold that the forebridge had to be aban-
doned, and the ship conned from aft, using the lower steering
position. At this time the enemy was on our starboard,
with a heavy list to starboard, and at 1.50 p.m., or one hour
and forty minutes from the firing of the first shot, she cap-
sized to starboard and went down bows first, with colours
flying. It was some time before we got the fire under,
which necessitated keeping the ship before the wind, and
consequently we could not go to the assistance of the sur-
vivors, some of whom got away in boats and were picked
up by one of the colliers.

The enemy before sinking was in wireless communica-
tion with some German vessel, and as smoke was seen in
the northern horizon and the signalman thought he could
make out a cruiser's funnels, we went off full speed to the
southward. When we were in touch with the Cornwall
all we asked him was to meet us, as the ship was
unseaworthy and practically all communications and
navigational instruments were destroyed, rendering the
conning and navigation of the ship difficult and
uncertain.

On the 15th, at 4.30 p.m., the Bristol picked us up
and escorted us until relieved by the Cornwall, who took
us on to an anchorage to effect temporary repairs.

The Action of H.M.S. Carmania 171

The following were decorated for their services during
this engagement :

Captain Noel Grant, Royal Navy, awarded the C.B. He
commanded and manoeuvred the Carmania throughout
the action, and handled the ship with rare skill and
judgment.

Acting-Commander James C. Bars, Royal Naval Reserve,
awarded the C.B. He was primarily concerned in
getting the fire under, and prevented it spreading.

Lieutenant-Commander E. L. B. Lockyer, Royal Navy,
awarded the D.S.O. Controlled the gun-fire in the
most cool and efficient manner, after which he con-
centrated all his energy on extinguishing the fire.

Chief Gunner Henry Middleton, Royal Navy, awarded
the D.S.C. Did extremely well in charge of the ammu-
nition parties, and encouraged his men by his personal
behaviour and coolness.

Acting Sub-Lieutenant G. F. Dickens, Royal Naval
Reserve, awarded the D.S.C. Saved vital parts of the
Standard Compass when the bridge was abandoned, and
then assisted in saving the charts.

Midshipman D. N. Colson, Royal Naval Reserve, awarded
the D.S.C. Took the fire-hose into the (hart House,
and in spite of being burned by falling wood, managed
to pass the charts out to Sub-Lieutenant Dickens.

Lieutenant-Commander W. J. O'Nkil and Lieutenant
1J. A. Mi'RCHiE, of the Royal Naval Reserve, together with
Chief - Engineer F. Drummond and 2nd Engineer J.
Mcdonald, were all specially mentioned in dispatches.

in addition to the above, twelve men were awarded the
D.S.M. for various acts of gallantry.

II

DISPATCH OF THE ACTION
FOUGHT OFF CORONEL

November 1st, 1914

THE NAVAL FIGHT OFF CHILE

The Secretary of the Admiralty announces that the follow-
ing report has been received from H.M.S. Glasgow (Captain
John Luce, R.N.) concerning the recent action off the Chilean

coast : —

Glasgow left Coronel 9 a.m. on November 1 to rejoin
Good Hope (flagship), Monmouth, and Otranto at rendezvous.
At 2 p.m. flagship signalled that apparently from wireless
calls there was an enemy ship to northward. Orders were
given for squadron to spread N.E. by E. in the following
order : Good Hope, Monmouth, Otranto, and Glasgow, speed
to be worked up to 15 knots. 4.20 p.m. saw smoke ; proved
to be enemy ships, one small cruiser and two armoured
cruisers. Glasgow reported to Admiral, ships in sight were
warned, and all concentrated on Good Hope. At 5 p.m.
Good Hope was sighted.

5.47 p.m., squadron formed in line-ahead in following
order : Good Hope, Monmouth, Glasgow, Otranto. Enemy,
who had turned south, were now in single line-ahead 12
miles off, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau leading. 6.18 p.m.,
speed ordered to 17 knots, and flagship signalled Canopus,
' I am going to attack enemy now.' Enemy were now 15,000
yards away and maintained this range, at the same time
jambing wireless signals.

By this time sun was setting immediately behind us

172

Action off Coronel 173

from enemy position, and while it remained above horizon
we had advantage in light, but range too great. 6.55 p.m.,
sun set, and visibility conditions altered, our ships being
silhouetted against afterglow, and failing light made enemy
difficult to see.

7.3 p.m., enemy opened fire 12,000 yards, followed in
quick succession by Good Hope, Monmouth, Glasgow. Two
squadrons were now converging, and each ship engaged
opposite number in the line. Growing darkness and heavy
spray of head sea made firing difficult, particularly for main
deck guns of Good Hope and Monmouth. Enemy firing
salvo got range quickly, and their third salvo caused fire to
break out on fore part of both ships, which were constantly
on fire till 7.45 p.m. 7.50 p.m., immense explosion occurred
on Good Hope amidships, flames reaching 200 feet high.
Total destruction must have followed. It was now quite
dark.

Both sides continued firing at flashes of opposing guns.
Monmouth was badly down by the bow and turned away to
get stern to sea, signalling to Glasgow to that effect. 8.30
p.m., Glasgow signalled to Monmouth, ' Enemy following us,'
but received no reply. Under rising moon enemy's ships
were now seen approaching, and as Glasgow could render
Monmouth no assistance, she proceeded at full speed to
avoid destruction. S.50 p.m., lost sight of enemy. 9.20 p.m.,
observed 75 flashes of fire, which was no doubt final attack
on Monmouth.

Nothing could have been more admirable than conduct
of officers and men throughout. Though it was most trying
to receive great volume of fire without chance of returning
it adequately, all kept perfectly cool, there was no wild
firing, and discipline was the same as at battle practice,
When target ceased to be visible, gunlayers spontaneously
ceased lire. The v rious reverse sustained has entirely failed
to impair the spirit of officers and ship's company, and it
is our unanimous wish to meet the enemy again as soon as

possible.

Ill

OFFICIAL DISPATGH OF VICE-
ADMIRAL COUNT VON SPEE

The following official report of the action fought off Coronel
on November ist appeared in the German Press, and is
interesting in the light of being an accurate account as
viewed by our enemies.

On comparing it with Captain Luce's account, it will be
seen that the German clocks were about thirty minutes
slow on our time. Other evidence also points to this con-
clusion : —

The squadron under my command, composed of the
large cruisers Schamhorst and Gneisenau, and the small
cruisers Niimberg, Leipzig, and Dresden, reached on Novem-
ber ist a point about twenty sea miles from the Chilean
coast, in order to attack a British cruiser which, according
to trustworthy information, had reached the locality on
the previous evening. On the way to the spot the small
cruisers were several times thrown out on the flanks to
observe steamers and sailing ships.

At 4.15 p.m. the Niimberg, which was detached on one
of these missions, was lost sight of to the north-east, while
the Dresden remained about twelve sea miles behind. With
the bulk of the fleet, I was about forty miles north of Arauco
Bay. At 4.17 p.m. there were sighted to the south-west
at first two ships, and then at 4.25 P.M. a third ship about
fifteen miles away. Two of them were identified as war-
ships, and were presumed to be the Monmouth and Glasgow,
while the third was evidently the auxiliary cruiser Otranto.
They, too, seemed to be on a southerly course. The squadron

174

Admiral von Spee and Coronel 175

steamed at full speed in pursuit, keeping the enemy four
points to the starboard. The wind was south, force 6,
with a correspondingly high sea, so that I had to be careful
not to be manoeuvred into a lee position. Moreover, the
course chosen helped to cut off the enemy from the neutral

>>t.

About 4.35 p.m. it was seen that the enemy ships were
steering to the west, and 1 gradually changed my course
south-west, the Scharnhorst working up 11 knots, while the
Gneisenau and the Leipzig slowed down. The enemy's
numerous wireless messages were 'jammed' as far as
possi!

At 5.20 the arrival of another warship was reported
which took the head of the line, and was identified as the
Good Hope, the flagship of Rear-Admiral Cradock.

The enemy ships now got into battle formation, hoisted

their mastdiead flags, and tried slowly to approach a south-

erly course. From 5.35 p.m. onwards I held to a south-

• rly course, and later to southerly course, and reduced

speed to enable my own ships to come up. At 6.7 both

lines — except Dresden, which was about one mile astern,

and the Niimberg, which was at a considerable distance —

were on an almost parallel southerly course, the distance

rating them being 135 hectometres (14,760 yards).

At 6.20, when at a distance of 124 hectometres, I altered

my course one point towards the enemy, and at 6.34 opt m ,1

•t a range of 10 ) hectom< tr< s. There was a head wind

and si-a, and the ships rolled and pitched heavily, particularly

-mall cruisers, on both sides.

Ob ': and range-finding work was mosl difficult,

• ping over the forecastles and conning-towers,

preventing the use of some guns on the middle decks,

of which wi re never able to see the sterns of their

opponents, and only 1 oally their bows. On the other

1, the gun- of the two armoured cruisers worked splen

didly, and were well • rved

At 6.39 the first nil '-corded in the Good Hope.

Shortly afterwards the British opened fire, I am of opinion

176 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

that they suffered more from the heavy seas than we did.
Both their armoured cruisers, with the shortening range and
the failing light, were practically covered by our fire, while
they themselves, so far as can be ascertained at present,
only hit the Scharnhorst twice and the Gneisenau four times.
At 6.53, when at a distance of 60 hectometres, I sheered off
a point.

The enemy's artillery at this time was firing more slowly,
while we were able to observe numerous hits. Among other
things, it was seen that the roof of the fore double turret
was carried away, and that a fierce fire was started in the
turret. The Scharnhorst reckons thirty-five hits on the
Good Hope.

As the distance, in spite of our change of course, had
now decreased to 49 hectometres, it was to be presumed that
the enemy doubted the success of his artillery, and was
manoeuvring for torpedo firing. The position of the moon,
which had risen about six o'clock, favoured this manoeuvre.
At about 7.45, therefore, I gradually sheered off. In the
meantime, darkness had set in, and the range-finders in the
Scharnhorst for the moment used the reflections of the fires
which had broken out in the Good Hope to estimate the dis-
tances ; gradually, however, range-finding and observation
became so difficult that we ceased fire at 7.26.

At 7.23 a big explosion was observed between the
funnels of the Good Hope. So far as I could see, the ship
did not fire after that. The Monmouth seems to have stopped
firing at 7.20.

The small cruisers, including the Niirnberg, which came
up in the meantime, were by ' wireless ' at 7.30 to pursue
the enemy and make a torpedo attack. At this time rain
squalls limited the range of vision. The small cruisers were
not able to find the Good Hope, but the Niirnberg came upon
the Monmouth, which, badly damaged, crossed her bows
and tried to come alongside. At 8.58 the Niirnberg sank
her by a bombardment at point-blank range.

The Monmouth did not reply, but she went down with
her flag flying. There was no chance of saving anybody

Admiral von Spee and Coronel 177

owing to the heavy sea, especially as the Niimberg sighted
smoke, and believed that another enemy ship was approach-
ing, which she prepared to attack.

At the beginning of the fight the Otranto made off. The
Glasgow was able to keep up her harmless fire longer than
her consorts maintained theirs, and she then escaped in the
darkness.

The Leipzig and the Dresden believe that they hit her
several times. The small cruisers sustained neither loss of
life nor damage. The Gneisenau had two slightly wounded.
The crews went into the fight with enthusiasm. Every man
did his duty, and contributed to the victory.

IV

DISPATGH OF THE BATTLE
OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

December 8th, 1914

ADMIRAL STURDEE'S DISPATGH

Admiralty, 3rd March, 19 15.
The following dispatch has been received from Vice-Admiral
Sir F. C. Doveton Sturdee, K.C.B., C.V.O., C.M.G., reporting
the action off the Falkland Islands on Tuesday, the 8th of
December, 1914 : —

Invincible at Sea,

December igth, 1914.
Sir,

I have the honour to forward a report on the action
which took place on 8th December, 19 14, against a German
Squadron off the Falkland Islands.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,

F. C. D. STURDEE,
Vice- A dmiral, Commander-in-Chief.
The Secretary, Admiralty.

(A)— PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS

The squadron, consisting of H.M. ships Invincible, flying
my flag, Flag Captain Percy T. H. Beamish ; Inflexible,
Captain Richard F. Phillimore ; Carnarvon, flying the flag
of Rear-Admiral Archibald P. Stoddart, Flag Captain Harry
L. d'E. Skipwith ; Cornwall, Captain Walter M. Ellerton ;
Kent, Captain John D. Allen ; Glasgow, Captain John Luce ;
Bristol, Captain Basil H. Fanshawe ; and Macedonia, Cap-

178

The Battle of the Falkland Islands 179

tain Bertram S. Evans ; arrived at Port Stanley, Falkland
Islands, at 10.30 a.m. on Monday, the 7th December, 1914.
Coaling was commenced at once, in order that the ships
should be ready to resume the search for the enemy's squadron
the next evening, the 8th December.

At 8 a.m. on Tuesday, the 8th December, a signal was
received from the signal station on shore :

A four-funnel and two-funnel man-of-war in
sight from Sapper Hill, steering northwards."

At this time, the positions of the various ships of the
squadron were as follows :

edonia — At anchor as look-out ship.
Kent (guard ship) — At anchor in Port William.
Invincible and Inflexible — In Port William.
Carnarvon — In Port William.
Cornwall — In Port William.
Glasgow — In Port Stanley.
Bristol — In Port Stanley.

The Kent was at once ordered to weigh, and a general
signal was made to raise steam for full speed.

At 8.20 a.m. the signal station reported another column
of smoke in sight to the southward, and at 8.45 a.m. the
Kent passed down the harbour and took up a station at
the entrance.

The Canopus, Captain Heathcoat S. Grant, reported at
8.47 a.m. that the lust two ships were 8 miles off, and that
tii- smoke reported al 8.20 a.m. appeared to be tin- smoke
of two ship- about 20 mil' off.

At 8.50 \ m. the signal station reported a further column
moke m sighl 1" the southward.

The Macedonia was ordered to weigh an< hor on the inner
ih'i 'up . and await ordei ,

At 9.20 \ m. the two leading ships of the enemy [Gneisenau

and N timber g), with gun I on the wireless station,

within mi, • of the Canopus, who opened fire .it them

180 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

across the low land at a range of 11,000 yards. The enemy
at once hoisted their colours and turned away. At this time
the masts and smoke of the enemy were visible from the
upper bridge of the Invincible at a range of approximately
17,000 yards across the low land to the south of Port William.

A few minutes later the two cruisers altered course to
port, as though to close the Kent at the entrance to the
harbour, but about this time it seems that the Invincible
and Inflexible were seen over the land, as the enemy at once
altered course and increased speed to join their consorts.

The Glasgow weighed and proceeded at 9.40 a.m. with
orders to join the Kent and observe the enemy's movements.

At 9.45 a.m. the squadron — less the Bristol — weighed,
and proceeded out of harbour in the following order : Car-
narvon, Inflexible, Invincible, and Cornwall. On passing Cape
Pembroke Light, the five ships of the enemy appeared clearly
in sight to the south-east, hull down. The visibility was at
its maximum, the sea was calm, with a bright sun, a clear
sky, and a light breeze from the north-west.

At 10.20 a.m. the signal for a general chase was made.
The battle-cruisers quickly passed ahead of the Carnarvon
and overtook the Kent. The Glasgow was ordered to keep
two miles from the Invincible, and the Inflexible was stationed
on the starboard quarter of the flagship. Speed was eased
to 20 knots at 11.15 a.m. to enable the other cruisers to
get into station.

At this time the enemy's funnels and bridges showed
just above the horizon.

Information was received from the Bristol at 11.27 A-M-
that three enemy ships had appeared off Port Pleasant,
probably colliers or transports. The Bristol was therefore
directed to take the Macedonia under his orders and destroy
transports.

The enemy were still maintaining their distance, and
I decided, at 12.20 p.m., to attack with the two battle-cruisers
and the Glasgow.

At 12.47 P-M- tne S1gnal to " Open fire and engage the
enemy " was made.

The Battle of the Falkland Islands 181

The Inflexible opened tire at 12.55 PM- from her fore
turret at the right-hand ship of the enemy, a light cruiser ;
a few minutes later the Invincible opened fire at the same
ship.

The deliberate lire from a range of 16,500 to 15,000 yards
at the right-hand light cruiser, who was dropping astern,
became too threatening, and when a shell fell close along-
side her at 1.20 p.m. she (the Leipzig) turned away, with the
Xiirnberg and Dresden to the south-west. These light cruisers
were at once followed by the Kent, Glasgow, and Cornwall,
in accordance with my instructions.

The action finally developed into three separate en-
counters, besides the subsidiary one dealing with the threat-
ened landing.

(B)— ACTION WITH THE ARMOURED CRUISERS

The fire of the battle-cruisers was directed on the Scharn-
horst and Gneisenau. The effect of this was quickly seen,
when at 1.25 p.m., with the Scharnhorst leading, they turned
about 7 points to port in succession into line-ahead and
opened fire at 1.30 p.m. Shortly afterwards speed was eased
to 24 knots, and the battle-cruisers were ordered to turn
together, bringing them into line-ahead, with the Invincible
leading.

The range was about 13,500 yards at the final turn, and
increased until, at 2 p.m., it had reached 16,450 yards.

The enemy then (2.10 p.m.) turned away about 10 points
to starboard and a second chase ensued, until, at 2.45 P.M.,
the battle-cruisers again opened fire ; this caused the enemy,
at 2.53 p.m., to turn into line-ahead to port and open fire
at 2.55 p.m.

The Scharnhorst caught fire forward, but not seriously,
and her fire slackened perceptibly ; the Gneisenau was badly
hit by the Inflexible.

At 3.30 p.m. tin- S ' ted round about 10 points

to starboard ; just previously her fire h.id slackened per-
ceptibly, and one shell had shot away her third funnel ;

182 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

some guns were not firing, and it would appear that the
turn was dictated by a desire to bring her starboard guns
into action. The effect of the fire on the Scharnhorst became
more and more apparent in consequence of smoke from
fires, and also escaping steam ; at times a shell would cause
a large hole to appear in her side, through which could be
seen a dull red glow of flame. At 4.4 p.m. the Scharnhorst,
whose flag remained flying to the last, suddenly listed heavily
to port, and within a minute it became clear that she was
a doomed ship ; for the list increased very rapidly until
she lay on her beam ends, and at 4.17 p.m. she disappeared.

The Gneisenau passed on the far side of her late flag-
ship, and continued a determined but ineffectual effort to
fight the two battle-cruisers.

At 5.8 p.m. the forward funnel was knocked over and
remained resting against the second funnel. She was evi-
dently in serious straits, and her fire slackened very much.

At 5.15 p.m. one of the Gneisenau' s shells struck the
Invincible ; this was her last effective effort.

At 5.30 p.m. she turned towards the flagship with a heavy
list to starboard, and appeared stopped, with steam pouring
from her escape pipes and smoke from shell and fires rising
everywhere. About this time I ordered the signal " Cease
fire," but before it was hoisted the Gneisenau opened fire
again, and continued to fire from time to time with a single
gun.

At 5.40 p.m. the three ships closed in on the Gneisenau,
and at this time the flag flying at her fore truck was apparently
hauled down, but the flag at the peak continued flying.

At 5.50 p.m. " Cease fire " was made.

At 6 p.m. the Gneisenau heeled over very suddenly, show-
ing the men gathered on her decks and then walking on
her side as she lay for a minute on her beam ends before
sinking.

The prisoners of war from the Gneisenau report that, by
the time the ammunition was expended, some 600 men had
been killed and wounded. The surviving officers and men
were all ordered on deck and told to provide themselves

The Battle of the Falkland Islands 183

with hammocks and any articles that could support them
in the water.

When the ship capsized and sank there were probably
some 200 unwounded survivors in the water, but, owing to
the shock of the cold water, many were drowned within
sight of the boats and ship.

Every effort was made to save life as quickly as possible
both by boats and from the ships ; life-buoys were thrown
and ropes lowered, but only a proportion could be rescued.
The Invincible alone rescued 108 men, 14 of whom were
found to be dead after being brought on board ; these men
were buried at sea the following day with full military honours.

(C)— ACTION WITH THE LIGHT CRUISERS

At about 1 p.m., when the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau
turned to port to engage the Invincible and Inflexible, the
enemy's light cruisers turned to starboard to escape ; the
Dresden was leading and the Niimberg and Leipzig followed
on each quarter.

In accordance with my instructions, the Glasgow, Kent,
and Cornwall at once went in chase of these ships ; (he
Carnarvon, whose speed was insufficient to overtake them,
closed the battle-cruisers.

The Glasgow drew well ahead of the Cornwall and Kent,
and at 3 p.m. shots were exchanged with the Leipzig at
12,000 yards. The Glasgow's object was to endeavour to
outrange the Leipzig with her 6-inch guns and thus cause
h< 1 i" alter course and give the Cornwall and Kent a <hance
of coming into action.

At 4.17 p.m. the Cornwall opened fire, also on the Leipzig.

At 717 p.m. the Leipzig was on fire fore and aft, and the
(."m., all and Glasgow ceased fixe.

Ih. / vpxig turn, d ovei on hei porl ide and <li ap
■\ al ■« p.m Seven office] and eleven men were saved.

At 1 ;'» I'M. the Cornwall ordered tin' Kent to enga
the Nurnbe) ■;. the nean 1 < 1 uiser to hei .

184 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

Owing to the excellent and strenuous efforts of the engine
room department, the Kent was able to get within range
of the Number g at 5 p.m. At 6.35 p.m. the Number g was
on fire forward and ceased firing. The Kent also ceased
firing and closed to 3,300 yards ; as the colours were still
observed to be flying in the Numberg, the Kent opened
fire again. Fire was finally stopped five minutes later on
the colours being hauled down, and every preparation was
made to save life. The Numberg sank at 7.27 p.m., and
as she sank a group of men were waving a German ensign
attached to a staff. Twelve men were rescued, but only
seven survived.

The Kent had four killed and twelve wounded, mostly
caused by one shell.

During the time the three cruisers were engaged with
the Numberg and Leipzig, the Dresden, who was beyond
her consorts, effected her escape owing to her superior speed.
The Glasgow was the only cruiser with sufficient speed to
have had any chance of success. However, she was fully
employed in engaging the Leipzig for over an hour before
either the Cornwall or Kent could come up and get within
range. During this time the Dresden was able to increase
her distance and get out of sight.

The weather changed after 4 p.m., and the visibility was
much reduced ; further, the sky was overcast and cloudy,
thus assisting the Dresden to get away unobserved.

(D)— ACTION WITH THE ENEMY'S TRANSPORTS

A report was received at 11.27 A-M- from H.M.S. Bristol
that three ships of the enemy, probably transports or colliers,
had appeared off Port Pleasant. The Bristol was ordered
to take the Macedonia under his orders and destroy the
transports.

H.M.S. Macedonia reports that only two ships, steam-
ships Baden and Santa Isabel, were present ; both ships
were sunk after the removal of the crew.

The Battle of the Falkland Islands 185

I have pleasure in reporting that the officers and men
under my orders carried out their duties with admirable
efficiency and coolness, and great credit is due to the Engineer
Officers of all the ships, several of which exceeded their
normal full speed.

The names of the following are specially mentioned :

Officers
Commander Richard Herbert Denny Town end, II. M.S. In-

t incible.
Commander Arthur Edward Frederick Bedford, H.M.S. Kent.
Lieutenant-Commander Wilfrid Arthur Thompson, H.M.S.

Glasgow.
Lieutenant-Commander Hubert Edward Danreuther, First and

Gunnery Lieutenant, H.M.S. Invincible.
Engineer-Commander George Edward Andrew, H.M.S. Kent.
Engineer-Commander Edward John Weeks, H.M.S. Invincible.
Paymaster Cyril Sheldon Johnson, H.M.S. Invincible.
Carpenter Thomas Andrew Walls, H.M.S. Invincible.
Carpenter William Henry Venning, H.M.S. Kent.
Carpenter George Henry Egford, H.M.S. Cornwall.

Petty Officers and Men

Ch. P.O. D. Leighton, ON. 124238, Kent.

P.O., 2nd CI.. M. J. Walton (R.F.R., A. 1756), ON. 1 18358, Kent.

Ldg. Smn. F. S. Martin, O.N. 233301, Invincible, Gnr's Mate,
Gunlayer, 1st CI.

Sigmn. F. Glover, ON. 225731, Cornwall.

Ch. E. R. Art., 2nd CI., J. G. Hill, O.N. 269646, Cornwall.

Actg. Ch. E. R. Art., 2nd CI., R. Snowdon, O.N. 270654, In-
flexible.

E. R Art., i^t CI., G. H. P. McCarten, ON. 270023, Invincible.

Stkr S. Brewer, O.N. 15095°. Kent

l'') W. A. Townsend, O.N. 301650, Cornwall.

Stkr., it a., J. Smith, O.N. SS 111915. Cornwall.

Shpv.'rt. I8tCL. A N I England, O.N. 341071, Glasgow.

Shpwrt., 2nd CI , A. C. II Dymott, O.N. M. 8047, Kent.

Portsmouth R.F.R.B.-3307 S rgeant Charl May . H.M.S.

Kent

F. C. D. STURDEE.

BATTLE OF FALKLAND ISLANDS,

December 8th, 1914.

MESSAGES OF CONGRATULATION.

H.M.S. Invincible,
nth December, 1914.
Memorandum.

The following copy of a telegram received from the
Admiralty, and the reply thereto, are forwarded for in-
formation. Both of these messages are to be read to the
whole Ship's Company on the Quarter Deck of H.M. Ships
under your command.

(Signed) F. C. D. Sturdee,
Vice- Admiral,
Commander-in-Chief.
The Rear-Admiral and Officers Commanding

H.M. Ships,
South Atlantic and South Pacific Squadron.

For Admiral, Invincible. (Date) 9. 12. 14
From Admiralty.

The following message has been received for you from
His Majesty : —

I heartily congratulate you and your officers and
men on your most opportune victory.

George R.I.

2. Our thanks are due to yourself and to officers
and men for the brilliant victory you have reported.

Reply to His Majesty :

Your Majesty's gracious message has been received with
pride and satisfaction by myself, the Rear-Admiral, Captains,
Officers, and Ship's Companies under my command.

186

Messages of Congratulation 187

We hope soon to have the privilege of completing our
mission by disposing of the remaining cruiser.

Commander-in-Chief, Invincible.

Reply to Their Lordships :

Admiralty congratulations not received till to-day.
Myself, officers and men desire to thank their Lordships
for the approbation of our efforts.

From C.-IN-C. Home Fleets, H.M.S. Cyclops.

(Date) 10. 12. 14. 1. 14 a.m.
With reference to your telegram 485* may I be permitted
to offer my sincere congratulations on the splendid success
attending your dispositions.

From Admiral, Marseillaise, Brest. (Date) 10. 12. 14.

To Naval Attache.

I beg to express to the Admiralty how fully I share their
joy at the brilliant revenge taken by the British Navy at
the Falklands. F.N. A. Office.

From Petrograd.

To Vice-Admiral Sturdee, Admiralty, London.

(Date) 12. 12. 14. 3.0 a.m.

Please accept Heartiest Congratulations from the Russian
Navy for the Brilliant Action of your Squadron in fighting
the Enemy and sweeping out the oceans.

Vice-Admiral Roussn N< imi r.

From ' Home Flei i . H.M.S. Cyclops.

[Dot | 11. 12.14 I 58 VM-
Submit th< I ongratulatiorj ol the Grand Fleet

mi in •. i< torj in 11'.' yed to Admiral Sturdi 1

emu ihtpi

188 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

Messages exchanged between H.E. the Governor of the
Falkland Islands and C.-in-C. South Atlantic and Pacific :

Governor to Vice-Admiral : 11th December, 1914.

Warmest congratulations from self and Colony on your
Victory.

Vice-Admiral to Governor :

May I thank you and the Colony for myself, the R.A.,
Captains, Officers and men of the Squadron for your con-
gratulations on our success, which will not be complete
until Dresden is accounted for. We wish to convey our thanks
for the early warning of the approach of the enemy due
to the good lookout from Sapper's Hill.

We feel the honour that the Canopus and the Squadron
were in a position to prevent an old British Colony from
being insulted or injured in any way, and hope that the
enemy will have been taught a lesson not to repeat such
action against any other part of the British Empire.

This Memorandum is to be read to whole Ship's Company
on the Quarter Deck.

Invincible, at Port William,

nth December, 1914.
Memorandum.

The Commander-in-Chief wishes to congratulate all the
ships of the squadron on the success of their main encounter
with the enemy's squadron, and to thank the Rear-Admiral,
Captains, Officers and Men for their individual assistance
in attaining this great result. The zeal and steadiness under
fire of all hands were most noticeable.

2. The victory will not be complete until the remaining
cruiser is accounted for, and directly the squadron is coaled
a further organised search will be made.

3. One of the greatest merits of the action is the small
list of casualties due to the able handling of the ships by
their Captains, who utilised the power of the guns and the
speed of the ships to the best advantage. Further, the

Messages of Congratulation 189

effective fire at long range and the thorough organization
were very evident and enabled the action to be fought with
success against a foe who displayed splendid courage, deter-
mination and efficiency.

4. The excellent way in which the Engine Room De-
partments responded to a sudden and unexpected demand
reflects great credit on the officers and the whole engine
room complements — this demand was made at a time when
ships were coaling and making good defects during the few
hours the ships were in harbour.

5. The successful disposal of the two powerful cruisers,
two of the three light cruisers, and two colliers, will be of
great advantage to the Naval Strategy of the British Empire.

6. Therefore all concerned can feel that they have per-
formed a National Service on the 8th December, 1914, off
the Falkland Islands.

(Signed) F. C. D. Sturdee,
Vice- Admiral,
Commander-in-Chief.

The Rear-Admiral, Captains, Officers, and all concerned,
South Atlantic and South Pacific Squadron.

GALLANT SERVICES

"KENT" SERGEANT'S BRAVE DEED

Lord Chamberlain's Office,
St. James's Palace, S.W.,

yd March, 1915.
The King has been graciously pleased to give orders for
the following appointment to the Most Honourable Order
of the Bath in recognition of the services of the undermen-
tioned Officer mentioned in the foregoing dispatch : —

To be an Additional Member of the Military Division of the
Third Class or Companion :
Captain John Luce, Royal Navy.

Admiralty, S.W.,

yd March, 1915.
The King has been graciously pleased to give orders for
the award of the Distinguished Service Cross to the under-
mentioned officers in recognition of their services mentioned
in the foregoing dispatch : —

Carpenter Thomas Andrew Walls.
Carpenter William Henry Venning.
Carpenter George Henry Egford.

The following awards have also been made : —

To receive the Conspicuous Gallantry Medal :
Portsmouth R.F.R.B.-3307 Sergeant Charles Mayes, H.M.S.
Kent. A shell burst and ignited some cordite charges in the

190

Gallant Services 191

casemate ; a flash of flame went down the hoi^t into the ammu-
nition passage. Sergeant Mayes picked up a charge of cordite
and threw it away. He then got hold of a fire hose and flooded
the compartment, extinguishing the fire in some empty shell
bags which were burning. The extinction of this fire saved a
disaster which might have led to the loss of the ship.

To receive the Distinguished Service Medal :

Chf. P.O. D. Leighton, O.N. 12423S.

P.O.. 2nd CI ., M. J. Walton (R.F.R. A. 1756), O.N. 118358.

Ldg. Smn. F. S. Martin, O.N. 233301, Gnr's Mate, Gunlayer,

1st CI.
Sigmn. F. Glover, O.N. 225731.

Chf. E.-R. Artr., 2nd CI., J. G. Hill, O.N. 269646.
Actg. Chf. E.-R. Artr., 2nd CI., R. Snowdon, O.N. 270654.
E.-R. Artr., 1st CI., G. H. F. McCarten, O.N. 270023.
Stkr. P.O. G. S. Brewer, O.N. 150950.
Stkr. P.O. W. A. Townsend, O.N. 301650.
Stkr., 1st CI., J. Smith, O.N. SS 111915-
Shpwrt, 1st CI, A. N. E. England, O.N. 341971.
Shpwrt, 2nd CI., A. C. H. Dymott, O.N. M. 8047.

The following officers subsequently received recognition : —

Vice-Admiral Sir F. C. Dove-ton Sturdee, K.C.B., C.V.O.,
C.M.G., was honoured with a Baronetcy of the United
Kingdom.

To be made Companions of the military division of the
Bath :—

•.tin John Lao (H.M.S. Glasgow).
Captain J. I). Allen (H.M.S. Kent).

Engineer-Commander E. J. Weeks was promoted to
Acting Engineer-Captain.

f it Lieutenants of the Invincible, Inflexible, Cornwall,
Kent, and Glasgow were all promoted to the rank of Com-
mander in the next batch <>t promotions on December 31st,

192 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

Lieutenant-Commander J. Wolfe Murray (Cornwall).
Lieutenant-Commander H. E. Danreuther (Invincible).
Lieutenant-Commander \V. A. Thompson (Glasgow).
Lieutenant-Commander E. L. Wharton (Kent).
Lieutenant-Commander R. H. C. Verner (Inflexible).

Engineer Lieutenant-Commander J. F. Shaw, the senior
officer of his rank in the squadron, was promoted to Engineer
Commander.

LIST OF BRITISH CASUALTIES
AT THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

The following is the complete revised casualty list of the
action off the Falkland Islands on December 8th, 1914 : —

H.M.S. "GLASGOW"

Killed.— Martell, E. H., stoker petty officer, P0./310682.

Dangerously wounded. — Bridger, M. J. E., A.B., P0./J7095.

Severely wounded. — Ford, H. B. S., signalman, P0./J4597 ;
M.ijor, P. E., shipwright 2nd class, P0./3444S9 ; Scotchmcr,
A. D., A.B. P0./232275.

H.M.S. "INFLEXIBLE"

Killed.— Livingstone, N., A.B. (R.F.R., Ch./B3593), Ch./
190790.

Slightly wounded. — Hasler, T., ord. seaman, Ch./JiSo32 :
Mayes, A., seaman, R.N.R., 4754A ; Spratt, G. F., A.B., Ch./
237219.

H.M.S. "KENT"

Killed.— Kelly, S., pte., R.ML.I. (R.F.R., A366), P0./3793 ;
Kind, W. J., pte., R.M.L.L, P0./15049 ; Titheridge, A. C, pte...
R.ML.I. (R.F.R., B1254), P0./11220; Wood, W., pte. R.M.L.I.,
P0./16920 ; Young, W., >'-;iman, R.N.R., 2543C.

Died of wounds. — Duckctt, G. A., officers' steward 1st cl
P0./L2428 ; Snow, G., pte., R.M.L.L, P0./1685S ; Spence, T.,
sergt., R.ML.I. (R.F.R.. A811), P0./5674.

Wounded.— ArnoM, W. P., R.M.L.L (R.F.R., B8l
P0./8302 ; Brewer, G. S., stoker petty officer (R.F.R., A3572),
T 150950; Day, F. T.. pte.. R.M.L.L (R.F.R.. A1008),
Ch./65i7; Lixtdsey, EL, Btoker 1st cl. (RJ EL, 63754), P&/SS
1 i; ,, J;.-. E., 1 mce-corporal KM I. I. (R.F.R., 1

3 ; Pear, J , toker 1 1 < 1. (R.F.R., 4x72), P0./SS102840 ;
' kef 1 tcL(R 1 ML, l'r'55). l,°/-,)l"7.\ '■ Sheridan,
*.. P., pte , k.Mi.i, P0./1

THE "DRESDEN": ACTION WITH
"KENT" AND "GLASGOW"

The Secretary of the Admiralty makes the following an-
nouncement : —

On 14th March, at 9 a.m., H.M.S. Glasgow, Captain John
Luce, C.B., R.N. ; H.M. Auxiliary Cruiser Orama, Captain
John R. Segrave, R.N. ; and H.M.S. Kent, Captain John D.
Allen, C.B., R.N., caught the Dresden near Juan Fernandez
Island.

An action ensued. After five minutes' fighting the Dresden
hauled down her colours and displayed the white flag.

She was much damaged and set on fire, and after she
had been burning for some time her magazine exploded,
and she sank.

The crew were saved. Fifteen badly wounded Germans
are being landed at Valparaiso.

There were no British casualties, and no damage to the
ships.

194

Appendix

a list of officers serving

in the actions recorded in

the narrative

APPENDIX

A List of Officers serving in the Ships that took
part in the Actions recorded in the Narrative

H.M.S. "CARMANIA"

Armed Merchantman

Captain Noel Grant

Com. R.N.R. . . . . James Barr

Lieutenant Edmund L. B. Lockyer

Lieut.-Com. R.N.R. .. Wm. J. O'Neill
Lieut. R.N.R Peter A. Murchie

E. B. Dalby

Walter C. Battle

J. Henessey

M. F. Murray

William V. Ogley (act.)

A. Parnis (act.)

Ch. Eng. R.N.R Francis Drummond

Sen. Eng. R.N.R. . . James Mcdonald
Eng. R.N.R Robert Craig

Alexander Lindsay
:de Shore

Robert Wilson

John u. T- .

James Duncan

Harold Kendall

Clvnl' Rennie

Walt Fra 1 1

Jann M< I'll- r en
t-Surgeon \. ( ropley (l

py. Surgeon .. .. i.. M.'ynard
Harry Clough

198 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

Ch. Gunner

Act. Sub-Lieutenant

Asst. Eng. R.N.R.

Asst. Paym. R.N.R.

charge)

Asst. Paym. R.N.R.

(in

Midshipman R.N.R.

Henry Middleton
G. F. Dickens
Joseph Verdin
Albert E. Brittlebank
Percival J. Thompson

Walter H. Ramsden
Arthur H. Burden
Ernest W. Turney
William Man

D. N. Colson

E. R. Linger-Burton (proby.)
J. R. Bane (proby.)

W. Barr (proby.)

R. P. Nisbet (proby.)

J. B. Mein (proby.)

Appendix

199

-Admiral

II. M.S. "GOOD HOPE"

Armoured Cruiser

. . Sir Christopher G. F. M. Cradock,
K.C.V.O., C.B.

; iry
Flag Lieut. -Com.

Lieut. R.M . .
. to Sec.

Capl
Commander

Lieut. -Commander

Lieutenant

. nani R.N.R.

Eng. Com

Eng m.

Major R.M.
Chaplain

.;.'. . .
Surgcun
Surgeon (Rest l
Sub-Lieutenant
Asst. Paym

■ runner . .

Ch. Sig. E

Personal Staff

George B. Owens
George E. Gumming

Harold S. Walker
John Egremont
Edward C. Webber
Philip Francklin, M.V.O.
Arthur T. Darley
Walter Scott

\.,1 Van Straubenzee
Id B. Gaskell
Godfrey B. J. Bony on
Lancelot A. .Montgomery
Gordon E. E. Gray
John M. H. Fishi r
Douglas C. Tudor
Arthur G. Smith
Edward J. French
Arthur Brown
Herbert W. Couch

rich ' . I -.■ (wards
Ri v. Arthur li. J. Pitt

|. w'.il h, M.B.
Alfred II. Veitch
1
aand L J. M. de Vert nil, M.B.
1 1 tter

John !•'-. Tizard
Stuart Wi

1 . 1 ii
:

200 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

Boatswain Franklyn F. Stephens

John W. Bushell
Warrant Officer (act.) Robert C. T. Roe

Gunner William D. Wright

Francis A. G. Oakley

Robert J. Page (act.)

William W. Kingdom (act.)

Carpenter Albert J. Hellyer

Artif. Eng Richard M. Healy

William R. Henon

Joseph Duckworth
Wt. Mechanician . . William A. Bass
Mid. R.C.N W. A. Palmer

F. V. W. Hathaway

A. W. Silver

M. Cann
Mid. R.N.R Graham Trounson (proby.)

Henry K. D. Cuthbert (proby.)

Geoffrey M. Dowding (proby.)

Asst. Clerk Charles G. Cook (tempy.)

Naval Cadet . . . . G. Coffin

I. M. R. Campbell

S. M. Raw

D. A. Willey

R. A. Macdonald

Appendix

201

H.M.S. "MONMOUTH"

Armoured Cruiser

Captain
Commander . .
Lieut-Commi

Lieutenant

Eng.
Eng.

Com.

Lieut

Captain P.M.
Chaplain
Staff Surgeon
Fleet Paym.
Surgeon
Sub-Lieutenant
Asst. Paym.
Ch. Gunner . .
Ch. Carpenter
Gunner
Boatswain

Arlif. Eng. . .

Frank Brandt

Spencer D. Forbes

B rtie W. Bluett

Hugh D. Collins

Hon. Peter R. II. D. Willoughby

John A. Lees

Thomas Stapleton

Harry P. Rogers

Alfred Edgar

Wilfred D. Stirling

Maurice J. 11. Bagot

John B. Wilshin

Bernard C. Child

Lionel B. Wansbrough

Geoffrey M. I. Herford

W't. Mechanician
Wt. Eng. R.NR

Clerk ..
Asst. Clerk
Naval Cadit

Henry Woods
John Cooper
Albert J. Tonkinson
I lanway Cooper
Douglas B. Lee
Robert T. H. V. Lee
Frederick G. Hartland
James Bennett
William J. Barrett
Thomas B. Ireland (act.)
George II. Farcbrother
Alfred T. Johns
William Day
Alfred Start
Charl< Driver
l St. m. Card*

Cecil T. Martin (lempy.)
k. A. If, Somcrvilli-
G. R. Bruce

202 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

Naval Cadet

J. F. Boulton

V. G. E. S. Schreiber

J. R. Le G. Pullen

F. A. Cooper
C. Musgrave
J. M. Pascoe

G. W. Muir
P. S. Candy

Appendix

203

H.M.S. "GLASGOW"

Light Cruiser

Captain

Lieut. -Commander

Lieutenant
Lieut. R.X.R.

Sub-Lieutenant
Eng. Lieut. -Com.
Eng. Lieut.
Fleet Surgeon
Staff Surgeon
Staff Paymaster
Asst. Paym. . .

Gunner

Carpenter
Art if. Eng.

Midshipman R.X.R.

John Luce

Wilfred A. Thompson
Charles L. Backh<>
Maurice P. B. Portman
1 ! tbert I. N. Lyon
Charles G. Stuart
Walter M. Knowles
T. W. F. Winter
I tcderick B. Alison
Percy J. Shrubsole
John S. Machan
Robert T. Gilmour
Alexander T. Wysard (ret.)
Francis E. Adams
Lloyd Hirst
Norman H. Beall
Arthur G. Foreman
Wdliam R. Hcilbroun
George H. Bartlett
Sylvester G. Pawley
Charles A. Palscr
James Milne (act.)
George W. Wilson

204 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

H.M.S. "OTRANTO"

Armed Merchantman

Captain

Commander R.N.R.
Lieutenant
Lieutenant R.N.R.

Ch. Eng. R.N.R.
Sen. Eng. R.N.R.
Engineer R.N.R.

Tempy. Surgeon . .
Sub-Lieutenant R.N.R.
Asst. Eng. R.N.R.

Asst. Paym. R.N.R.

Gunner

Midshipman R.N.R.

Herbert M. Edwards

Walter de M. Baynham, R.D.

Julian M. Ogilvie

T. B. Storey

H. W. Woodcock

H. G. Thompson

R. M. Ward

F. R. O' Sullivan
A. W. Clemson
David Montgomery
William J. Philip
William Mackersie
Robert Pittendrigh
Andrew Allen
Adam A. I. Kirk
W. Meikle

S. Robertson

G. F. Willdigg
R. Roscoe
Alan Cameron
Peter Brown
Thomas R. Blellock
Alexander C. Mearns
John Gemmell
Aymer. R. McDougall
William McL. Allan
Roland H. Draper
Thomas B. Wildman
W. J. Drew (ret.)
Charles E. F. St. John
Herbert J. Anchor
George D. Scott
George E. D. Billam
D. N. White

C. C. Lawrence

Appendix

205

H.M.S. "CANOPUS"

Captain
Commander . .
Lieut. -Commander

Lieutenant

Licut.-Com. R N.R.
Lieutenant R.N.R.

Eng. Commander
Eng. Lieut. -Com.
Captain R. M.L.I
Fleet Paymaster . .
Lieutenant R.N.R.

Staff Surgeon

Tempy. Surgeon . .

Surgeon R.N.V.R.

Asst. Paym. R.N.R.

Chaplain

Ch. Boatswain

Gunner

Boatswain

Ch. Artificer Eng.

Art. Eng.

Wt. Eng. R.N.R.

Ch. Carpenter

Midshipman

Heathcote S. Grant

Philip J. Stopford

Andrew Kerr (ret.)

Philip Hordern

Harry T. Bennett

Henry N. Lesley

Owen W. Phillips

Arthur H. Bird

Charles T. Keigwin. R.D.

Clarence Milner

David M. Clarke (act.)

"William A. Williamson (act.)

Malcolm C. Powell

William Denbow

Sydney P. Start

Gerald S. Hobson

Albert Greenwood

Charles C. Cartwright

William J. Donohue

August J. Wernet

Michael Vlaste

Charles H. F. Atkinson

Harold E. W. Lutt

Rev. James D. de Vitrc

John Myers

James Irish

William Evans

William E. T. Honey (act.)

Walter G. Morris

Ernest E. Moorcy

T. W. Greenwood

Albert Hughes

C. R. O. Burgc

R.fcT. Young

P. R. lialet d<; Carter t

206 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

Midshipman . . . . J. L. Storey

H. M. L. Durrant

R. H. L. Orde

R. K. Dickson

B. R. Cochrane

L. H. P. Henderson

L. H. V. Booth

Male R. C. T. Roe (act.), left by Good Hope

on an island at Vallenar Roads,
Chile

Clerk Jean le Jeune

Midshipman, R.N.R. . . Lawrence H. Faragher

Appendix

207

11. M.S. "CARNARVON"

Armoured Cruiser

Admiral

Secretary

Flag Lieutenant

Clerk to Sec.

Captain
Commander . .

it. -Comma

Lieutenant

Lieutenant R.N.R.

Eng. Commander
Eng. Lieutenant
Maj. R.M. . .
Captain R.M.
Chaplain
Fleet Surgeon
Fleet Paym. . .
Surgeon

Surgeon R.N.V.R
Sub-Lieutenant

Assl. Paym. . .
Gunner

Boatswain
Sig. Boatswain

Archibald P. Stoddart

Thomas R. Watcrkousc

Hon. Humphrey A. Pakington

H. Guy Pertwee

Harry L. d'E. Skipwith
Thomas A. Williams
Ronald E. Chilcott
Arthur S. Burt
Arthur G. Leslie
Ralph Leatham
A. M. Donovan
David B. Nicol
Bertram Shillitoc
Bertram H. Davies
Alfred T. P. Read
Edward Iliff
Edmund Wray
Arthur J. Mcllor
Rev. John Beatty
Edward Cooper
Albert E. B. Hosken
Arthur G. Valpy French
William H. Condcll
Philip F. Glover

rick W. F. Cuddeford
Herebert E. Symons
William II. Hunt
Sidney I . Woodrifle
John F. Ilannaford
W. II. Ellis
Alfred Hill
Albert E. Pearson

tt li. Ilunwicks

208 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

Carpenter Norman O. Staddon

Artif. Eng Harold E. Oyler

Claude B. King

James Telford

Charles Hill

William S. Branson

Clerk Charles H. Doubleday

Midshipman . . . . J. R. Warburton

P. M. S. Blackett

P. J. M. Penney

S. P. Broughton

A. C Jelf

R. M. Dick

R. G. Fowle

C. J. M. Hamilton

J. C. E. A. Johnson

M. S. Graham

R. Mandley

L. H. Peppe

Appendix

209

H.M.S. "CORNWALL"

Captain
Commander . .
Lieut. -Commander

Lieutenant

Sub-Lieutenant R.N.R.

Eng. Commander
Eng. Lieutenant . .

Captain R.M.
Chaplain and N.I.
Fleet Surgeon
Fleet Paymaster . .
Naval Inst

Surgeon

Asst. Paym

Asst. Paym. R.N.R.
Ch. Art. Eng.

Gunner

Boatswain
Carpenter
Art. Eng.

Midshipman

Armoured Cruiser

. Walter M. Ellerton

. Herbert A. Buchanan- Wollaston

James Wolfe-Murray

Henry E. H. Spencer-Cooper, M.V.O.
. Mansel B. F. Colvile

Edward W. Sinclair

Kenneth B. Millar

Norman Whitehead

John S. Hammill

Robin E. Jeffreys

Desmond A. Stride

William H. Richardson

Archibald W. Maconochie

Douglas G. Campbell

Cecil J. Meggs

Herbert R. Brewer

Robert McKew, B.A., B.D.

Malcolm Cameron

Harry G. Wilson

Chas. S. P. Franklin, B.A.

George H. Andrew, M.A.

Cecil R. M. Baker

Henry Rogers

Joseph H. Wilson

Thomas R. I. Crabb

Edwin C. Edwards

Ernest Stone

Richard F. Hall

Edward W. Pearnc (T.)

Ernest H. Gearing

George H. Egford

Percy S. Walkey

Edwin Fo

Philip F. Armstrong

Arthur II. Ashwurlh

210 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

Midshipman .. ... Hugh E. Burnaby

John Bostock
Douglas M. Branson
Lycett Gardiner
Jocelyn S. Bethell
Morice Blood
Richard F. Carter
Willoughby N. Barstow
Nigel D. Bury
William S. Batson

Appendix 211

H.M.S. "BRISTOL"

Light Cruiser

Captain Basil H. Fanshawc

Commander Harry L. Boyle

Lieut. -Commander . . Ernest G. H. Du Boulay
Lieutenant Robert F. U. P. Fitzgerald

Archibald B. Cornabe

Edward G. G. Hastings
Lieutenant R.N.R. . . James A. Hodges
Eng. Commander . . James D. W. H. F. Cranley

Etlg. Lieutenant . . . . Edward G. Sanders
Staff Surgeon .. .. Leslie M. Morris
Staff Paym. . . . . Tom Henley

Sub-Lieutenant . . . . Cyril A. H. Brooking

Charles H. L. Woodhouse
Gunner Stephen W. Duckett

George W. Callaway

Boatswain Frank Box

Carpenter William L. Harfield

Art if. Evg William Tcarlc

Joseph L. Wagstaff
Clerk John G. B. Collier

James Hogg

2i2 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

H.M.S. "MACEDONIA"

Armed Merchantman

Captain

Commander R.N.R.
Lie ut.- Commander
Lieut. -Com. R.N.R.

Lieutenant R.N.R.

Ch. Eng. R.N.R.
Sen. Eng. R.N.R.
Eng. R.N.R.

Tempy. Surgeon . .
Sub-Lieutenant R.N.R.

Surg. Prob. R.N.V.R.
Asst. Eng. R.N.R.

Asst. Paym. in charge
Asst. Paym. R.N.R.

Gunner

Midshipman R.N.R.

Bertram S. Evans, M.V.O.
Edwin P. Martin
Valentine D. English
Henry G. Westmore, R.D.
W. F. Pollard
W. C. Young
T. C. W. Thompson
F. Cross

James G. Crichton
Thomas S. Ferguson
William C. O. Taylor
Walter J. Hickingbotham
James Finnecy
George R. R. Cushing
Edmund J. Caws
Frederick P. Voisey

A. M. Russell
Alfred W. Drew

E. F. Hannan
O. Taylor
Jeffery Elliott
Harold Williamson
Oliver J. R. Pinkney

F. C. Masters
Joseph Neale
William G. Cheeseman
Herbert W. Landon
Percy Selwin

James W. Drew
H. J. Miller

G. V. Thomas

F. H. E. Firmstone
Gordon D. Brown

B. V. Rutley
W. G. Hiscock

Appendix

213

H.M.S. "ORAMA"

Armed Merchantman

Captain

Commander R.N.R.
Lieut. -Commander

Lieut. R.N.R.

Ch. Engineer
Sen. Engineer
Engineer

Asst. Engineer

Tempy. Surgeon . .

Sub-Lieut. R.N.R.

Asst. l'aym. R.N.R.

Midshipman i:

John R. Segrave

John F. Healey, R.D.

Joseph W. L. Hunt

Geoffrey G. Thome

Edward S. Carver

Henry T. Healc (ret.)

Allen Fielding

Frederick W. Willsden (ret

T. P. Webb

W. A. Assenheimer

John Robertson

Donald McL. McWilliam

J. R. Dowling

James Imrie

H. P. Jack

Alexander S. Hall

Alexander Manson

Neil H. T. Hill

Charles W. Howil

Donald Matheson

David A. Sheeby

David M. Johnston

William Turner

William Houston

James Piggott

James McAdam

(.■ orge J [erd

1 [1 ib' rt E. Scowcroft

Sydney W< lham

.M. \V. < ■

1 [1 1 bert New man

J"lm F. COOpt 1
Arthur J Bui

i.i Robert
Stuai 1 1 . Pocock

214 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

Midshipman R.N.R. . . Leonard E. Fordham
Bernard K. Berry
S. S. Adley
H. Schofield
H. C. C. Forsyth
G. E. G. Sandercock

Appendix

215

Vice-AJmiral

Secretary

Flag Lieutenant

Clerk to Sec.

1I.M.S. "INVINCIBLE"

Battle-Cruiser

Sir F. C. Doveton Sturdec, K.C.B.,
C.V.O., CM.G.

Cyril S. Johnson
Reginald W. Blake
Arthur D. Duckworth

Captain
Commander . .
Lieut. -Commander

Lieutenant

Lieutenant R.N.R.
Eng. Commander
Eng. Lieut. -Conini
Eng. Lieutenant . .
Major R.M.
Captain R.M.
Temp. Lieut. R.M.
Chaplain

Paynt

Surgeon

i

l I m

i

Gunner

Percy T. H. Beamish
Richard H. D. Townsend
Hubert E. Dannreuther
Hon. Edward B. S. Bingham
John C. F. Borrett
Lionel H. Shore
Edward Smyth-Osbourne
Cecil S. Sandford
Cameron St. C. Ingham
Hugh H. G. Begbie
George ff. H. Lloyd
Edward J. Weeks
James F. Shaw
Francis L. Mogg
Robert C. Colquhoun
Charles H. Maiden
John T. Le Seelleur
Rev. Arthur C. Moreton, M.A.
Ernest \Y. Mainprice
Walter J. Bearblock

t Mai Ewan
( Ian n< e E Gro on, M.B.
Alexandi r r. McMullen

K-.lv it R. St v.. nt

"ii Franklin

( V up ni A. \v Hand

William 1 I [unt
Eloberl Connolly
M.u k W. < ameroo

216 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

Gunner Ernest J. Read

Sydney C. Kennell

Boatswain Frederick Luker

Philip J. Warrington

Wilfred Turner
Sig. Boatswain . . . . William F. Raper

Gunner R.M Albert E. Nixon

Carpenter Thomas A. Walls

Artf. Engineer . . . . Walter H. Bull

John Dews

Frederick C. Fry

Clerk William R. C. Steele

Midshipman . , . . Gordon T. Campbell

Edwin T. Hodgson

Douglas A. C. Birch

John M. Shorland

John H. G. Esmonde

Allan G. McEwan

Rupert C. Montagu

Lionel D. Morse

Duncan G. Reid

Appendix

217

H.M.S. "INFLEXIBLE"

Battle Cruiser

Captain
Commander

Lieut. -Commander

Lieutenant

Lieutenant R.N.R

Eng. Commander

Eng. Lieut. -Commander

Eng. Lieutenant

Major R.M.

Captain R.M.

Chaplain

Fleet Surgeon

Fleet Paym. . .

Surgeon

Sub- Lieutenant (act.)

Paym. . .
Lh. (jiinner . .
B oat swain
Ck. A*t). j >...

Richard F. Philliniore, C.B., M.V.O.

Ernest Wigram

John W. Carrington

Rudolf H. C. Verner

Hon. Patrick G. E. C. Acheson,

M.V.O.
Frederic Giffard
Ralph B. Janvrin
Edward C. Denison
Kenneth H. D. Acland
Arthur W. Blaker
Brian L. G. Sebastian
Herbert J. Giles
Harry Lashmore
Arthur E. Lester
Rey G. Parry
John B. Finlaison
Robert Sinclair
Rev. Ernest S. Phillips, M.A.
Edward H. Meaden
Henry Horniman
John H. B. Martin, M.B., B.A.
Martyn H. Langford
Thos. H. Welsby
Alexander C. G. Madden
Leicester St. J. Curzon-Howe
Robert D. Oliver
Alfred E. B. Giles
Jnlni H. Mai nair

I k orge T. Philip
Terence J 1. 1 teu k
John !•'. Stephen 1
Edward Fox
Alfred M. Cady
George E. Martin

218 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

Gunner

Boatswain
Sig. Boatswain
Gunner R.M.
Carpenter
Artf. Engineer
Artf. Eng. (act.)
Bandmaster R.M
Midshipman

Clerk

John H. Moore
Frederick W. Furmadge
John A. Brander
Phillip J. Jones
John Cameron
William A. Cawsey
Charles A. Richards
William S. Barnes
Herbert Reely
Rupert E. Bethune
John D. Chappie
Regd. G. France-Hay hurst
David D. Mercer
Crichton F. Laborde

Appendix

219

H.M.S. "KENT"

Armoured Cruiser

Captain
Commander
Lieut. -Commander

Lieutenant

Lieut. -Com. R.N.R.

Lieutenant R.N.R.

Eng. Commander
Eng. Lieutenant . .
Captain R.M.
Chaplain

Paymaster
Temp. Surg.
Surgeon R.N. V.R.
Asst. Paym. R.N.R.
Gunner

Boatswain

Sig. Boatswain

Carpenter

A rlj. 1

Wt. Engirt > R N R.

M ids fnp,) l

John D. Allen
Arthur E. F. Bedford
Eric L. Wharton
James R. Harvey
Victor H. Danckwerts
Charles M. Redhead, R.D.
Harold T. Dunn
Frederic C. Howard
William G. B. Jones
Walter R. Tilling
James Marshall
John L. S. G. Lilley
George E. Andrew
Victor O. Foreman (ret.)
Robert W. J. Laing
Rev. Norman B. Kent, B.A.
Edward B. Pickthorn (ret.)
Sydney G. Andrews
Ronald E. B. Burn
Thomas B. Dixon
William G. Stewart
Thomas P. Collins
Claude II. Griffiths
William T. Dunning
Walter 1 1. Speed

1 in I C Crouch r
William 1 1. Venning

William MuiiL
John < '.u row
John \V. Scuit

Id Campbell
Robi it I. Bui 1 idge
John l> Ro

I M Willi. mi

< . 1;. Liley

220 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

Midshipman R.N.R. . . Cecil B. Hogan

Harold W. S. Wright

Midshipman R.N.R. . . Frederick E. Valentine
George W. Barker
Edgar H. Cowan

Clerk Reginald H. Kitchin

INDEX

Allardyce, the Hon. William,

Governor of Falkland

Islands, 13S

.Mien, Captain J. D., of Kent, 27

a tribute to crew of Kent bj .

13'
created a C.B., 191
America (South), apprehension in,

Germans in, 16, 6S

scenery of, 159
Asama in eastern Pacific, 46
Atlantic (South), battle in, 9, 26,

?5« l(*9

Australia joins North Pacific
squadron, 72

Baden sunk by Bristol, 92

I3arr, Acting-Commander James
C, awarded C.B., 171

Battle-cruiser action, a, 96, 181

Beamish, Captain P. H., of
Invincible, 27

Boarding parties and their work,
29

Brandt, Captain Frank, of Mon-
mouth, 21

Brazilian ports, enemy shipping
at, 25

Brewer, Stkr. P.O. G. S., a
D.S.M. for, 191

Bristol, officers of, 211
opens fire on Karlsruhe

British casualties in the Falk .

men-of-war off South America,
19-27

da purchases submarines, 7
Canopus, an amusing incident on,
90
converted into a floating fort,

63, 8?
fine work of, 58
go' g by, 90

offic-

skilful navigation of, 58
Caf Trafalgar, sinking;

official dispatch on aci> a, log

Car mania, a conflagration on, 38
decorations for officers and men,

'7'
heroism of crew, 44
officers of, 197-8
sinks Cap Trafalgar, 9-10, 26,
35 et seq., 169

irvon, a German's toast, 108
a valuable capture by, 24
chases the enemy, 93
officers of, 207
Chilean coast, action off the

Coronel, battle of)
China, German squadron in, 4
Coaling, the ''delights" of, 30
Colson, Midshipman D. N.,

awarded D.S.'C, 171
Concentration, necessity of, 61, 64
Cornwall chases enemy, no
decorations for crew, 121-3
escorts Carmania to base, 42
officers of 209
opens fire on Leipzig, 114
Coronel, battle of, 45 et seq.
enemy torpedo attack at, 55
official dispatches on, 172-7
outstanding features of, 59
unreliable accounts of, 60
vessels engaged in, 46

ibility conditions advan-
tageous to enemy, 52
von Spee's report on, 52, 174
<'radock, Rear-Admiral Sir Chris-
topher, a tribute to, 58
goes down with his ship, 56
his command reinforced,
his at Coronel.

hoisN fids fie .
sights and chases Karlsrut.
21 '

■man pri-

( \>m. I!. I ,
pron . 192

to join southern

Town, 7<)

g Sub-Lii !>• I ■■ 1 .

aw. iid' 111...1' 1.1

222 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

Dresden, a vain search for, 136, 158
arrives at Orange Bay, 7
chase of, no
eludes her pursuers, 114
hoists the white flag, and sinks,

165, 166
joins von Spee, 8
sinking of : Admiralty an-
nouncement on, 194
Dymott, Shpwrt. A. C. H.,
awarded D.S.M., 191

Easter Island, German squadron

at, 6, 45
Edinburgh Castle, deck hockey on,

26
Edwards, Captain H. MoL, of

Otranto, 21
Edwards, Mr., of Easter Island,

45

Egford, Carpenter G. H., receives

D.S.C., 121, 190

Ellerton, Captain W. iM., of Corn-
wall, 21 j 113
effioient handling of his ship,
119

Emden, exploits and sinking of,
11-12, 15, 63

England, Shpwrt. A. N. E., a
D.S.M. for, 191

Evans, Captain B. S., of Mace-
donia, 21

Falkland Islands, battle of, Ad-
miral Sturdee's dispatch on,
178

battle-cruiser action, 96

et seq., 181
British casualties in, 138,

193-4

commercial importance of,

I5I
congratulations on, 138,

186-9
decisive nature of, 135
enemy sighted, 87
light cruiser action, no,

l83.

the prize bounty, 139
contemplated seizure of, 74, 75,

89, 119, 152
land and sea defences of, 63, 85
topography of, 81
why chosen as base, 18
Fanning Island, British cable sta-
tion destroyed at, 6

Fanshawe, Captain B. H., of Bris-
tol, 21, 23, 24

Felton, Mrs., her services recog-
nised, 88

Food problem in wartime, 30

Francklin, Captain Philip, of Good
Hope, 20

French colonies, Germans and, 13

German barbarity, a typical in-
stance of, 108
casualties in the Falklands, 138,

139

4'i-inch gun, range of, 47, 126
light cruisers, chase of, no
men-of-war in foreign seas, 1 et

seq.
sailors buried at sea, 109
Germans abandon colonies in Poly-
nesia, 14
in .South America, 16, 68
Germany, her responsibility for the

war, 156, 157
Glasgow, a duel with Leipzig, 112
casualties in Coronel battle, 56
chases enemy cruisers, no
officers of, 203
sights enemy, 49
Glover, Signalman Frank, awarded

D.S.M. , 123, 191
Gneisenau, a gallant fight by, 102
accurate shooting by, 53
end of, 104

her commander rescued, 107
Good Hope becomes Admiral Cra-
dock's flagship, 20
loss of, 54-5
officers of, 199-200
Grant, Captain Heathcoat, of

Canopus, 21, 23
Grant, Captain Noel, of Carmania,

26, 37
awarded C.B., 171
Great Britain and German colonies,

enters the War, 4

Hague Conference and the law of

neutrality, 152
High explosives, curious examples

of damage by, 121
Hill, Chief Engine Room Artificer,

awarded D.S.M., 122, 191
Hizen in the Pacific, 46, 72

Idzuma in the Pacific, 46, 72

Inde.\

--:.

Inflexible, a fine run by, 66

first shot in Falkland Islands
battle, 93

officers of, 217
InvincibU and Falkland Islands
battle, 93

damaged, 105, 106

joins Admiral Stoddart's squad-
ron, 66

lost in Jutland battle, 140

officers of, 215

J afan declares war, 13, 14
Japanese cruisers in the eastern
Pacific, 46

Karlsruhe, chase and escape of, 8

end of, 9, 62
Kent, anxiety regarding fate of,

'32

casualties on, 132

chases German cruisers, no

duel with Number g, 128

ensign of, 133

officers of, 219

opens fire on Leipzig, 114

sights Dresden, 164
Konigsberg blocked up and de-
stroyed, 12, 63
Kronprir.z Wilhelm, escape of, 8

internment of, 11

Lkatham. Captain E. La T., of

Defence, 26
Leighton, Chf. P.O. D., a D.S.M.

for, 191
Leipzig, a running fight by, 115
chase of, no
eludes her pursuers, 45
end of, no et seq., 118
joins von Spec's squadron, 7,45
on fire, 1 17

stories of survivors, 119
Life at sea in 1914, 28 et seq.
Lockyer, Lieut. - Commander

E. L. B., awarded D.S.O.,
'">
Luce, Captain John, of Glasgow,
21
and Falkland Islands battle,

"!, 'M
award' 1 I '. B., 1 ,1

■>n Coron< 1 nation,

>:-

martare, 105, no,

ionia conveya German pri-
soners, 139
officers of, 212

Magellan, Straits of, 161

Maltzhan, Baron von, 155

Martin, Ldg. Smn. F. S., awarded
D.S.M. , 191

Mas-a-Fuera, temporary head-
quarters of German squad-
ron, 71

Mayes, Sergt. Charles, brave deed
recognised, 129, 130, 190

MoCarten, E.-R. Artr. G. H. F.,
awarded D.S.M., 191

Mcra, voluntary internment of, 155

Merchant ships, increased enemy
sinkings of, 24

Mersey destroys Konigsberg, 12

Middleton, Chief Gunner Henry,
awarded D.S.C., 171

Monmouth in Coronel action, 53
loss of, 56
officers of, 2or-2

Murray, Lieut. -Com. J. Wolfe, pro-
motion for, 192

Napier, Captain W. R., of Edin-
burgh Castle, 26
Naval actions, tactics of modern,

5°
Navarro sunk by Orama, 63
Navy, the, life at sea, 28 et seq.

postal arrangements of, 32

work in wartime, 28-34
Newbolt, Sir Henry, on Admiral
Cradock, 58

on Falkland Islands battle, 135
Newcastle in the North Pacific, 72
Number g, chase of, no

duel with Kent, 128

joins von Spee's squadron, 6

sinking of, 131

sinks Monmouth, 56

Orama, officers of, 213

sinks a German storeship, 63
Otranto, officers of, 204

under enemy fire, 57

Pacific (Western), the, c.erman

squ.ulron in, 4

■ mberdnv trl >f, 21

il sunk at, '1

• .-. Internment of, 155

f'egasus, sinking of, 12

224 The Battle of the Falkland Islands

Phillimore, Captain R. F., of

Inflexible, 27
Port Stanley, arrival of Canofus:

the scene, 84
description of, 82
Port William, British squadron in,

85
Postal arrangements at sea, 32
Princess Royal in North American

waters, 155
Prinz Eitel Friedrich, internment

of, 10, 164
Professor Woermann, capture of, 24

Royal Naval Reserve, efficiency of,
132

Sailors, the psychology of, 141 et

sea.
Santa Isabel, sunk by Bristol, 92
Scharnhorst badly hit, 99, 100
good marksmanship of, 53
sinking of, 101
Segrave, Captain J. R., of

Orana, 21
Serajevo tragedy, the, 157
Severn and the end of Konigsberg,

12
Seydlitz, escape of, 123
Shark fishing as a pastime, 31
Shaw, Eng. Lieut.-Com. J. F.,

promotion for, 192
Skipwith, Captain H. L. d'E., of

Carnarvon, 24
Smith, Stoker John, a D.S.iM. for,

122, 191
Snowdon, Adt.-Chf. E.-R. Artr.R.,

a D.S.M. for, 191
South America {see America,

South)
Spee, Vice-Admiral Count von,
and his command, 4
aims and hopes of, 151 et seq.
contemplates seizure of Falk-

lands, 74, 75, 89, 119, 152
death of, 105

movements of his squadron, 67
policy of, considered and ana-
lysed^ 13-18

Spee, Vice-Admiral (cont.) :
refuses to drink a toast, 139
report on Coronel battle, 52

Stoddart, Rear-Admiral and a
rescued kinsman, 108
commands British squadron,

*59
reinforcements from England

for, 65
succeeds Admiral Cradock, 60
transfers his flag, 63
Sturdee, Vice-Admiral F. C. Dove-
ton, 27
a Baronetcy for, 191
dispatch on battle of Falkland

Islands, 178 et seq.
his strategic victory, 135
in command of British squad-
ron, 79, 80
ordered to Gibraltar, 159
Submarines purchased by Cana-
dian Government, 7
Suffolk chases Karlsruhe, 8
Sydney dn action with Etnden, n

Thompson, Lieut.-Com. W. A.,

promotion for, 192
Titania, enemy auxiliary cruiser, 6
Townsend, Stoker P.O. W. A.,

awarded D.iS.tM., 122, 191
Tsingtau, German base at, 4
Turner, Maj., commands Falkland

Island Volunteers, 86

Venning, Carpenter W. H.,
awarded D.S.C., 190

Verner, Lieut.-Com. R. H. C, pro-
motion for, 192

A., awarded

Walls, Carpenter T

D.S.C., 190
Walton, P.O. M. J.,

for, 191
Weeks, Engineer-Com.

motion for, 191
Wharton, Com., and

Nurnberg, 133
promotion for, 192
Wireless stations, German, 16

a D.-S.-M.
E. J., pro-
sinking of

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